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# THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

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PART I

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## ORIGINAL PAPERS

### THE PROBLEM OF PAUL MORPHY<sup>1</sup>

#### A CONTRIBUTION TO THE PSYCHO-ANALYSIS OF CHESS

BY

ERNEST JONES

Paul Morphy was born at New Orleans on June 22, 1837; he had a sister six and a half years older than himself, one two and a quarter years younger, and a brother two and a half years older.<sup>2</sup> His father was a Spaniard by nationality, but of Irish descent; his mother was of French extraction.

When Paul was ten years old his father, who was himself no mean player, taught him chess. In a year or two he proved himself the superior of his elder brother Edward, his father, his mother's father, and his father's brother who was at that time the chess king of New Orleans. A game is preserved which, according to an eye-witness, he is said to have played victoriously against his uncle on his twelfth birthday while blindfolded. At the same age he played against two masters of international renown who happened to be in New Orleans at the time. One of these was the famous French player Rousseau, with whom he played some fifty games, winning fully nine-tenths. The other was the Hungarian master Loewenthal, one of the half-dozen greatest living players; of the two games played the young Paul won one and the other was drawn. After this period little serious chess was played for some eight years while he was pursuing his studies; his

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<sup>1</sup> Read before the British Psycho-Analytical Society, November 19, 1930.

<sup>2</sup> As the dates of their birth are not given in any of the biographies I may usefully mention them here: Mahrina, February 5, 1830; Edward, December 26, 1834; Paul, June 22, 1837; Helena, October 21, 1839.



father allowed him to play occasionally on Sundays, but with the exception of Judge Meek, the President of the American Chess Congress, against whom he played and won six games when he was seventeen years old, he encountered only much inferior opponents. His uncle had by then left New Orleans for the West, Rousseau was otherwise absorbed, and Paul's brother, father and grandfather had abandoned chess when he was in the teens, so the statement that has been made is probably true that in these years he never met anyone to whom he could not give a rook, consequently no one from whose play he could learn anything. In 1851 the first International Chess Tournament had taken place, at which Anderssen emerged as victor, and in 1857, when Morphy was just twenty years old, one was held in New York. He easily gained the first place, losing only one game out of seventeen, and during his stay in New York played a hundred games with the best players there, losing only five of them. In circumstances which will engage our attention presently he visited London and Paris in the following year and his prodigious feats there read like a fairy tale. He not only defeated every champion he could induce to meet him, including Anderssen himself, but also gave several astounding exhibitions of simultaneous blindfold play against eight picked players, winning the large majority of the games. Towards the end of his stay in Paris he defeated blindfold the whole of the Versailles Chess Club playing in consultation. On his return to New Orleans he issued a challenge to play anyone in the world at odds. On receiving no response to this he declared his career as a chess-player—which had lasted barely eighteen months, comprising actually only six months of public play—finally and definitely closed.

Of the actual quality of Morphy's play we shall have something to say later, but for the moment it will suffice to say that many of the most competent judges have pronounced him to have been the greatest chess-player of all time. After his extraordinarily premature retirement he took up the practice of law, his father's profession, but although he possessed much skill in the work he was unsuccessful in practice. He gradually relapsed into a state of seclusion and introversion which culminated in unmistakable paranoia. At the age of forty-seven he died suddenly of 'congestion of the brain', presumably apoplexy, as his father had before him.

The evident problem arises of what relation, if any, his tragic neurosis bore to the supreme activities of his life, activities for which his name will always be remembered in the world of chess. It was



popularly believed that the excessive preoccupation had affected his brain, but his biographers, who were naturally chess enthusiasts and zealous for the credit of their beloved pursuit, asserted with conviction that this was in no way responsible. Nevertheless, with our present knowledge we should find it impossible to believe that there was not some intimate connection between the neurosis, which is necessarily concerned with the kernel of the personality, and the superb efforts of sublimation which have made Morphy's name immortal. In contemplating this problem let us begin with some reflections on the nature of the sublimation in question.

The slightest acquaintance with chess shows one that it is a play-substitute for the art of war and indeed it has been a favourite recreation of some of the greatest military leaders, from William the Conqueror to Napoleon. In the contest between the opposing armies the same principles of both strategy and tactics are displayed as in actual war, the same foresight and powers of calculation are necessary, the same capacity for divining the plans of the opponent, and the rigour with which decisions are followed by their consequences is, if anything, even more ruthless. More than that, it is plain that the unconscious motive actuating the players is not the mere love of pugnacity characteristic of all competitive games, but the grimmer one of father-murder. It is true that the original goal of capturing the king has been given up, but from the point of view of motive there is, except in respect of crudity, no appreciable change in the present goal of sterilizing him in immobility. The history of the game and the names for it are of confirmatory interest here. Authorities seem to be agreed that the game originated in India, passed from there to Persia, whose Arabian conquerors transmitted it to Europe nearly a thousand years ago. Its first name, from which all others are derived, was the Sanscrit one of *chaturanga*, literally four members. This was also the Indian word for 'army', probably because of the four components of elephants, chariots, horse and foot. The old Persians shortened the name from *chaturanga* to *chatrang* and their Arabian successors, having neither the initial nor the final sound of this word in their language, modified it into *shatranj*. When it re-emerged into later Persian the unconscious must have been at work, for it had by then been shortened to *Schah*, an assimilation having evidently taken place with the Persian *Shah* = King; 'chess' thus means the royal game, or the game of kings. *Shah-mat*, our 'checkmate', German 'Schachmatt', French 'échec et mat', means literally 'the king is dead'. At least so the Arabian

writers on chess thought, and most European authors copy them in this. Modern Orientalists, however, are of opinion that the word 'mat' is of Persian, and not of Arabian, origin, and that 'Shah-mat' means 'the king is paralysed, helpless and defeated'. Again from the point of view of the king it makes very little difference.

In the Middle Ages an interesting innovation was introduced into the rules of chess which deserves incidental mention. By the side of the king stands another piece who was originally his counsellor, Persian *firz* (Turkish *vizier*). As his main occupation was supposed to be, not fighting, but advising and defending, he was in action the weakest piece on the board, his only move being one square diagonally. In the Middle Ages he gradually changed his sex, thus passing through the same evolution as the Holy Ghost, and came to be known as the regina, dame, queen, and so on. It is not known why this happened. It was suggested by Freret, an eighteenth-century writer on chess, that a confusion must have arisen between the words 'fierge', the French for *firz*, and 'vierge'. It has more generally been thought that as this used to be the only piece for which a pawn could be exchanged on reaching the eighth square, when it was sometimes called 'un pion damé', this circumstance led to its being given the same name as the French one for draughts, i.e. *dames*. About the middle of the fifteenth century this change in sex was followed by a great increase in power, so that the piece is now stronger than any other two together. Whatever may be the truth, therefore, about the linguistic speculations I have just mentioned, it will not surprise the psycho-analyst when he learns the effect of the change: it is that in attacking the father the most potent assistance is afforded by the mother (= queen).

It is perhaps worth remarking further that the mathematical quality of the game gives it a peculiarly anal-sadistic nature. The exquisite purity and exactness of the right moves,<sup>3</sup> particularly in problem work, combine here with the unrelenting pressure exercised in the later stages which culminates in the merciless *dénouement*. The sense of overwhelming mastery on the one side matches that of unescapable helplessness on the other. It is doubtless this anal-sadistic feature that makes the game so well adapted to gratify at the same time both the homosexual and the antagonistic aspects of the son-father contest. In these circumstances it will be understood that a serious match places a

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<sup>3</sup> Chess may well be called the art of the intellect.



considerable strain on the psychical integrity and is likely to reveal any imperfections of character development. All games are apt at times to be marred by unsportsmanlike behaviour, i.e. by the sublimation undergoing a regression to its asocial origins, but with chess the strain is exceptionally great and is complicated by the circumstance that a specially high standard of correct demeanour is exacted.

It is interesting to compare with these psychological considerations some historical data on the way in which the game has been variously received by religious authorities. Van der Linde and Murray, the two greatest authorities on the history of chess, discuss sympathetically the Indian tradition that the game was invented by the Buddhists. It is certainly suggestive that the first mention of it occurs in connection with a stronghold of Buddhists. According to their ideas, war and the slaying of one's fellow-men, for any purpose whatever, is criminal, and the punishment of the warrior in the next world will be much worse than that of the simple murderer; hence—so runs the story—they invented chess as a substitute for war. In this they would appear to have anticipated William James' suggestion of providing war-like substitutes, one quite in accord with the psycho-analytical doctrine of the displacement of affects. In a similar vein St. J. G. Scott narrates a Burmese story to the effect that chess was invented by a Talaing queen who was passing fond of her lord and hoped by this distraction to keep him out of war. Ambivalence runs through the whole story, however, for the view has also been put forward that chess was invented by a Chinese mandarin, Han-sing, who wanted to amuse his soldiers when in winter quarters. A Ceylon legend has it that the game was invented by Ravan, the wife of the King of Lanka, in order to distract that monarch when his metropolis was being besieged. On the other hand, about the year 1000, a puritanical regent of Egypt usually known as Mansar issued an edict forbidding chess. In mediæval times chess became widely popular and the ecclesiastical attitude towards it appears to have been mainly negative. The statutes of the church of Elna, for example, lay down that clergy indulging in chess shall be *ipso facto* excommunicated. At the end of the twelfth century the Bishop of Paris forbade the clergy even to have a chess-board in their house, in 1212 the Council of Paris condemned it utterly, and some forty years later St. Louis, the pious King of France, imposed a fine on whoever should play the game. John Huss, when in prison, deplored having played at chess and thereby run the risk of being subject to violent passions.

In returning to the problem of Paul Morphy I shall begin with giving some description of his personal attributes and the characteristics of his play. In appearance he was small, only five foot four in height, with preternaturally small hands and feet, a slim, graceful figure and a 'face like a young girl in her teens' (F. M. Edge). Falkbeer, who knew him, observed that he appeared younger than he really was, adding 'One would certainly have taken him rather for a schoolboy on his vacation than for a chess adept who had crossed the Atlantic for the express purpose of defeating, one after another, the most eminent players the world then knew.' He had a very pleasing manner and a delightful smile. His demeanour was strikingly modest. On only two occasions was he known to invite anyone to play with him, and with an uncanny intuition he chose for these exceptions the two men, Staunton and Harrwitz, who were to exercise such a baleful influence on his life. He bore himself, even in the unpleasant controversy we shall presently relate, with the greatest courtesy and dignity. While playing he was very impassive, with his eyes fixed steadfastly on the board; opponents got to know that whenever he looked up, which he did without any exultation, it meant he could foresee the inevitable end. His patience seemed inexhaustible; Edge, his first biographer, records having watched the famous Paulsen spend an hour or two over a single move while Morphy sat calmly looking on without the slightest movement of uneasiness. He seemed insensitive to fatigue and I will recall a story which illustrates his powers of endurance as well as two other features: his astounding memory—which, incidentally, he possessed also for music—and his capacity for sensorial imagery, a quality which links chess players with musicians and mathematicians. It is narrated by Edge, who was at the time acting as his secretary, and concerns an exhibition he was giving when just twenty-one at the Café de la Régence in Paris, then the Mecca of chess players from all over the world. He played blindfold eight games simultaneously against powerful opponents who, incidentally, were freely helped by advice from a crowd of expert players. It was seven hours before the first of them was defeated and the match lasted ten consecutive hours, during the whole of which time Morphy abstained from taking either food or even water. At the close there was a scene of terrific excitement, and Morphy had the greatest difficulty in extricating himself from the ovation in the streets and escaping to his hotel. There he slept well, but at seven in the morning he called his secretary and dictated to him every move in all the games, at the same time dis-



cussing with him the possible consequences of hundreds of hypothetical variations. It will be agreed that only a mind working with exceptional ease could have accomplished such an astounding feat. Nor was it an isolated achievement sustained by excitement. There are few more exhausting occupations than serious chess, and the number of those who can continue for more than three or four hours on end without feeling the strain is not very great. Yet Morphy has been known to play continuously from nine in the morning until midnight on many successive days without his play weakening in the least and without his showing any signs of fatigue. In psycho-analytical terms this must signify a very exceptional level of sublimation, for a psychological situation of such a degree of freedom can only mean that there is no risk of its stimulating any unconscious conflict or guilt.

It is not easy to describe Morphy's qualities as a player in other than general terms without presupposing a knowledge of chess technique. I hope that the generalizations I shall venture on will be in some measure trustworthy; we possess, at all events, ample data on which to found generalizations, for there survive some four hundred of Morphy's games and an extensive literature has grown up of critical comments subsequent authorities have made on the individual moves.

To begin with, there are different styles of chess which depend partly on the temperament and aim of the player and partly on the conditions under which he is playing. Speaking very roughly, it depends on whether one sets more store on winning or on not losing. In tournaments, for instance, where defeats are heavily penalized it may pay to aim at a few victories and a number of draws rather than at more victories but more defeats. The two extremes are represented by a slashing, but risky attack on the one hand and a tediously defensive stonewalling on the other. Naturally the ideal player combines the best from each attitude. He spends some time in fortifying his army, not so much for defensive reasons as to get them into the strongest position from which to deliver an attack. A player may excel in either of these activities, or his fortifying may have an almost purely defensive aim in which any opportunity for an attack comes rather as a piece of luck. In chess there are—if we omit the recent 'hyper-modern' play—two well-known styles, known as the combinational and the positional, which are sometimes said to correspond with the romantic and the classical temperaments respectively. At the period we are concerned with, about the middle of the last century, only the former existed and, indeed, the latter is essentially the product



of the last fifty years. The main difference between the two methods, at least in its extreme form, may be likened to that between a cleverly designed attack in battle and a steady siege. The aim of the combinational method is to plan a skilful grouping of pieces to make a co-ordinated onslaught on the king, whereas that of the positional method is the more cautious—but in the end sounder—one of gradually building up a fortified position and taking advantage of the slightest weakness in the opponent's position, wherever this may happen to be.

Now Morphy certainly possessed in the highest degree the gifts necessary for a master of combinational play, those of foresight, calculation and power of divining his opponent's intentions. Some of his games are masterpieces in this respect which have rarely been equalled and indeed the popular impression of his style among chess-players is that of vehement and victorious onslaught. One would therefore have anticipated with assurance that someone possessing such gifts, and whose brilliant performances were at such an early age, would have owed his success to an unusual genius in the qualities of intuition and adventurousness that might naturally be expected to appeal to youth. Yet the interesting thing is, and one that throws a good deal of light on Morphy's psychology, that he passed beyond this style and, in fact, ranks as the first pioneer of positional play—though it was Steinitz who later developed the principles of it. It was a fortunate coincidence that the only player in history whose genius in combinational play has equalled Morphy's was not only just at that time at the height of his career, but actually met Morphy in combat : I refer to Anderssen, till that moment the foremost player of the day and virtually the world's champion—though this title was not formally employed till a decade later. Murray says of the two men : ' Both were players of rare imaginative gifts, and their play has never been equalled for brilliancy of style, beauty of conception, and depth of design. In Morphy these qualities blazed forth from sheer natural genius ; in Anderssen they were the result of long practice and study '. Reti, in his *Modern Ideas in Chess*, has instructively explained that Morphy's famous victory over Anderssen was due, not to greater brilliance in the sense just indicated, but to his establishing the method of brilliance on a basis of the more mature positional play. It must have been a memorable scene to witness this slim youth overpowering the huge, burly Teuton of forty, not in the traditional fashion of the young hero overcoming a giant by more audacious imagination—for in this quality they were equally matched and equally unsurpassable—



but by more mature depth of understanding. The interest of this observation for our purpose is the indication it gives that in Morphy's mind chess must have signified a fully adult activity, and success in it the serious occupation of a man rather than the rebellious ambition of a boy. I shall submit later that being shaken in this matter was one of the factors that led to his mental catastrophe.

Morphy was master of all aspects of the game in such a high degree, and was so free of mannerisms and individual peculiarities of style, that it is not easy to single out any particular characteristics. Chess, it is true, like all other games, is replete with unconscious symbolism. One could, for instance, comment on the skill he showed in attacking the king from behind or in separating the opposing king and queen ; the latter, by the way, is illustrated in the first of his games ever recorded, which was played against his own father. But such details are not to our purpose, for pre-eminence in chess depends on a broad synthesis of exceptional qualities rather than on skill in any particular device or method. Careful consideration of the whole of Morphy's manner of play yields, I think, the indubitable conclusion that the outstanding characteristic he exhibited in it was an almost unbelievably supreme *confidence*. He knew, as though it was a simple fact of nature, that he was bound to win, and he quietly acted on this knowledge. When the Americans who had seen him play prophesied that on meeting any European champion he would, in the manner of Raphael, ' bring the sweat into that brow of his ', chess players in Europe scoffed at the prediction as mere American bombast, and the only question in their minds was whether it was worth their leaders' while to play such a youngster. To anyone who knows what years of assiduous practice and rich experience go to attaining any degree of prowess in chess nothing could seem more utterly unlikely than that a beginner embarking on this arduous path, as Paul Morphy was, should have the career he actually did on reaching Europe. Yet before he left his native town he calmly predicted his coming victories with the completest assurance. Such presumption might reasonably be regarded as megalomania were it not for the awkward fact that it was justified. On his return home, far from being flushed with pride, he remarked that he had not done so well as he should have, and in a sense this also was true, for when playing on a few occasions in a state of indisposition he was guilty of some weak moves that fell below his usual standard of play and even cost him a few games. It is not surprising that endowed with such confidence in his powers his play was marked by a boldness and even

audacity in his moves that give at first the impression of being over-adventurous, and perhaps even of hazarding risks, until one perceives the sureness of the calculation behind them. His intrepidity was naturally more manifest when he had to do with relatively inferior players. Here he could behave with apparent recklessness, extravagantly flinging away one after another of his pieces until with an unsuspected movement his small remaining force would suddenly deliver the *coup de grâce*; on one such occasion he achieved the extraordinary feat of effecting a mate by simply castling. His boldness and his sense of how important position is in chess playing are shown in two other characteristics for which he is well known: the extent to which he appreciated the value of developing the pieces early and continuously, and his willingness to make sacrifices to gain a better position. There is a story, perhaps apocryphal, that when he was a child he was so eager to bring his pieces forward that he regarded his pawns as a nuisance to be got rid of as soon as possible: how different from the great Philidor, who had declared pawns to be the very soul of chess! It is at all events quite fitting that the name 'Morphy opening' in chess has been attached to the following device. What is called the Muzio opening is characterized by a bold attack in which a knight is sacrificed in the fifth move so as to obtain what is believed to be a commensurate advantage in position. In the Morphy opening the same tactics are followed up by sacrificing a bishop also, so that it is sometimes known by the name of 'double Muzio'. Very few people indeed are to be found confident enough of their attack to be able to risk such grave initial losses. Even the defence named after him, the Morphy defence to the Ruy Lopez opening, one which is so valuable as to have been elaborated since into some twenty named variations, is the most aggressive of the manifold defences to this opening.

With Morphy chess sense, if one may use such an expression, was far more innate than acquired. He had read a good deal, but gave away the book as soon as he had looked through it. He said himself that no author had been of much value to him, and that 'he was astonished at finding various positions and solutions given as novel—certain moves producing certain results, etc., for that he had made the same deductions himself, as necessary consequences' (Edge). MacDonnell, who watched his play in London, wrote later of it in his *Chess Life-Pictures*: 'I fancy he always discerned the right move at a glance, and only paused before making it partly out of respect for



his antagonist and partly to certify himself of its correctness, to make assurance doubly sure, and to accustom himself to sobriety of demeanour in all circumstances'. The following story raises the whole question of the method employed in mental calculation. In the famous seventeenth move in the Four Knights' game played with Paulsen on November 8, 1857, Morphy offered to exchange his queen for his opponent's bishop. Paulsen was naturally suspicious of a trap and carefully investigated the possibilities. After pondering on the situation for more than an hour, and detecting no trap, he accepted the offer and after eleven more moves had to resign. Years afterwards Steinitz carried out a full analysis of the situation and maintained as a result of it that the future possibilities in the game were far too numerous and complicated for it to be conceivable that any human brain could calculate and predict them. It so happened that an onlooker had asked Morphy after the game was over whether he had been able to foresee the end of it from his famous move; to the question he returned the enigmatic answer: 'I knew it would give Paulsen a deal of trouble'. Steinitz was doubtless right in his conclusion so far as consciousness is concerned, but one wonders whether the so-called intuitive chess sense does not imply a special power of pre-conscious calculation. The experiments Milne Bramwell carried out showed that the subconscious capacity for arithmetical calculation, as tested in hypnosis, far exceeds the conscious capacity, and the same may well hold good for the computation of chess moves.

We may take it that this remarkable combination of capacity and confidence could not occur unless it was a direct representative of the main stream of the libido and was providing the best possible solution of any conflicts in the deepest trends of the personality. It follows that anything interfering with such an indispensable expression of the personality would be likely gravely to endanger its integrity, and so indeed events proved. Our knowledge of the unconscious motivation of chess-playing tells us that what it represented could only have been the wish to overcome the father in an acceptable way. For Morphy the conditions necessary for its acceptability were essentially three: that the act in question should be received in a friendly manner; that it should be ascribed to worthy motives; and that it should be regarded as a serious and grown-up activity. We shall see that each of these conditions was grossly violated on his fateful visit to Europe and shall try to trace the mental consequences of this. It is no doubt significant that Morphy's soaring odyssey into the higher realms of chess began

just a year after the—unexpectedly sudden—death of his father,<sup>4</sup> which had been a great shock to him, and we may surmise that his brilliant effort of sublimation was, like Shakespeare's *Hamlet* and Freud's *Traumdeutung*, a reaction to this critical event.

I shall now consider the critical period of Morphy's life in more detail, and for this purpose shall find it necessary in the first place to introduce to those of you who are not conversant with the history of chess some of the most prominent figures of the day in that world. Six of these need to be mentioned in this context : four of them became friendly admirers of Morphy, the other two set him a psychological problem to which he was not equal.

First in order of time was Loewenthal, whom Morphy had already successfully encountered when a child. Loewenthal had made further progress since then and in the Birmingham Tournament that took place during Morphy's visit to England, in which the latter did not participate, he won the first place, although both Staunton and St. Amant were also competitors. In a match arranged between the two Morphy decisively beat him, and Loewenthal became a firm friend and admirer, taking his side in the unfortunate controversy to which we shall presently have to refer. He foretold that after Morphy's games were published—a task which he himself successfully undertook later—the chess world would rank him above all other players, living or dead. The stakes in the Loewenthal match were £100, and after winning Morphy immediately presented Loewenthal with some furniture costing £120 for a new house he was taking. We shall repeatedly have occasion to note how fastidious Morphy was over the subject of money. Before he left America, for instance, when the New Orleans Chess Club offered to subscribe money to enable him to participate in the Birmingham tournament, he had refused—not wishing to travel as a professional chess-player. Next comes Paulsen, an American, famous at that time for his amazing exhibitions in blindfold chess and later for winning two matches against Anderssen as well as for his important contributions to chess theory. He was Morphy's only serious rival at the New York tournament and from reading a couple of his published games he predicted on that occasion that Morphy would beat him ; just before the tournament they played three games blindfold, of which Morphy won two and drew one. Paulsen also became a devoted friend of Morphy's. St. Amant was at that time the foremost player in France.

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<sup>4</sup> This occurred on November 22, 1856.



He did not play any single-handed games with Morphy, but lost five and drew two of seven consultation games against him. He also became a fervent admirer, and said of his blindfold play that it was enough to make the bones of Philidor and La Bourdonnais rattle in their grave, without doubt the handsomest compliment a Frenchman could pay. The genial Anderssen we have already met. He was the best player living and was generally recognized to be the world's champion until his defeat by Steinitz some years later; he obtained a prize at each of the twelve tournaments he took part in and won the first place in seven of them. Mongredien, the president of the London Chess Club, said of him that he was 'except Morphy, the most splendid and chivalrous player whom I ever encountered', and his treatment of Morphy certainly confirms this estimate of him. Although his colleagues brought the greatest possible pressure to bear to prevent his impairing German prestige by going abroad to play a match with a youngster of no official standing, and in spite of his having no opportunity to practise beforehand, Anderssen made no excuses but travelled to Paris to meet his fate at Morphy's hands. Reproached afterwards for not having played so brilliantly as he had in his famous match with Dufresne, he made the generous rejoinder, 'No, Morphy wouldn't let me'.

Morphy's relations with these four men contrast sadly with his experiences of the two who will next concern us. Of these the more important was Staunton, and to explain his significance for Morphy a word must be said about the position he occupied. He was a man with a greater prestige than his tournament record would lead one to suppose. It is true that by his victory over St. Amant, Horwitz and Harrwitz in the 'forties he could claim to be considered the leading player in the world, but he was not able to sustain this position, being beaten, for instance, in the London tournament of 1851 and the Birmingham one of 1858. He was, however, a great analyst; and the standard text-book that he wrote, together with his position as one of the first chess editors, made him the *doyen* of the English, if not of the European, chess world. In the middle of the last century England was easily paramount in chess, and perhaps this contributed to the reasons that made Morphy select Staunton as the antagonist he most wanted to meet; it was the wish to play against Staunton that was his main motive in crossing the Atlantic. In psycho-analytical language we may say that Staunton was the supreme father *imago* and that Morphy made the overcoming of him the test case of his capacity to play chess,

and unconsciously of much else besides. A piece of evidence is extant which goes to show that this choice of father *imago* was far from being a recent one. At the age of fifteen Morphy had been presented with a copy of the games played at the first International Tournament of 1851, of which Staunton was the secretary. He took it on himself to write on the title page: 'By H. Staunton, Esq., author of the *Handbook of Chess, Chess-Player's Companion*, etc. (and some devilish bad games)'. After Morphy's victory at the New York tournament some enthusiasts mooted the possibility of a European champion coming to America to play him. On hearing of this Staunton published a deprecatory paragraph in his weekly chess column and remarked that 'the best players in Europe are not chess professionals but have other and more serious avocations'. To hint that Morphy's chess was either a juvenile pastime or else a means of making money were innuendoes that must have wounded him to the quick, for there is ample evidence that he was morbidly sensitive to either suggestion. His New Orleans friends nevertheless issued a challenge to Staunton to come to America, which he not unnaturally refused, dropping, however, a broad hint that Morphy would find him at his disposal were he to come to Europe. Morphy crossed four months later and on being introduced to Staunton at once asked him for a game. Staunton pleaded an engagement and followed this by a course of such ungentlemanly behaviour as to be explicable only on the score of neurotic apprehension; it was in fact said of him that he suffered from what was called 'nervous irritability'. For three months, during his stay in England and after, Morphy endeavoured in the most dignified manner to arrange a match, to which Staunton responded by a series of evasions, postponements, broken promises and pretexts that his brain 'was overtaxed by more important pursuits'—not that the latter prevented him from participating in the Birmingham Tournament in the very same month. Foiled in his hopes Morphy laid the whole matter before Lord Lyttelton, the President of the British Chess Association, who made a sympathetic reply, and the matter rested at that. During this time, however, Staunton kept up in his chess column a steady fire of criticism of the man he avoided meeting, depreciating his play, hinting that he was a monetary adventurer, and so on. One sentence may be quoted from Morphy's final letter to him: 'Permit me to repeat what I have invariably declared in every chess community I have had the honor of entering, that I am not a professional player—that I never wished to make any skill I possess



the means of pecuniary advancement'.<sup>5</sup> The whole episode led to an acrimonious wrangle in the chess world in which the large majority supported Morphy, and subsequent opinion almost unanimously regards Staunton's behaviour as totally unworthy of him. The effect on Morphy was immediate, and it showed itself in a strong revulsion against chess. As Sergeant, Morphy's latest and best biographer, writes, 'Morphy sickened of chess tactics—off the board. Is there any wonder?'

Towards the end of this episode Morphy crossed to Paris, where he at once approached Harrwitz, *le roi de la Régence*. This gentleman also does not appear in an amiable light in his dealings with Morphy, which were marked by morbid vanity and a total lack of chivalry (Sergeant). We need not go into the sordid details, which have been fully described by Edge, but the upshot was that Harrwitz withdrew from the match when he was being decisively beaten. Morphy at first refused to accept the stake, a sum of 290 francs, but on its being represented to him that other people would lose money unless his victory was officially sealed in this way he assented, but devoted the sum towards defraying Anderssen's travelling expenses to Paris. Morphy's neurosis increased after this, and it was only temporarily abrogated by the pleasant episode of the match with Anderssen, the final flare-up of his chess fever.

Something should now be said about the reception Morphy's successes met with, for they were of such a kind as to raise the question whether his subsequent collapse may not have been influenced through his perhaps belonging to the type that Freud has described under the name of *Die am Erfolge scheitern* ('Those wrecked by success'). I alluded earlier to the scene at the Café de la Régence on the occasion of the brilliant *tour de force* when Morphy successfully encountered eight strong players at once when blindfold; it was so tumultuous that soldiers ran up in the expectation that there was another revolution. Morphy became the lion of Parisian society, was entertained everywhere, politely allowed himself to be defeated at chess by duchesses and princesses, and finally left France in a blaze of glory, the culmination of which was a banquet at which his bust, made by a famous sculptor, was presented crowned with a laurel wreath. His reception on his return to New York, where patriotic fervour was added to the other enthusiasms, may well be imagined. It was widely felt that this was

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<sup>5</sup> F. M. Edge: *Exploits and Triumphs of Paul Morphy*, 1859.



the first time in history in which an American had proved himself, not merely the equal, but the superior of any representative in his field drawn from the older countries, so that Morphy had added a cubit to the stature of American civilization. In the presence of a great assembly in the chapel of the University he was presented with a testimonial consisting of a chess-board with mother-of-pearl and ebony squares and a set of men in gold and silver; he also received a gold watch, on which coloured chess-pieces took the place of the numerals. An incident that occurred at this presentation may be mentioned as illustrating Morphy's sensitiveness. Colonel Mead, the chairman of the reception committee, alluded in his speech to chess as a profession, and referred to Morphy as its most brilliant exponent. 'Morphy took exception to be characterized as a professional player, even by implication, and he resented it in such a way as to overwhelm Colonel Mead with confusion. Such was his mortification at this untoward event that Colonel Mead withdrew from further participation in the Morphy demonstration' (Buck). At the Union Club of New York he was presented with a silver wreath of laurels. He then proceeded to Boston, where a banquet was given in his honour at which were present, among others, Agassiz, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Longfellow and Lowell; in a speech at this banquet Quincey made the witty remark: 'Morphy is greater than Cæsar, because he came and without seeing conquered'. Shortly after this he was presented with a golden crown in Boston.

Adulation of this degree showered on a young man of twenty-one inevitably imposes a severe strain on his mental integrity, and one may well ask whether it did not play some part in the tragedy that followed. In this connection I should like to quote an interesting passage from the obituary notice written years later by Morphy's boyhood friend Maurian. Maurian ascribes the revulsion against chess—which, by the way, he does not associate with the subsequent mental derangement—to the completeness of Morphy's success, but in quite the opposite sense to that we have just indicated. He writes: 'Paul Morphy was never so passionately fond, so inordinately devoted to chess as is generally believed. An intimate acquaintance and long observation enables us to state this positively. His only devotion to the game, if it may be so termed, lay in his ambition to meet and to defeat the best players and great masters of this country and of Europe. He felt his enormous strength, and never for a moment doubted the outcome. Indeed, before his first departure for Europe he privately and modestly, yet with perfect confidence, predicted to us



his certain success, and when he returned he expressed the conviction that he had played poorly, rashly—that none of his opponents should have done so well as they did against him. But, this one ambition satisfied, he appeared to have lost all interest in the game’.

Before attempting to answer the question just raised I think it well to finish the story itself and give some account of the later mental developments. On settling down in New Orleans Morphy’s intention was to devote himself to the profession of law, of which he had an excellent knowledge. He found, however, that his now unwelcome fame as a chess player prevented people from taking him seriously as a lawyer, and this injustice preyed greatly on his mind. Buck, who had the assistance of Morphy’s relatives in compiling the story of his later years, states that ‘he became enamoured of a wealthy and handsome young lady in New Orleans and informed a mutual friend of the fact, who broached the subject to the lady; but she scorned the idea of marrying “a mere chess-player”’.

Within a year or two of his establishing himself in what he intended to be his serious permanent profession the Civil War broke out and Morphy was faced with the prospect of a real war interfering with his endeavour to substitute a peaceful occupation for his pastime of mock war.<sup>6</sup> His reaction was characteristic of the man who had built his mental integrity on converting hostile intentions into friendly ones—he hastened to Richmond, and in the midst of hostilities applied for a *diplomatic* appointment. This was refused and soon after his return to New Orleans, his mother-town, it was captured by the Federal enemy. The Morphy family fled on a Spanish warship to Cuba, thence to Havana, Cadiz and Paris. He spent a year in Paris and then returned to Havana until the war was over.

Already at that time his mental state could not have been at all satisfactory, for within a couple of years of returning to New Orleans his mother persuaded him to spend eighteen months in Paris, his third visit there, in the hope that the change of environment would restore him. His aversion to chess was by now so complete that he did not go near the scenes of his former triumphs.

Before long there manifested itself unmistakable evidence of

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<sup>6</sup> In the discussion of this paper Dr. Bryan and Miss Searl attached great importance to the effect of this episode on Morphy’s mind, and I am inclined to agree with them; it may even have been the precipitating cause of the psychosis, as the London experiences certainly were of the neurosis.

paranoia. He imagined himself persecuted by people who wished to render his life intolerable. His delusions centred on the husband of his elder sister, the administrator of his father's estate, who he believed was trying to rob him of his patrimony. He challenged him to a duel and then brought a law-suit against him, spending his time for years in preparing his case ; in court it was easily shewn that his accusations were quite baseless. He also thought that people, particularly his brother-in-law, were trying to poison him, and for a time refused to take food except at the hands of his mother or his (younger, unmarried) sister. Another delusion was that his brother-in-law and an intimate friend, Binder, were conspiring to destroy his clothes, of which he was very vain, and to kill him ; on one occasion he called in the latter's office and unexpectedly assaulted him. He was given to stopping and staring at every pretty face in the street, which I should ascribe to feminine identification. He was also passionately fond of flowers. I will quote one habit from this time, on which, however, I am unable to throw any light. During a certain period, according to his niece's account, he had a mania for striding up and down the verandah declaiming the following words : ' Il plantera la bannière de Castille sur les murs de Madrid au cri de Ville gagnée, et le petit Roi s'en ira tout penaud '. It sounds like a quotation, but if so I have not been able to trace it, nor can I explain the allusion. His mode of life was to take a walk every day, punctually at noon and most scrupulously attired, after which he would retire again until the evening when he would set out for the opera, never missing a single performance. He would see no one except his mother, and grew angry if she ventured to invite even intimates to the house. Two years before his death he was approached for his permission to include his life in a projected biographical work on famous Louisianians. He sent an indignant reply, in which he stated that his father, Judge Alonzo Morphy, of the High Court of Louisiana, had left at his death the sum of 146,162 dollars and 54 cents, while he himself had followed no profession and had nothing to do with biography. His talk was constantly of his father's fortune, and the mere mention of chess was usually sufficient to irritate him.

The problem we have set ourselves at the outset is what relation did Morphy's chess career bear to his later mental disorder ? Sergeant is at pains to demonstrate that mere preoccupation with chess could not be held responsible, and every medical and psychological expert can only confirm this opinion. His summary of the pathogeny of the



disorder is so clear as to merit full quotation. ' Firstly, Morphy had some reason to be disgusted with, not chess, but chess-masters, whom he found of a very different character from himself. He set out, very young, generous, and high-spirited, recognizing, as he said himself, no incentive but reputation, and met not fellow-knights but tortuous acrobats of the pen, slingers of mud, and chess-sharpers. Granted he also met very decent gentlemen such as Anderssen, Löwenthal, and the majority of the leading amateurs in London and Paris. But the mean wounds inflicted by the other sort did not readily heal. Secondly, he always kept himself pure from any taint (as he rightly or wrongly imagined it to be) of professionalism in chess, yet was constantly being, if not called, at least looked on as a professional. And, lastly, he was ambitious in the career he had chosen for himself in life, and, failing in that through an unfortunate combination of circumstances, laid the blame upon chess. The disappointed ambition was assuredly a cause of Morphy's sad fate. . . . A super-sensitive nature like his was ill-fitted to stand such trials '. How much Morphy strove to conceal his wound from himself may be seen from the following passage from his speech at the presentation made to him on his return to New York : ' Of my European tour, I will only say that it has been pleasant in almost every respect. Of all the adversaries encountered in the peaceful jousts of the checkered field, I retain a lively and agreeable recollection. I found them gallant, chivalrous and gentlemanly, as well as true votaries of the kingly pastime '.

Let me put the problem in another way. Was Morphy's mental derangement brought on by his very success or by his failure and disappointment ? Was his situation that of Browning's *Pictor Ignotus*, from whom the approach of supreme fame brought forth the cry :

' The thought grew frightful, 'twas so wildly dear ! ' ?

Did he say to himself, like Andrea :

' Too live the life grew, golden and not grey,  
And I'm the weak-eyed bat no sun should tempt  
Out of the grange whose four walls make his world.'

Did he withdraw from the world with the disdainful consolation :

' At least no merchant traffics in my heart ' ?

Couched in more psychological language, was Morphy affrighted at his own presumptuousness when the light of publicity was thrown on it ? Freud has pointed out that the people who break under the strain of

too great success do so because they can endure it only in imagination, not in reality. To castrate the father in a dream is a very different matter from doing it in reality. The real situation provokes the unconscious guilt in its full force, and the penalty may be mental collapse.

I do not think the full explanation can lie here. We have to remember that in the aim most vital to Morphy he had not succeeded, but failed. We have seen how Staunton must have been to him the arch *imago*, and he had not managed to bring him to book. It was all very well to have shewn himself to be the best player in the world, with a good presumption that he could have defeated Staunton also. But the cold fact remains that this arch-opponent eluded him. The dreaded father was not merely still at large, but had himself shown signs of unmistakable hostility. Morphy's aim had miscarried of dealing with his repressed hostility towards his father—and the fear of his father's towards him—by converting this into a friendly homosexual encounter. The following consideration gives, I think, a hint that Morphy himself was partly conscious of the failure of his aim. When he returned to New York he declared he would not play any American again except at odds, and this was doubtless justified in the circumstances. But when, a few weeks later, he reached the safety of his home in New Orleans he issued a challenge to play anyone in the world at odds of pawn and move, the only instance in his whole chess career of his probably over-estimating his powers.<sup>7</sup> I read this as indicating a psychological compensation for the underlying sense of having failed, and the anxiety this must have stirred in his unconscious.

There was, however, more than this. When Staunton eluded him he did so in a way that must have suggested to a sensitive person, as Morphy assuredly was, that his aim was a disreputable one. We know that mental integrity rests essentially on moral integrity, that mental stability can exist only so long as there is guiltlessness. It is impossible that Morphy could have displayed the capacities he did had not his gifts and mental functioning been free to be wholly concentrated on the tasks he set them. But this was so only as long as he could be relieved from any possibility of the counter-forces in his unconscious being stirred. He was at the mercy of anything that might do this. I have

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<sup>7</sup> Against this, I admit, the fact might be brought forward that no less a master than Saint-Amant had maintained that 'Paul Morphy must in future give odds to every opponent.'



pointed out earlier how abnormally sensitive he was to any hint that his aims might not be received in a friendly manner, i.e. that they might be treated as if they were unfriendly themselves ; to any suggestion that they did not proceed from the purest incentives, and particularly to the possibility of their being tainted by mercenary motives ; and to any attitude that betrayed disdain for their juvenile nature.<sup>8</sup> Staunton bitterly wounded him in each of these three respects. His treatment of him was certainly the reverse of friendly—it is hardly an exaggeration to call it scurrilous ; he practically accused him of being a penniless adventurer ; and he finally avoided him on the plea that he had more serious, i.e. grown-up, matters to attend to. In the face of these accusations Morphy's heart failed him, he succumbed and abandoned the wicked path of his chess career. It was as if the father had unmasked his evil intentions and was now adopting a similarly hostile attitude towards him in turn. What had appeared to be an innocent and laudable expression of his personality was now being shewn to be actuated by the most childish and ignoble of wishes, the unconscious impulses to commit a sexual assault on the father and at the same time to maim him utterly : in short, to 'mate' him in both the English and the Persian senses of that word. Obedient to his actual father's wishes he now engaged in the grown-up profession of law and discarded what he had been told was the childish pre-occupation of chess.<sup>9</sup> But it was too late : his 'sins' pursued him. In the two things that comprise manhood, a serious career among men and the love of women, his chess past dogged and thwarted him. He was

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<sup>8</sup> How beautifully Morphy 'moralized' the pastime may be observed in the following passage from the speech already cited : 'It is not only the most delightful and scientific, but the most moral of amusements. Unlike other games in which lucre is the end and aim of the contestants, it recommends itself to the wise, by the fact that its mimic battles are fought for no prize nor honour. It is eminently and emphatically the philosopher's game. Let the Chess board supersede the card table and a great improvement will be visible in the morals of the community.'

<sup>9</sup> To quote again from the speech mentioned above : 'Chess never has been and never can be aught but a recreation. It should not be indulged in to the detriment of other and more serious avocations—should not absorb or engross the thoughts of those who worship at its shrine, but should be kept in the background, and restrained within its proper provinces. As a mere game, a relaxation from the severe pursuits of life, it is deserving of high commendations.'

never able to escape from the 'sins' of youth and to take his place among the world of men. Little wonder that his abandonment of chess became increasingly complete, until he loathed the very name of it. The only recourse left to him in attempting to deal with his burden of guilt was to project it. In the delusions of being poisoned and robbed we recognize the oral- and anal-sadistic phantasies projected on to his sister's husband. His homosexual friendliness to men had broken down, and the antagonism underlying it lay exposed. This emerged in the direction of his brother-in-law, evidently a substitute for his brother, while the last anecdote of his life related above, shews how he clung to the exaltation and veneration of his father, to whom was reserved the patriarchal privilege of 'making money'.

Perhaps a general conclusion emerges from contemplating this tragic story. It would seem to afford some clue to the well-recognized association between genius and mental instability. It may well be that Morphy's case is a general one. Genius is evidently the capacity to apply unusual gifts with intense, even if only temporary, concentration. I would suggest that this, in its turn, depends on a special capacity for discovering conditions under which the unconscious guilt can be held in complete abeyance. This is doubtless to be connected with the well-known rigour, the sincerity and the purity of the artistic conscience. It is purchased, however, at the cost of the psychical integrity being at the mercy of any disturbance of these indispensable conditions. And that would appear to be the secret of 'artistic sensitiveness'.

The story also lends itself to a discussion of some important psycho-analytical considerations which I have scarcely time here to adumbrate.

It will have been noticed that, for the sake of simplicity, I have throughout referred to Morphy's gifts as a mark of his capacity for sublimation, and the question may well be asked whether this is a just description of a disguised way of gratifying hostile, e.g. parricidal, impulses. In answer I would admit that the impulses behind the play are ultimately of a mixed nature, but the essential process seems to me to be a libidinal one. I conceive that the parricidal impulses were 'bound' by an erotic cathexis, actually a homosexual one, and that this in its turn was sublimated. The enormous value of the process to Morphy's mental health is evident from the considerations adduced above, and this I take to be an example of an important general law, namely that the process of sublimation has ultimately a defensive



function.<sup>10</sup> By discharging id energy along a deflected path, and particularly by transforming a sexualized aggressivity it protects against the dangers to the ego which we know to proceed from excessive accumulation of that energy.

Finally, it is worth pointing out that when one speaks clinically of the 'breakdown of a sublimation' one really means the cessation of its defensive function. Morphy could play chess as well after as before his mental failure, as may be seen from his occasional games with Maurian: in most such cases, perhaps in all, the actual capacity acquired in the sublimating process remains intact in itself. What is lost is the ability to use this talent as a means of guarding against overwhelming id impulses, and this is really what patients are fearing when they express the anxiety lest 'psycho-analysis will take their sublimations away from them'.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Dr. Glover expressed a similar conclusion in his recent paper before this Society: 'Sublimation, Substitution and Social Anxiety, October, 1930.

<sup>11</sup> The original material on which this essay is based can mostly be traced through the bibliographical references given in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* (eleventh and fourteenth editions), and P. W. Sergeant's *Morphy's Games of Chess* (1921). I am also greatly indebted to Mr. Sergeant for his courtesy in placing at my disposal much unpublished material, including the manuscript of another forthcoming book by him on Paul Morphy. I am also obliged to Paul Morphy's niece, Mrs. Morphy-Voitier, of New Orleans, for kindly furnishing me with much useful information about him and the family.

# THE TECHNIQUE OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS <sup>1</sup>

BY

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LONDON

V

## ANXIETY: OUTBREAK AND RESOLUTION

When an external danger threatens a person's life, fear dictates the ways taken to secure self-preservation.

Neurotic anxiety is due, not to an outer danger confronting the ego, but to an internal one. The greater the threat to the ego from this unknown danger the more desperately is the ego driven to seek safety. Every type of psychical vicissitude results. We have the whole range of psychical disturbances. Every type of inhibition is related to this anxiety. Every successful sublimation is a method of dealing with it. Behind physical suffering itself the ego can take shelter from more terrifying calamities that threaten its existence. Anxiety in its most momentous and spectacular aspects is exemplified by the world-conquerors. 'Were we to do for ourselves what we do for our country what scoundrels we should be', said Cavour. Machiavelli and Napoleon are supreme examples. The inner drive of anxiety compels the world-conqueror to externalize his problem into terms of his country, with which he identifies himself. In terms of his country he is unsafe until he stands on top of the world. By fair means or foul, by violence or unscrupulousness, all who oppose his country, i.e. himself, must be removed. Only in supremacy is he safe.

To understand anxiety manifested in analysis one's mind must have grasped this sweep of vicissitudes that will include the epic of a Napoleon in reality, the great epics in literature, a little child stammering and raging in temper, or another succumbing to a vomiting fit and attended by solicitous parents. The struggle for ego-preservation is being waged in the last case as in the first. If we have firmly in our minds that the psychical problem is one of *bodily preservation*, we shall the more surely realize that it is not until the ego has attained a place of security against unconscious dangers that love can have much meaning beyond that of support, security and ownership, and that

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<sup>1</sup> Lectures delivered to candidates in training at the British Psycho-Analytical Institute, March, 1930.



love which is not these is a danger and a menace to life. Love can only be an outgoing and a giving for both sexes where ego-anxiety in all its varied forms has been set at rest. This is an unattainable ideal at present, but alleviation of anxiety through analysis will be more and more adequate as our technique becomes more subtle.

A little girl, oppressed with she knows not what apprehensions, casts her mind to the future with dread. She thinks, 'I wish I'd been through an earthquake, a fire, a shipwreck. I wish it had all happened, then I *should know*. I should have been through the very worst then'. The girl grows up and becomes a wife and mother. She suffers illness and survives operations. In analysis, after all her life experiences, the child in her cries out just the same. 'If only I knew what would happen in the future'. She is still waiting for the cataclysm, the earthquake and fire through which she is to test whether she will survive. If earthquake and fire and shipwreck really happened and she survived, even then that ego-anxiety would not be appeased.

Another child reacts differently. She must test and try out her apprehensions of some frightful destiny. She courts punishment. 'Don't dare to do that again', says her mother. She dares. For that 'daring' she is shaken. 'So that is what happens if you dare. You get shaken.' It interests the child no longer. It is not dreadful enough. 'If a man call his brother "Fool", he is in danger of hell-fire.' So the child says 'Fool' in a half-frightened way to herself. Nothing happens. 'If a man has faith, he can remove mountains'. So she has faith and commands a tree in the middle of the lawn to remove itself. It doesn't move. 'That's all right then', she thinks, 'I knew nothing would happen'. Note the concreteness of the dangers feared. Hell-fire is a real fire. The thing that is feared is real damage, real destruction to the actual body. This child, forever proving that nothing happened, took for granted unconsciously that dire punishment was bound one day to occur. Later in life she became a case of hysterical conversion.

To handle anxiety states effectively we need to know what the patient is experiencing and why he is experiencing it. The first obvious thing is that he is in a state of fright, of greater or lesser degree, which may be shown in slight or marked manifestations, such as rigidity of body and inability to speak, a heavy weight of oppression on the chest, necessity to micturate frequently, attacks of diarrhoea, an inability to assume the recumbent position, turning to look at the analyst, a refusal to leave the room, an inability to lie on the couch at all, a

necessity to be a distance away from the analyst, a need to walk about, quick breathing, rapid talking in a rising crescendo, a sudden insulting verbal attack, and in extreme cases in attempting to fling things about the room. I need not detail familiar signs further.

We infer from these signs that something has become unbearable. Liken it to being faced by an external menace when apparently there is no way of escape. It *feels* as though life were at stake. That which feels this panic is the self, the ego.

The menace that threatens the existence of the ego is the terrorizing unconscious super-ego evoked by the unconscious id-wishes. As the unconscious impulses gather momentum and strive for fulfilment, so the unconscious super-ego rages accordingly. The more unconscious these forces are the more incapable the ego is, the more impaired the sense of reality. The less the sense of reality, the greater the anxiety when the ego is hard beset between these forces.

Therefore in resolving an anxiety-state we have to subject the unconscious factors to reality. We have to bring into consciousness the feared unconscious impulse. We have to shew how for that wish the unconscious super-ego has provided a dreadful punishment of exactly the same nature as the wish. The resolution of anxiety finally occurs through our exposing this unconscious dreaded wish in connection with the analyst, and shewing also that the analyst has become the representative of the fierce punishing part of the mind. This means that we support the patient's ego. We ally ourselves with reality, for we can bear this hostile wish the unconscious directs against us, we can talk about it, shew what it is for and what it desires to achieve. We can shew that the terrible revenge imagined is the work of the unconscious mind, and does not exist in reality at all. We are not afraid. We do not retaliate or condemn. The all-important thing is the bringing into consciousness of the dreaded unconscious desire, for while anxiety is truly apprehension of terror, yet in anxiety-states we can see the psychical self-preservative function at work. Anxiety is offered also as a propitiation. It says, 'See how terrified I am, how little, be kind to me, look after me!' That is also true, but we must remember that the little child is terrified of what in phantasy it omnipotently feels it can do, as though it believed that it really *could* destroy. It is frightened by its own power phantasies, frightened of course of destruction being turned against itself, but to analyse anxiety the emphasis must be put upon the hostile omnipotence the ego fears.

Take for example the following: A man explains his anxiety to



me in terms of an actual reality-crisis in his present life. It is true he has one. 'How will events turn out? What will happen?' is his continual cry. He works up, as it may justifiably appear, anxiety concerning this unknown issue. This reality with its attendant anxiety blocks nearly all phantasy life. Now and again he dares to give up his preoccupation with reality, and what I find is this pattern.

When he was a child and he disliked people he would think, 'I need not think of them and then they don't really exist'. That gives at once the omnipotent scheme in which his psyche is involved.

His younger baby brother died when he was five years of age. He wished at that time he were the only child. The result of his wishing meant for him that the baby died. Later he reversed the omnipotent method. If he did *not* think, did not wish, people ceased to exist. His phantasy life is inhibited, sublimation is inhibited. 'Not thinking', i.e. 'not phantasying', is the return of the repressed through the repression. Both achieve the same end, viz. the omnipotent control, the power to destroy. He fears his own dreaded power. The ego is in a constant state of anxiety because of the unconscious sadism.

For practical purposes we will divide our analysands into three groups :—

(a) Those who start their analysis in an anxiety-state.

(b) Those who shew no initial anxiety, but from whom we learn that anxiety in some form such as night terrors, phobias, fits of rage were common in childhood.

(c) Those who do not remember having suffered from anxiety to any degree of discomfort at all.

In every successful analysis we shall expect in due time to work back to the childhood anxiety of class (b), and have some kind of repetition of it.

In class (c), we shall hope to deal with the defence-mechanisms in such a way as to know how anxiety has been annulled. If we are successful in analysing defence-mechanisms and loosening early anxiety we shall do much towards bringing about character changes and liberating a personality. This means a very lengthy analysis.

Classes (b) and (c) I will group together. In them we have an easier initial task of handling than in group (a). In the first two we shall have a period of analysis before anxiety is accessible. We shall learn the characteristic defence-mechanism and symptoms, if any. We shall know the general trend of development and have a fairly good idea of the childhood setting of early anxiety-attacks. We shall have

dream-material, and know the orientation of the transference-situation. Our finger will be on the pulse, and we shall be forewarned of the breaking down of defences. We shall note the disappearance of some symptom, and be ready to analyse an anxiety-state when it makes an appearance, analyse it, that is, in its setting: (1) the unconscious wish; (2) the direct reference to the analyst; (3) the correlation with earlier outbreaks; (4) the repetition-pattern from childhood. A complete analysis must supply all these factors in order to give the real support the ego needs for itself.

In class (a) anxiety marks the initial stages of the analysis. Here we know little or nothing of actual history. We have no data to draw upon and yet we have to do something to make analysis possible. We have to exercise immediate judgement and decisions in these cases, in the same way as the child analyst does in dealing with an anxiety-ridden child. For this I would say that at least a knowledge of how children's cases are conducted is desirable for any analyst, even though an actual child's analysis has never been undertaken. One principle can be laid down in adult analysis as in children's. This is, that as the child has definite things forbidden him, for definite reasons, so must the adult. The child is allowed the full scope of play and words. He is allowed to destroy his own toys, to carry on murderous intents towards cushions, but he is not allowed to hurt the analyst, i.e. he is not allowed to develop blind rages in which analysis is impossible. Extreme measures such as being sent home or being put out of the room are adopted here. The reason is that the analyst acts on behalf of reality in a situation where the child's ego is too feeble to act. Now in adult analysis there must be some such criterion. We must have some ultimate, beyond which no patient may go. The guide for that is reality and the conditions under which analysis can be carried on. Just as a child who made analysis impossible would be sent away, so an adult would be dismissed. An adult patient whose conduct interfered with the analyst's times must be treated firmly and for the same reason as in the case of a child. We must act for the ego, and not for the id or super-ego. That is, we must be guided by the demands of reality for ourselves and for the patient, and by the fact that we can only do our work under conditions that admit of analysis. There is, however, even for adults a restricted field for abreaction of anxiety, in addition to the usual one of the vehicle of words while the patient lies supine. The analyst must judge of the efficacy of allowing the patient to abreact anxiety in other ways than the usual verbal



method and the test will be whether it conforms to the following criteria :—

- (a) The analysis must be confined to the usual time limit.
- (b) There must be no interference with the property in the room.
- (c) Interpretation should have the effect of reducing anxiety so that the patient can resume the usual analytical position. If this does not follow in due course, then the deviation from the normal procedure is serving no analytical end.

In handling anxiety-states with the necessary firmness and understanding one great asset is that of having experienced them oneself in personal analysis, of knowing what anxiety feels like, and of the complete knowledge of its meaning. This, rather than the calmness born of ignorance, is an asset for analysis. An analyst who *knows*, in this sense of having had unconscious anxiety analysed, will avoid the first error that can be made, viz. that of exacerbating anxiety, arousing it further. We have to learn by experience and knowledge a knack of saying the right word, doing the right thing, to make initial anxiety just tolerable. We must also get interpretative work going as soon as possible. Here again in this state the work follows the lines of child technique. Actions, gestures, incoherencies must be linked together to give some meaning and interpreted as soon as possible. As soon as anxiety subsides sufficiently and becomes intermittent, so that analytical work follows a more normal routine which means the transference-situation is developing, there is a very sure guide in all subsequent anxiety-states. It is true in all our work that the infantile problems, if not worked out in connection with the analyst, are repeated *ad infinitum* in connection with present-day people and affairs ; but what is so difficult to achieve in certain types of analyses is thrown into a high relief in an anxiety-case. When the anxiety-state occurs we must always find the present-day stimulus. There is every probability on days of stress that one will get a good analytical result if the patient has arrived at a point where he or she is lying down and talking. Dreams, memories, associations may reveal the unconscious wishes, but the crux of the matter is this, what in reality links with this outbreak ? It may be some thought not expressed about the analyst. It is very likely to be found in some suppressed external event. We must remember that the anxiety patient is one who dramatises id, ego, super-ego. The rôles are distributed abroad, and all kinds of temporary alliances outside analysis are made for the alleviation of anxiety. So that a clue that always can be surmised in repetition-states of anxiety

is a present-day event, a present-day person, analyst, or some other, who has in some way stimulated the patient's unconscious mind. We must correlate the present-day anxiety with our knowledge of the unconscious conflict, as far as it has been revealed. I have known a patient suffer an hour's anxiety, accompanied by migraine and excessive sleepiness due to the unconscious suppression of an immediate external stimulus. The following day or days revealed the suppressed fact. Here one had reached the very pattern in childhood where conversion symptoms had been laid down. For this patient came, not with migraine, but with a more serious symptom. During analysis this had disappeared and we reached in this type of hour that place of fluidity where a present-day event aroused id-wishes leading to unconscious suppression. The suppression causing immediate bodily suffering.

I cannot do better than close this lecture by giving you some examples of unsuccessful and successful technique. They will not include your difficulties, but every case is an experience, and only experience can give us an elasticity of orientation and increase our skill.

This case shews the beginner in technique. The patient was a young woman of twenty-five, unable to carry on her work because of anxiety attacks, the most marked feature being frequent micturition and colitis. She spent nearly an hour before each treatment in and out of the lavatory. When these symptoms subsided after some analysis, she had attacks of pain resembling rheumatism, or she would develop an anxiety on going out into the streets. Burning stripes would develop on throat and chest during treatment, much resembling stigmata. She had violent fits of temper.

I had not a grip of the dynamics then. The super-ego was not then known. Analysis of transference was mainly concerned with the analysis of the sexual phantasies in relation to the analyst and a pointing out of hostility. With the help of dreams, and the recovery of memories, analysis progressed in three years to the point where all the patient's symptoms practically disappeared and she went back to work. This meant the curtailment of analysis to twice a week. The patient came one week under the new régime and had a fit of hysterics on each occasion. She came a second week and the same thing happened. I then consulted a doctor and on his advice she left me and had an hour's analysis in the week with a male analyst. This went on for a few months, and then the analysis was stopped. She has now for eight years been away from London, and has had no relapse. This is what happened.



The patient built up a strong positive transference towards me with only occasional phases of negative feeling. Her violent outbursts of rage were nearly always directed against someone in the external world. By positive transference in the analysis and the negative affects outside, we had a scheme that worked up to the point of the disappearance of symptoms and recovery of her ability to work. I did not realize that her psychical assurance was an alliance with the mother by which she was unafraid of her hostility against others representing her father.

The curtailing of analysis, her going out into the world to work, left her with an intolerable heaped-up anxiety due to unanalysed negative feeling to the mother. She was left without an ally. The oral frustration lighted up again. The archaic super-ego became rampant. Her only way was the way of infancy. By screaming she would master me.

She got well so quickly afterwards because she had the alliance of a father-figure in giving free rein to her hostile thoughts about the mother, and the resolution of anxiety could follow.

I did not at that time know of the super-ego, ego and id forces. I did not realize the necessity for the full playing-out of these rôles and consequently had not a clear notion of the terror that was still present in the overcompensating positive mother-transference. Technique had not acquired the ability to bring within the analysis *all* the rôles, and *both* parental figures.

I would contrast that case with another young woman of the same age, who suffered from an inability to take any interest in life, or to follow up any of her main interests. The collapse had come after an unfortunate love-affair and had lasted over a year. Other external incidents had exacerbated her condition. She betrayed signs of fixed persecutory ideas and delusional tendencies. In analysis she showed anxiety at once by very rapid breathing and restlessness of hands and agitated movements. Her immediate and prolonged expressions of filial love and duty to her mother and her easily reached hostility to her father showed me the path clearly. Her hostility to the mother was played out in diatribes against a woman fortune-teller who had prophesied ill luck to her. This patient was accustomed to self-control. She had always been the good and docile daughter since the age of four or five. Her breakdown had brought depression. There was no fear of an immediate outbreak of anxiety but one had to note the heavy anxious breathing. I seized the first chance I had of associating myself

with the fortune-teller. The patient of course did not believe that the association was valid; she laughed at it. Then it became possible later to bring her mother, myself and the fortune-teller together. After some months of work her interests returned. She resumed singing and dancing with increasing vigour, but anxiety was becoming free and her docility and sweetness gave place to energy and a very ragged temper.

One day her ballet-mistress made some uncalled-for critical remark. The patient came to me in great agitation. She lay down and began to beat her hands on the couch, and to talk rapidly. 'She said, she said, she said, the wretch, the brute—if I could only talk to her face to face, be on equal terms with her, I'd tell her what I thought of her. Oh I'm so afraid, so afraid.' Her voice got increasingly higher in pitch, and in another second she would have lost control in a fit of hysterics. I interfered here. 'Yes', I said, 'a good idea. Get up, that will help you'. I got a chair for her, and said, 'Let's sit face to face and tell me what you think about her'.

She started again, explaining more coherently the scene that had taken place, and she concluded, 'Now don't you think Miss Sharpe is a wretch, don't you think she's a brute? I could kill her'.

'Yes', I said, 'I know you could kill me. That's what you are so frightened of, that's why you think I am bound to be a wretch and a brute. Won't you lie down now, you won't be frightened any more'.

She lay down like an exhausted child, and said, 'It must be true that underneath it's you and mother I'm afraid of'.

'Only because you have not known why you hated her and felt like killing her when you were little. You have been afraid of your own thoughts.' And so analysis proceeded. The next day she went calmly to her ballet-mistress and complained of the injustice and obtained an apology from her. We had no more hysterical attacks, and a much greater ease in analysing the transference-affects.

The success in this handling was due to the early recognition of anxiety signs, the knowledge that as depression symptoms were alleviated anxiety would increase, and the seizing of every opportunity of linking the hostility expressed to mother-surrogates in the external world on to myself.

I am going to refer you again to a patient mentioned in an earlier lecture who started analysis with a strong hostile transference. I told you the first difficulty was in talking at all and of how hours were spent in explaining to me how she did not really and could not really tell me what she was really thinking, for when she spoke, what she said really



did not seem the same as her thought. For every explanation I gave as to procedure she had another difficulty. I only just kept hold of this case during the critical times, and then more by intuition than by real foresight. Had I had foresight I should have remembered her ease in school when she stood up to lecture. I knew that anxiety concerning her unconscious hostility was increasing and that this meant an unbearable situation in a short time; but it was not until she said, 'I believe the position makes me a difficulty', that I followed up with the suggestion she should walk. I would like to give the particulars again, as this is one of those cases where one had to interpret without much data, since we were at the beginning of the analysis.

As she walked about, and later on the couch, I encouraged her to describe and find similes for the difficulty in speech. They ran on these lines. She must know what she was going to say. To speak first and think afterwards would mean saying something foolish, making a mess of her thought. The more she thought of doing that, the more impossible it was to speak. Now I made a direct interpretation of this and though she ridiculed it she was able very soon to lie down. We came then to memories of early difficulties concerning accidents in defecation. It would have been useless to have regarded this patient's initial resistance as a conscious resistance to saying *what* was in her mind. It was not the '*what*' that was the difficulty, but the anxiety about loss of control that spontaneous talking meant to her in this position on the couch. To lose control, to talk freely, that is, to defecate as in the accidents, meant to be exposed to the feared hostile impulses of her own unconscious, and consequently to endanger herself with regard to the hostile imago, the super-ego, the mother, the analyst. The only position of safety for her was in keeping control. That is why being allowed to walk about restored assurance at the most crucial moments of the anxiety.

This case illustrates very well the gain that results from asking the patient to describe the difficulty to us in similes. If only a patient will say 'it seems as if'; 'it is as if'; 'it feels like this', we can then get on the track of the meaning of unconscious resistance.

In a case of very severe anxiety I have allowed a patient for three months to sit on the floor, and after that for over a period of six months to get off the couch and sit near the fire when an anxiety-state appeared. In fact, I never with this patient gave any ruling at all. As anxiety lessened she remained on the couch longer, until finally she had no need to get up at all. I do not think this type of anxiety-case need



give an analyst difficulty, if the analyst has more than book knowledge, i.e. if the analyst has himself been analysed sufficiently to reach anxiety levels. This means that one can gauge what *can* be borne and what *cannot*. One knows when to interpret, when to keep still. One understands that with a patient who turns cold with fright and sways with giddiness and drops off to sleep, one has three main things to keep in view.

The first is to give latitude for these abreactions. They in themselves make for readjustment. The sleep is the symbolical suicide. The shivering fear and anxiety is the protection against the unconscious hostility. This patient was acting like a little child in sitting on the floor. But such a burden of fear for such unknown infantile hostility can only be alleviated at first as one would alleviate it for a child with night-terrors. She *is* in a nightmare, and the night has to pass away on its own slow feet. The factor of time, the provision of an environment where the patient feels safe is the first necessity. By being safe I mean, where the patient *can be hostile safely*. She was being hostile by being the child on the floor, by being left to sleep. If I had interfered in the early stages of analysis at all it would have meant to her unconscious mind that *I* was afraid of her hostility, and therefore that it was not safe for her to be hostile. There must be latitude for the expression of anxiety, the allowing of fear-reactions, the factor of time, the provision of a safe place for hostility. There must be the maintenance of an absolutely kind equable imperturbable demeanour which a patient like this will know is born out of assurance, not out of ignorance of her state, nor yet out of an attempt to make her assured. To let a patient of this type leave the room half-dazed and stumbling, immersed in anxiety-affects, may at times cause one misgivings. But every time it so happened in this case there followed a lessening of the patient's own feared hostility. Had I shown anxiety or solicitude, her own anxiety would have increased. There must be direct, rapid interpretation the moment anything can be interpreted. Even if this is only a very partial interpretation one should not hesitate.

Lastly, in an anxiety-case, after the excessive states have subsided, one must watch carefully for the periodical stress. As these times recur it should become more possible to find a present-day stimulus that will light up a past situation with an unconscious impulse. I regard the present-day stimulus, always important, of the utmost importance in finally resolving anxiety-states. This is to be borne in mind when one begins to analyse a case of severe anxiety. Present-day



events, to begin with, have little reality. When the patient is on the way to recovery, and reality begins to play a part again, the recrudescence of anxiety can be definitely linked with a present-day stimulus and analysis can proceed with greater results.

When a patient suffering from anxiety finds safety in phantasy and avoids reality, I should allow a latitude in technique in dealing with any occurrence in analysis that was hinged to reality. For instance, if such a patient said, 'I can't make out what that is on your desk. When I came in I thought it was a box of matches, but I don't know', I should either tell the patient what the object was, or show it, *after* she had told me what she had thought the article was. When a patient suffering from anxiety finds relief in reality and avoids phantasy, I should not do this. If such a patient wondered what I had on my desk, I should only try to evoke phantasy.

If a patient who takes refuge in reality had a dream of a room, of a house, of a pattern, a strange thing, I might suggest that it would be clearer perhaps if we had a drawing, or if it were traced in the air. I say, 'Shew me how'. This is a symbolical thing that is done. We are evoking phantasy, which is the seat of anxiety, and drawing it away from reality channels. When a patient lies immobile without moving for days and weeks, one may be sure that there is a problem of repressed anxiety due to repressed phantasies of sadistic intent.

When a patient persists in turning round and looking at the analyst, one surmises that he fears an attack by the analyst, and that this fear is due to his own unconscious hostility. If the patient's anxiety is that of fear, if the patient is masochistic, and turns round and looks as a means of reassurance, I should draw my chair a little forward so that the patient could see a little without having to turn round very much, and then as anxiety-states were interpreted one would find that the need to turn round would grow less, or only take place as fresh unconscious material was being given.

On the other hand, if turning round and looking represented anxiety in a directly sadistic way and was intended as an attack, I should give partial interpretations as soon as I could. How far I allowed this turning round would depend entirely upon the degree to which it hampered or helped analysis. One has to gauge the seriousness of the anxiety. One does not permit things that serve no analytical end either immediately or in the near future. Some patients quite clearly exploit anxiety to keep control over the analyst. This produces a blockade of analysis and endless repetition which leads nowhere.

Unless this exploitation of anxiety ceases through interpretation there is no other course than to stop the analysis. Real anxiety needs all our skill, but an exploitation of anxiety needs decision and firmness on the analyst's part. The patient is then acting like a child who has found out a method of getting and keeping his own way. The patient is using this anxiety to prevent analysis. A genuine anxiety is resolved, it may be slowly, but is resolved by analysis. Anxiety which is not being exploited will appear and disappear at intervals; it will have times and seasons, and on every reoccurrence after the greatest stress has been relieved, will coincide with unconscious wishes or actions that are laden with danger to the ego.

I do not volunteer assurances to a patient, but if in great anxiety a patient himself says, 'I shall be all right, shan't I?' I should answer 'Yes' (if the patient is not obsessional). But if an obsessional patient told me he had phantasies of jumping out of a window, or of sticking a knife into his wife, or of throwing himself in front of a train and wanted me to reassure him that he would do none of these things, I should *not* reassure him. During analysis I should want to know more about these things. If he asked me for assurance when he was not on the couch, I should parry the question, tell him if I answered his question he would find another one to-morrow, and it would be as well to wait until to-morrow to see what the next thing was.

One severe obsessional case I have has not yet recovered from his astonishment when in a nursing home a doctor, to whom he told his dread of jumping out of the window, said nothing, but left him in a bed near a window. 'How did he know I shouldn't do it?' he says in aggrieved tones. 'I might have done it. He didn't know I shouldn't'. The annoyance at not being able to frighten the doctor is illuminating. Neither should I assure patients that they are getting on with analysis, making good progress, when I know that 'being well' is the most dangerous thing that could happen to them. On the other hand, to patients of this type whose anxieties lie with their repressed omnipotence-phantasies I occasionally say, 'Perhaps you can help me to see a little more what this dream means'.



## VI

## VARIATIONS OF TECHNIQUE IN DIFFERENT NEUROSES

## DELUSION : PARANOIA : OBSESSION : AND CONVERSION TYPES

I have been arrested by the phrase 'justify my existence' used in two days by three patients whose psychological mechanisms are of very different types. There came to my mind a remark made by a very brusque member of a teaching staff I knew many years ago. A lanky overgrown boy of sixteen was standing miserably self-conscious in a classroom, undecided whether he would sit or stand. 'Oh, try not to look as if you were apologizing for your existence!' was the class-teacher's remark.

The people who enjoy the greatest ease, and to whom work and conditions in life bring the greatest internal satisfaction, are those who have justified their existence to themselves. They have won through to a right to live, and a right to live means a life in which physical and mental powers can be used to the ego's advantage and well-being, which means to the advantage and well-being of the community. For a 'right to live' is only ultimately based on the right of others to live. In a psyche that had attained that feeling of rightness to live there would be no obsession, no compulsion. There would be neither pathologically enforced idleness nor compulsive speed, but the attainment of a natural rhythm of activity and rest, in both the physical and the mental realm. Time, proportion and harmony would be kept. I believe 'justification for existence' is the very core of our problems, whether we are thinking of the malaise of the so-called normal or the pathological manifestations of the so-called neurotic. Matthew Arnold, speaking of the soul, says it 'mounts, and that hardly, to immortal life'. I would say that phrase is far more applicable to the struggle for attainment of the right of the ego to live.

It mounts, and that hardly, to *mortal* life.

I can leave this theme as it concerns so-called normal character until the final lecture and concentrate this evening upon definite pathological manifestations of its truth. For assuredly, if we look at the picture of delusion, paranoia, obsession, conversion, the first obvious truth we see is the impairment of the ego's powers to function in reality. The next resultant of the psychical conflict is that the justification for existence is only achieved by pains, penalties, and stress that seem to make actual life hardly worth while at all. Looked at from this angle of the ego's justification for existence, the various forms

of neuroses present to us this : ' I am only justified in living, I can only live, provided this and provided that ' ; that is, one may look upon the characteristic pathological manifestations as the means by which the ego has justified itself in existing. In the absolute life of phantasy in madness, the ego has given up the struggle for justification.

I am going to speak of technique with regard to the different neuroses from this point of view. I cannot speak in general terms, or give general formulas that can be applied to particular instances ; but I can give you particular instances, and it may be that from those some general deductions may be drawn that will be useful as a guidance by which you can compare or contrast your own experiences.

' Justification for existence.' The ego's ability to feel that justification is mental sanity. I have envisaged the abandonment of the struggle on the part of the ego to attain this justification as the complete relapse into madness—this and not a conscious preference for a pleasure-pain existence as contrasted with reality. The psycho-neuroses I see as psychical miscarriages in the attempt to justify the right of the ego to exist.

I believe this view of the matter is of importance in technique, because it will make us less likely to occupy the rôle of reformer under the mask of psycho-analyst. I have heard even psycho-analysts talk of patients who were under the dominance of the pleasure-pain principle as though by avoiding reality the patients were leading a care-free phantasy-existence pleasurable to the *ego* ; and they have said this too with a note of exasperation as though after all it were a summation devoutly to be wished because they condemn it so severely. It is profoundly untrue that the avoidance of or incapacity to deal with reality brings any ' pleasure ' in a reality sense.

I am going to illustrate technique from a delusional case first, and alongside this illustration I ask you to bear in mind this struggle that the ego is engaged upon, namely, its justification for existence.

The first phase of the analysis of this young woman gave this picture. There was a crystallized delusion that a doctor had made sexual overtures to her. There were hallucinations of bodies lying in pools of blood. At times the whole world around her seemed as though at any moment it might change and disappear. She clung desperately to a real task in the world. She did secretarial work for an organization which represented the one vital thing providing a justification for her existence. A mother-surrogate helped to run this organization, and in a sense the patient's secretarial work was really carried on for the



mother-surrogate through all the desperations of a much-impaired reality-sense.

Another factor in this ability to cling to reality must be mentioned, although I did not know this factor until the first phase of analysis was over. The patient possessed in secret a lady doll. It had been given her when she was twelve years old by her father. It was dressed as a grown woman and carried a baby. All through this first period, as I learned later, this doll was treated as a sacred object, looked at regularly to see that it was intact, and put back carefully. The patient had practically no pleasures and few contacts in reality. With intellectual gifts, she had no avenue for their use beyond office routine ; novels, theatres, pleasure-trips were longed for but forbidden by a guilt-laden conscience. Her main conscious occupation was worry lest she should have done wrong things in her work. At other times her intense grievance about life would occupy her. She wanted interests, friends, joy, and did not know how to set about getting them. At other times she battled through what she called her ' cloud ' periods, when the world was unreal, bodies in blood lay on the floor, things moved that ought to be still, voices spoke when no one was there. Beset by delusion and hallucination on the one hand, and on the other by a constant fear lest her work should be wrong, lest she had made dreadful errors, the ego-existence was very thin. From the results of the analysis I think of the particular aspect I have mentioned, namely, that her ego did not feel any justification for its existence.

In the first phase of this analysis I very quickly saw that the block to any real revelation of her psychical difficulties lay in her desperate fear of being neurotic. She was making a stand against being found neurotic, just as she was striving to make no faults in her work. She took the delusion as fixed and true ; her hallucinations happened and she would not talk about them. The system was closed and worked automatically, and the whole problem was how to break into it, how to make her accessible. I can say quite definitely, looking back to that time, that the path of access during the first three years of analysis lay entirely through work with the super-ego. I was content with every hardly-won revelation, either of fresh delusional material or the slow recovery of memory. The fresh delusional material would often be contrary to that already given me. Memories began to be contradictory, but I kept my judgement in suspension. I only cared that every aspect of super-ego strictness in dreams, in references to people



or to myself, should be pointed out without ceasing. It was almost the sole task for three years.

From the point of view of reality-testing, all accounts of her childhood proved to be as untrue as her delusion. This is a thing to remember above all in treating a delusional case. You may be getting truth ; you may not. A measure of this kind of distortion of facts is present in every analysis. In this particular case it was the most important thing ; and she held as true the untrue in life just as the delusion was held as fact. I should have done nothing with this patient had I been led astray by her intermittent beliefs that she was getting well. She had periods when her interest in the organization she worked for carried her over the abysses of dissociation. I should have achieved nothing if I had ceased at the end of three years, should have known nothing. Her dreams were few. When they came they were generally confused dreams about animals, or of herself in a bath-chair, or sitting on a seashore. There could be no such thing as free association from a psyche as hedged and bound as hers. She talked volubly. She scarcely made a movement on the couch. If I ventured to press her for more thoughts about the dream, she grew querulous and hedged. That hedging meant suspicion. She would reveal nothing that way. The only way was that of work upon the manifestations of the super-ego. I found later she had distorted her childhood to accommodate it to the demands of her super-ego.

The first phase then was a long unceasing struggle with the super-ego manifestation in consciousness, while at the same time one stored for reference later all the revelations of childhood delusional beliefs.

Now I cannot detail an analysis of the length of this one, but I can give you changes focussed around certain periods. I consider that the leverage all the time was *viâ* the modification of the super-ego—attention to that before anything else. It became plain that her office work was punitive, propitiatory, a reparation. I listened to her difficulties, but I put a different note in my voice every time she let a hint drop that she wanted to enjoy something. ‘I wish I could ride. My parents wouldn’t let me learn as a child.’ ‘That would be a great pleasure’, I interjected. Later, she thought how pleasant it would be to join an amateur dramatic society. I thought so too. These two things she did. Dreams around those two first essays of departure from the punitive system of her life brought the first hint of repressed masturbation and the interest of these dreams was the fact that she and I continually changed rôles. Now I was her id and she represented



super-ego, and then I became super-ego to her id wishes. This marked the first loosening in her system.

The next big movement occurred when, a week after the event, she told me she had been to see the house in which Katherine of Aragon had lived in London. I spoke before she had time to comment. 'How very interesting. How did it seem to you?' 'Oh, I thought you would think it neurotic, that's why I've not told you before.'

Then two years of analysis followed, the main leverage being still that of super-ego analysis. I reached her phantasy-life *viâ* historical personages; and, reaching that, the picture of her childhood underwent a metamorphosis. I began at last to see the daylight. Buried phantasies of childhood came through to consciousness intact, giving very definite news of what type of experience she had had to deny and repress.

The final phase of analysis coincided with her abandoning office work and taking up a diploma course in history at the University.

Now I will take you back to what I said at the beginning, that I believe a relapse from reality into a state of confusion, such as marked the collapse of this patient prior to analysis, is an abandonment of the ego's struggles to achieve justification for its existence.

The earliest pattern of denial of reality I unearthed from dreams was a bedroom episode in which the young child urinated when she saw her father's penis. That buried memory made a pattern. When she was between four and six, although there is unmistakable evidence that she saw a man's exposed penis, she retained no memory of it. The emphasis here has to be laid not alone on the denied external reality, but on the denied *impulse* evoked by that reality. That is, if she did not see the father's penis, then she did not wish to bite it, or to kill him. She denies reality to deny her impulses. If she did not see the penis, she did not urinate. If she did not urinate, she did not feel anxiety, she did not feel like murder.

When she came to me she had an automatic contact with her parents and sisters. In a sense they did not exist. Her picture of her childhood was in consciousness that of a child allowed no pleasures and made to do as she was told. You see what this meant. It was a denial of all her aggressive play, a denial of all her unconscious wishes against her mother, a denial of actual hostile acts against her sisters. You see why she had to deny these realities. This denial went so far that her body had to become anæsthetic to actual pain, though not to neurotic pains and conversion symptoms. She could dance a dance



through with a drawing-pin in her foot. It meant that her ego in the world of reality was threatened with the bodily destruction her aggressiveness had wished against others, that as she had demolished dolls and toys, so she in her real life was threatened with destruction. Her ego, so to speak, had no justification for existence, only justification for destruction, beset as it was by id wishes and super-ego terrors. You will remember the talisman of the doll, and now see it not as the clinging of a young woman to a childhood toy, but as a reassurance that she could live. It was an unharmed mother and child, a refutation of her hostility, and a justification of her own existence.

Therefore, as far as my experience with delusion is concerned, I should say that the way to reach reality again is *via* the delusional life, by obtaining access to phantasy, and that access to phantasy is only obtainable by the constant analysis of the super-ego. That what has to be made real is not only the denied external reality, but psychical reality, psychical facts, and that the ultimate solution lies with the possibility of consciousness of the destructive impulses. With these brought to consciousness, the ego will accept more and more reality, there is less and less need to deny it, while reparation for these impulses will cease to be an enforced punishment by which the ego can live. Sublimation of impulses will be set up, which is quite a different thing. Sublimation is in its very externalization an acknowledgement of powers within us of both love and hate.

I have given you this case in so much detail for I consider it my own most convincing experience. Through all the doldrums of hopelessness to the hard-won result of an eager life, I have tracked this analysis of a girl beset by delusion and unreality, and I have found that the ego can only face reality and justify its existence as it has a chance to deal with the aggressiveness of its id in terms of sublimations, instead of through the terrorizing of the super-ego.

As a guide then to the technique required for analysing delusional cases, I would put first in importance the necessity to analyse the super-ego. Upon the achievement of that depends the degree to which the patient will admit you to his secret phantasy-life, both conscious and unconscious. To reach the secret phantasy-life will mean eventually not only reaching the truth of the psychical conflict, but the truth of the denied childhood *life in reality*. If the analyst's own super-ego is camouflaged under an excessive valuation of 'normality' and a desire to achieve it in his patients, a delusional patient will sense this urge of his, and block the very avenue which must be traversed to



achieve normality. The analyst's objective must be modification of the super-ego and the possibility this affords of reaching the life of phantasy.

I will turn next to obsessional cases and, reverting again to the special angle from which I proposed to look at the psychical problems presented to us, will consider the justification for the ego's existence that we find in the obsessional.

The first obvious thing about an obsessional is that he or she is engaged in this justification unceasingly. There is no rest from the task. He never catches up, so to speak. He is always breathless. Like the boy with his hand over the hole in the dyke wall, if he takes it away for a second the water will flood through with destruction to everybody. But in his phantasy the obsessional is responsible for all of it, for the hole, for the water, and for preventing the destruction. That is why there is no rest for an obsessional. He keeps on wishing destruction. He believes in his power of bringing destruction upon his loved and feared objects, and because of this he must ceaselessly employ magical operations to bring his wishes to naught. His ego can live only under those psychical conditions.

The strength of his unconscious hostility is projected into the parent imagos. They are incorporated and form his terrorizing super-ego. Then he feels within himself this severity, this destructive force which would slay him. He has no justification for existence, so great is the condemnation passed upon his hostile impulses. If this were the whole story we should then have suicide, but the obsessional mechanism provides a way of escape. One is by ritual of various types whereby he omnipotently neutralizes his omnipotent powers of destruction; the other is by ejection of the incorporated hostile object by the anus. But these processes must never cease if his ego is to exist. The incorporated object is no sooner ejected than he is in danger from its externality and it must be incorporated again. The ritual must never cease, or his unconscious destructive power will bring about extinction of his ego through the wrath of the super-ego. The obsessional is on an increasing treadmill. He is forever escaping from a trap into which he continually returns.

The task in analysis is clearly that of resolving a pregenital problem. The ferocity of the super-ego means also the ferocity of the id-wishes, and a belief in their omnipotent power. The difficulty that technique encounters lies in the fact that the obsessional has found an omnipotent way of preserving his ego, and the defences against interference with his system are almost impregnable.

I can give you a few guiding lines in the analysis of an obsessional neurosis. I have had cases become so far normal that there has been no return of symptoms since analysis ended eight years ago, but I should hesitate to say that the obsessional system had been really resolved. The first important thing to note is this, that after any interpretation of id wishes, revealed by dream material and associative work, one may expect a reaction of some kind, a tightening of an obsessional symptom or a fresh one. The other thing is that one must allow time for repentance. One cannot drive all the time to analyse the super-ego as in a delusional case ; one cannot drive all the time to bring unconscious hostility to consciousness. One must allow for rhythm. The obsessional must be allowed time for self-castigation in sorrow and repentance. We must be aware of these rhythms. When the mourning for sin has taken place, then is the time again to do interpretative work and bring some unconscious factor to light. In a severe case there will be long periods of these alternating phases, first the obsessional symptoms in full swing and then grief and self-condemnation. As interpretative work proceeds, these periods will get shorter, but they will always be maintained to a certain degree, and I am sure that most success comes by the analyst's knowledge that the grief periods must have their way and be worked through, or we are going to exacerbate anxiety.

The next important thing is the observation of the disappearance of actual obsessional acts and rituals. These will disappear in time through the analytical work. They will then *reappear* in the analysis itself, and that is the most baffling task the analyst is faced with, unless he detects where the obsession is manifesting itself. That is, the more the symptoms in actual rites and ceremonies disappear, the more we must detect the obsessional drive in the analytical work. It means that we then have to separate the analytical material presented to us into

(a) Its value as an obsessional magical defence.

(b) Its value as to content.

Of these only the ' value as content ' material is of use for our interpretation. All our art and skill must be expended in detecting when we are being called upon to hear the repentance and sorrow theme, time for which we must allow for all through the analysis, until it is reduced to a minimum quantity. One must recognize that one is being presented with the obsessional magic in its latest form. We must discriminate between this and the analysable unconscious material.



The grief and repentance theme will be easily recognizable. The 'value as content' material will be found in dreams, fresh memories and in present-day occurrences. The latter is usually one of the things an obsessional is very likely to suppress, and as the patient improves, the analyst does well to be on the alert for such suppression, especially if analysis tends to become stalemate. When symptoms have disappeared, the patient will use all that has been said to him by the analyst, all that he has learnt through interpretation, *as an obsession*. He will put to an obsessional use what was insight on some previous occasion. We must let this proceed as an obsessional symptom, and it would be futile to try to analyse the content when the patient is obviously *functioning* in this way. For example, I have an obsessional case at present who when he came to me three years ago only preserved his own ego existence and everyone else's by spending hours a day on his knees praying that they and he might be saved from accidents. He prayed in taxicabs, in lavatories, fled into churches during business hours. He spent an hour every morning on his knees and longer at night. He prays no more. He says, 'I do not find it necessary'. But every few days in analysis he spends part of the hour in this kind of talk. 'Yes, I know that when I was a child I did many things I should not have done. I envied my father's penis, I envied my father's bank-book, I destroyed my brother's toys, I scratched my old nurse, I hated my little sister, and many other things I did, which are now forgotten, which I wickedly repressed, and which now through the thickness and weight of a heavy resistance you, my analyst, you who are my mother and father and brother and sister, you, O analyst, cannot see.' There is one word missing there. It is 'Amen'. Now, one does not analyse that material. You see from it the evidences of past analysis, but everything is here put to an obsessional use and the value lies in the mechanism and not in the content.

Here is a typical reaction after an interpretation made the day before in connection with the infantile unconscious wish to use the father's penis to get the contents of the mother's body. He begins:—

'I'm not pleased with myself. I've no guts in me. I've no spunk. I've nothing. I've more fear as I go on. I'm unwell. That releases me from any obligation. Money is a cursed nuisance. I've got a good cheque from commissions this month. I suppose you think I'm nearly well, I'm not. I haven't been feeling well at all. I'm inwardly burnt. I've been chewing my lips. There's nothing more to bite, but I go on

biting. I've heard of a woman who can't eat and is ill. I've infected myself with the same disease. Don't be afraid of me, don't think I'm going to lift off the bottom of this couch in my rage, I'm not. I've got pains in my stomach, lavatory pains. I used to have them at school. When I was taken there I was afraid of feelings in between my legs or wherever that thing between my legs may be situated on my body. What's that noise, I wonder?' Here I interrupt: 'What do you think it is, what does it sound like?' 'Aren't you opening up a biscuit tin? Going to take something out to eat, I suppose'.

This gives a very good example of analysis with an obsessional whose main symptoms have disappeared. The obsession is in the analysis. At this stage we get the reaction fairly quickly after an interpretation of unconscious material. The analyst has become a dynamic factor. The patient was suffering colic pains that morning. We have the immediate punishment of the revealed unconscious wish, a necessity to be ill, terror at being well, terror at having money, spunk. To possess these things would be to be dispossessed. He has no justification for having anything, no right to exist. Yet in spite of this we see the hostility is able to express itself. 'Don't be afraid, don't think I am going to lift the bottom off this couch.' In obsessional cases then the analyst must allow for the rhythm of obsessional phases and repentance phases, and must remember that when symptoms disappear the obsession will be in terms of the analysis. Then it will be necessary to discriminate between material to be analysed and that which is to be regarded as a functioning of the obsession. The present-day stimulus and the dynamics of the transference become increasingly important as analysis proceeds. The chances then occur to make anxiety bearable to the ego, and this means the possibility of breaking up the organized system in which the unconscious hostile impulses are being constantly cancelled out.

Lastly, I will submit some points in technique in the analysis of patients with conversion symptoms. For the purpose of clarity you will see that I have made a marked and clear distinction between delusional, obsessional, conversion hysteric, whereas of course in actual practice we get every variety of mixture.

In the obsessional case to which I have referred there are constant conversion symptoms. By giving points of technique in this way it may be a help to the gaining of particular nuances that are applicable according to the particular manifestation being dealt with at any given time. Always in the organized systems of neuroses we hope to liberate



anxiety. It is in the loosening of anxiety-affects that we finally resolve the problem presented to us in these systems.

We will think now of conversion symptoms. Conversion symptoms often change from time to time in nature. They are not always present. They appear and continue while stress concerning id wishes is great ; they disappear when the stress is lessened. The most marked difference between conversion and obsession is that in the conversion type there is much less conscious feeling of guilt. The severity of the super-ego is present in both cases, but while the obsessional is often guilt-laden in consciousness, the conversion patient has no haunting sense of sin such as dogs the life of the obsessional. The conversion patient presents his own special problems that are baffling to the analyst. One is that there is apparently less driving power in the analysis. There is less conviction at the outset that the problem is a psychological one, a tendency to revert to physiological causes and explanations, and a consequent unconscious exploiting of these in analysis.

Moreover, we must remember that the very fact that anxiety has passed into physical ailments means that physical pain is more easily borne than mental pain. It means that feelings of guilt have been intolerable in consciousness, and that expiation of sin has been attained through physical suffering. It means a long battle in a stubborn case to break up a system that has brought about an easier mind. The breaking up means, for a period at least, tolerating stress and guilt that have been assuaged formerly in an easier way. One can look at the problem from another angle, that is, *viâ* 'justification for existence'.

The story of little black Sambo illustrates this aspect. He had beautiful articles of apparel. He met a tiger in the forest who wanted to eat him, and Sambo gave him his shoes. To the next tiger he yielded a coat, and to the next an umbrella. Then luckily the tigers met each other, and fought to the death. All were killed, and little black Sambo gathered up his fine apparel and walked away alive and safe, having lost nothing. The tigers want to eat little black Sambo. The tigers in the unconscious only want to eat small children because that is the most frightful punishment small children can think of as likely to follow their own wishes to eat up the parents. It is the one right thing the tigers can do. But it is possible to live if you give the tigers something to please them, something to mollify them. Then you may escape.

Now in both male and female conversion symptoms I find that physical suffering serves the purpose of propitiation. It is offered, so

to speak, to mollify, to turn the anger of the tiger to pity, to remorse. Existence, so to speak, is possible under this condition. The danger of being eaten up entirely is averted by being a sufferer. This means that one is ill, needs to be cared for, looked after. Put in other words I would say 'one is not dangerous'. It is another version of saying 'I am weak, I am so little, I am so powerless'. Here it is 'See, I suffer', and one must remember that, in proportion to the need to turn away the expected wrath, the suffering may be of a very high degree.

Not only would I think of the spectacle of suffering as a means whereby the projected anger into parents is to be mollified, but I think too that it serves a deeper wish of the unconscious. You remember Sambo's life was saved. So I think in the suffering the psyche finds a justification for keeping something which means to it 'existence'. I would think of it as a masochistic means of completely camouflaging the sadistic purpose, of neutralizing it, paying for it, suffering for it, but retaining it. 'No cross, no crown.'

The anxiety in connection with the original sadism to the parents is allayed by this suffering. Moreover the suffering is a bodily suffering which is the very essence of that which the child would cause the parents if its wishes were fulfilled. It is as though the child has been punished, but this suffering of the child is the very weapon by which it controls and subdues the parents, makes them kind and gentle. It is suffering that will draw the world to repentance for sin, and it is in this way that the tables are turned upon the parents instead of the parents visiting punishment upon the child.

The first quite sudden physical symptom displayed itself in an analysis lately in the case of a man who has a horror of physical ailments, a man who has a fine physique, kept fit by constant exercise. He dreamt of walking over ground where there were rabbits. He was having a day's sport and shooting them. A series of dreams followed this, all with one purport, viz. that of searching the mother's body for children and food. Finally we came quite clearly, *viâ* dream-material, to the anger he must have experienced at the transition from breast to bottle, and the sadism associated with the wish to grasp and crush the breasts. He came at this time to analysis with small blisters on his hands and shewed them to me. There was no accounting for them. He said, 'They are exactly like the blisters I get when I dig vigorously in the garden, but I've not done any of that for weeks'. The blisters disappeared in the course of a few days, but each morning he held his hands high enough for me to see him examining them minutely. This



is an instance of a sudden conversion-symptom appearing in a character analysis, and there was no doubt of its being offered as a propitiatory suffering, nor of its genesis in the sadism towards the mother's breasts.

In considering technique with regard to typical conversion cases, the first thing one must remember is that the masochism is in bodily form. We cannot analyse thoughts that are corporeal. Therefore our task will be the evocation of masochistic phantasies. The production of masochistic phantasy instead of bodily suffering means the beginning of a breaking up of the enclosed system of sadism, masochism, activity, passivity. By the release of the masochism in actual phantasy there will be released finally the sadistic phantasies with which the anxiety is bound. One must remember that anxiety has been alleviated and not resolved in suffering. While the system is maintained, it requires suffering to be intermittent or constant to alleviate the anxiety. But once the sadism is no longer cancelled out in that way, anxiety is freed and becomes analysable.

I will give you as a final illustration an extract from an hour's analysis that touched directly upon a conversion symptom. This hour you must think of as being in the middle of an analysis, when much work had already been done, but the conversion symptom was not yet wholly understood. The symptom was pseudo-angina. I extract only the relevant material from the hour.

(1) The patient comes in on the minute as usual and says hurriedly : ' I shall be in time to-morrow, but the next day I may be a few minutes late. Will it be all right ? Does it matter ? ' She lies down and continues : ' I have had angina again. I have it now. Such storms we are having—I think of ships and how can they help but go down and sailors drown ? '

(2) ' I dreamt of seeing through the chinks of a palisade and there was a man running. He was in shorts. You walk one way and he is running in the opposite direction '. Then after that ? ' Someone said " Always horses, only saw horses " '.

(3) ' There was Dobbin in the nursery, very important, though he had no tail, which I didn't pull out ; it was always out '.

(4) ' There was little Dobbin made for me when I wouldn't walk. Used to sit on him and ride about. Got tired when out with Nannie, and legs got tired, and I imagined all the horses I would ride on back home '.

(5) ' Man on a horse. How mixed up he is, he and the horse, like a centaur '.



(6) ' I played being Old Man of the Sea in green trousers at a Christmas party. Got on P.'s back. Ought to have had my legs round her neck, but would have broken her head off, so sat on her back. Laughed and laughed until I wanted to pass water '.

(7) " " My heart is like a singing bird  
Whose nest is in a water'd shoot ".

You remember Christina Rossetti's poem ? '

(8) ' That's a nice book of Virginia Woolf's—you remember about that, don't you ? ' [I do, I remember that the quotation above is in the book mentioned, and that Virginia Woolf sees a Manx cat in the middle of the lawn without a tail, and thinks ' Was he born so, or had he lost his tail in an accident ? ']

(9) ' I like " water'd shoot " . That first book I had, you remember the picture of the water spout ? Was it really ? Had anyone ever seen it ? Did the water go up from the sea, or down from the sky ? and a whale throwing out a spurt of water was there too ' .

(10) ' I used to go to the village of Burghley with Nannie, and when I saw it in the distance I used to get so mixed up singing about it to myself. It made me think of Bethlehem.

" " O little town of Burghley  
How silently you lie  
With your arched neck and glossy back  
That standest meekly by . " "

It would come like that though I *knew* I was mixing up Bethlehem and " My beautiful, my beautiful "—you know about the " Arab Steed " ? He sold him, and then I was so glad he flung them back his gold and kept the steed. But when he rides off into the desert he said that " he may have him for his pains " . I didn't understand he would ride him so quickly no one ever would catch him ; I thought he meant that if one had pains, then one could have the horse ' . [Have pains and have the horse.]

(11) ' You know when Granny read sad stories I wouldn't stay unless I could sit out of sight. I wouldn't cry, I wouldn't. I just kept the tears inside. Then your eyes hurt, your throat hurt, and you get a pain inside, just through not crying, through the tears being inside ' .

(12) ' Yes, the palisades ; I looked and saw the man running through the chinks. Always palisades round my imagined native village. I wondered about cannibals climbing over them and then what would happen next. Couldn't think—too awful ' . (Patient whistles softly.)



(13) 'The man runs one way, you run the other'.

(14) 'I imagined, if I met a giant, I just rose in the air and over his head'. (Patient says angina pain has gone.)

(15) 'How can boats not get wrecked, must go down in such big seas' . . . .

I will now point out the significant things in relation to the symptom in these associations.

(1) The imagery of water as power to destroy—drown.

(2) The centaur—horse and man (in the last part of dream, 'only horses'). In childhood all her phantasies were in connection with horses only. The centaur is the huge father. Identification with him by riding on Dobbin, by 'being Old Man of the Sea', when she thinks she could break her sister's head off. She laughs until she needs to urinate.

(3) She did not pull off big Dobbin's tail. She makes the reference indirectly to the Manx cat: 'Was the tail lost in an accident?'

(4) The father and mother are put into juxtaposition in 'Little town of Burghley; How silently you lie', and 'the Arab steed that standest meekly by'. Note that nothing is happening, there is no movement in connection with either.

(5) The desire to possess the Arab steed. It was to be possessed by pains. 'Have thee for his pains'.

(6) Notice how pain is produced by restraining tears.

(7) Her pain is in her heart. But her heart is like a singing bird whose nest is in a water'd shoot.

(8) From the whole analysis previous to this given hour I have the right to interpret the palisades into the railings of a cot. What she saw was her father facing her, at the bottom of her cot, and he was running, i.e. urinating. She 'runs' too in the opposite direction.

You must feel yourself into that situation of a tiny child seeing this spectacle for the first time. You will realize other accompaniments of the child's involuntary urination, such as excitement, anxiety, and the child's heart beating rapidly through new and strange emotions.

Fear and hostility were felt at that unknown thing. Her water and his water mean the same thing. To be as powerful as he, she must have him, her Arab steed, his penis. A little girl must be able to rise up and sail over a giant when she meets him. Her loss of control frightens her. It means that, being little, he can drown her, destroy her if she is his enemy. Losing control betrays her hostility. She becomes self-controlled, controls urine and tears. But the internalized hostility is

felt in her heart, displaced upwards from the genital organs to the heart, and displaced from the water to the heart, because of the association between anxiety and the accompaniment of the quickened heart-beat.

But the pain in the heart has the same purpose as that unconscious urination. She may have him for 'her pains'.

You will notice that the anxiety at the beginning of the hour was in connection with the idea of being late. This will be connected with the anxiety of a urination accident. Her first thought on the couch was of storm and seas, sailors, ships, drowning.

The angina attack passed off during the hour. This I would attribute particularly to all the free phantasy there was indicating the wish to possess the father, to have his penis, the memories of playing the male rôle, and finally to the clear way in which the pain denoted the indirect unconscious wish as much as the direct expression of it.

## VII

### TECHNIQUE IN CHARACTER ANALYSES

In speaking of character analysis I am going to refer you again to the angle from which I viewed the neuroses in the last lecture, namely, that of 'justification for existence', and shall review very briefly the unconscious motivations and their results in the real life of several so-called normal people under analysis. The number included married people with children, while one was unmarried but sexually potent, having intercourse with a lover without psychical disturbance when analysis began. None of these people, to begin with, had any manifest neurotic symptoms. By this I mean they did not suffer from any phobia, obsession, conversion symptom, nor were there any hysterical characteristics. In varying ways they got into sympathetic touch with psycho-analysis and for varying reasons underwent a course of psycho-analysis. Those reasons of course were due to unconscious motives, but these people I have selected form a very fair representation of normal character, the kind of result one would have, I imagine, if one took the first few people one met walking along a street.

In each case the shortest length of analysis has been a year, in others longer or much longer. In thinking of these analysands for the purposes of this paper, I asked myself if I could see any one unconscious dynamic in common between them. Regarded as normal people functioning in a real world, was there one dynamic factor that



united them in their obvious differences ? Again, if there was this one factor operating in so-called normal people, could I make any correlation with neurotic patients, and, if so, how did this factor work in neurotics differently from normals ?

The normals include men and women ; they were of the educated classes, and of a high standard of intelligence. Their effectiveness in the world of reality varied. Yet in their diversity I found at once one common dynamic factor that was related to this question of ' justification in existence '.

You will remember that I viewed the neuroses from this angle. I reconstructed the pattern of the ' denial of reality ' in the delusional case, the dynamic centre of which was a traumatic event in childhood. If the event did not occur, if the real did not exist, neither did the feared impulses. In this case the world had to be dealt with magically because of the terror of the omnipotent infantile sadism. The severity of the super-ego was such that in view of id-hostility the ego was only justified in existence, only *safe* in existing, by a concrete magical talisman, such as the proof of an uninjured mother and child in the figure of the cherished mother doll and baby doll. Moreover, unconscious hostility was annulled by work that was offered as a propitiation and reparation to the mother-surrogate.

I will pass from that to the case of the obsessional. I mentioned a typical case of obsession, in which was a very clear picture of the desperate struggle waged with unconscious hostility, the severity of the super-ego, and the magical system of repentance and omnipotent neutralizing of the possible results of the unconscious wishes.

I passed from obsession to conversion and found that the deepest level of conversion symptoms lies in the fate of the oral and anal sadism. In effect the hostile impulse is internalized ; the suffering which originally was directed against the object is borne by the self. But that suffering had the same goal as the hostility, namely, that of *attaining* by suffering instead of by inflicting suffering. The unconscious hostile impulses of the id are feared, because they cause the self to think that the external world will be hostile in return. There can only be destruction for the ego if these hostile feelings are shown. They are dealt with magically. Far from being hostile, the self becomes the sufferer, and in becoming the sufferer the ego is justified in existing. The conversion type feels little conscious sense of guilt ; the ego is not conscious of hostile impulses. They are magically annulled, expiated in symptom-formation. Therefore in dealing with technique in the



different neuroses I have kept a certain basic principle before your mind, namely, that the ego's severest task is in connection with the sadism of the id and the super-ego. The two severities are complementary. The modification of one is a modification of the other, and upon this modification depends the stability of the ego and its sense of security in reality.

In this attempt to get security various magical ways are employed, such as actual denial of reality, the system of obsession, the system of conversion symptoms. All of these to a greater or lesser degree mean the impairment either of a sense of reality or of functioning in reality, i.e. the ego suffers loss, shrinkage. Its supports are not won from the confidence it gains by dealing with the external world of people and things, but from magical systems and underlying infantile omnipotence.

Now in considering the normal people with whom I have had to deal, the question arose whether their normality depended upon less severe id-hostility and a less severe super-ego; whether the apparently more stable ego meant an absence of magical systems and less infantile omnipotent thinking. It seemed this must be so, since ego-functioning in reality was obviously so much greater than where neurosis was present.

The one essential difference I find between neurotic and normal is not that id-wishes are less hostile, not that super-ego severity is less implacable, not absence of magic, or less infantile omnipotence; but a *reality system* of some kind in which the conflict is played out, or annulled, in connection with *real* people and *real* things. This is never complete, of course, but the person who enjoys the most freedom from mental stress and feels the greatest ego-freedom will be the one who has made a maximum resolution of his conflicts in terms of real people and real things.

I must say I have never analysed a person who enjoyed this maximum of ego-freedom, this minimum of mental stress. I am told that such exist, but analysis of normals has given me a different result. I will speak first of a married woman with a family. Her life presents a picture of a normal reality-method of dealing with conflict. It is a human picture. She has sexual potency, sexual desires and suffers no inhibitions regarding gratification. She has children who are a vital interest and occupation to her. She has a keen mind and intellectually shares her husband's pursuits. She looks forward to a career of her own when the children are older, but there is no neurotic manifestation of that wish. She is not only content to deal with her maternal prob-



lems, but her wits are exercised to the full in making the best environmental influences for the children. She is dealing in reality with people and things the whole day and every day with actual effectiveness. Yet it is plain that anxiety that would produce a neurosis in another person is here spread over and through every activity, and gets its discharge, so to speak, daily in that way. The unconscious sadism that lies at the root of this anxiety finds endless ways of expression, not one of these being an actual serious display, but minor ones, such as a flash of temper here, a sadistic funny story told there, a slip of a pin and a scratch on a child, a surreptitious eating up of chocolates not her own. Alongside this there is equally throughout the day a discharge of continuous reparation, continuous making-up for this unconscious hostility, not in crude and ill-judged acts, but in charming and pleasing thoughtfulness, such as a gift to this person, a surprise for the children, a happy jest for her husband. Her very real object-relationships in life are bound up with anxiety concerning her unconscious sadism, so that the picture of reality itself becomes at times that of *reality as a phantasy*.

I indicated that the problem in the technique of analysis with the so-called normal person was the task of draining this anxiety from its ramifying channels of everyday life into the analytic one, and that the two pivots of this were (1) the recovery of childhood memories, and (2) the evocation of phantasy.

In this particular case the greatest leverage came *viâ* the evocation of phantasy and by the analysis of the unconscious reasons why she could not do certain things she wished to do. For instance she could produce real children, but she could not cut out and make a garment without anxiety. This meant that phantasies belonging to a task that was symbolical were terrifying, while reality itself was a constant reassurance. In cases of this type, where reality annuls anxiety, technique must be directed to tracking anxiety to the underlying phantasies. Therefore anything that can carry over a symbolical significance, such as the occupation here mentioned, will give one a pathway to explore.

I turn next to another analysand with whom there was a complete absence of neurotic symptoms as such. His purpose in coming to analysis was not originally for a therapeutic aim at all. Conscious mental stress was caused by external events. He had never, except through physical illness, been incapacitated from carrying on his life. Physical satisfactions were enjoyed.

An analysis of some length only brought me within sight of the ramification and subtlety of his malaise. A definite obsessional or paranoid patient would have presented no greater problems for technique. Here, instead of obvious and gross projection of hostility, there were displayed a hundred subtle delicate kinds of suspicion and distrust. Trifling ways were employed of watching and finding out if these suspicions were true. He was patient in distress, loyal and uncomplaining when he had cause enough to be otherwise. The truth from an unconscious point of view was that the real suffering he had to bear annulled the guilt concerning his unconscious hostilities. The reality was embraced and clung to for this unconscious motive, whatever the conscious rationalization was.

Technique in this normal case almost, if not quite, reached its rubicon. How to track the anxiety played out in reality terms, the constant shifting of the different rôles on to other people, the number of little infinite manifestations of paranoia, was a task that called for a super-psycho-analyst. Technique was called upon to bring the main unconscious conflict finally into terms of the analyst and analysis, to get to the direct unconscious wishes in place of the passive gratification by *not* phantasying. Active phantasy could be the only solution in analysis, and for this an immense barrier against anxiety could only be removed by unrecognizable progress, for of those deep unconscious hostilities he was unconsciously afraid.

I pass next to a more neurotic type of character and yet definitely not to be included within the term 'neurosis'. Inhibition and difficulties of adjustment were inwardly experienced, but no neurotic symptom and no failure to carry on in the external world was shown. In this case where the man would be called normal, the 'flight to reality' has succeeded so far that in all he can do actively with his hands he succeeds and finds satisfaction. This *real* dominance in terms of *things* extends to his power over women. I say 'things' advisedly. He finds no permanent mate, of course. In this case, after much analysis, I am beginning to see spread all through his daily life in isolated ways the neurotic symptoms which would appear in a neurosis more dramatically concentrated. There in one situation he exhibits anxiety, in that minor habit he is obsessional, a paranoiac tinging of his thought is detected elsewhere. When one comes to analysing the thoughts and actions of daily life, one finds the neurotic element appearing everywhere, and yet nowhere sufficiently for it to become a definite blockade to effectiveness in actual life. The safety



in all the real things that he can do and control, including his power over women, is that he is thus delivered from his unconscious terror-phantasies. He is in control, he can manage and master. He has proof that he is safe. His unconscious terror due to the unconscious sadism is that he is in actual bodily danger. He is afraid of phantasy. Consequently in all symbolical pursuits (his sublimations, for example, where he can only wield words, which are fraught with unconscious significances) he finds difficulty and inhibition.

Technique in a case like this is again to be directed to the evocation of phantasy. One has to track out where the obsession appears, where anxiety manifests itself, where paranoiac thoughts are expressed. I have found that transference indications are most likely to be reached in dreams. This type of patient will suppress thoughts about the analyst all the time, and unless every opportunity that the dreams afford is seized, the analysis will be stalemate. In spite of resistance to transference-interpretations, one will find that dream life is stimulated thereby and the work goes on. This type of patient is in very sore need of help, and help is given, however the patient may scoff at the interpretations.

I think, therefore, that analysis of a normal person is as difficult and often more difficult than that of neurotics. In the normal person we have to be prepared to find out where the flight from phantasy to reality has occurred, where reality has been used as phantasy. We shall be prepared to find normal character accompanying *physical* illness as distinct from neurotic illness. We shall have actual operations, actual accidents. The emphasis is on '*real*'. Our task will be to sieve the reality of life of the underlying interpenetrating and ramifying neurosis. Resistances and defences in normal people will be of many types. One hint I can give you about these. This is to notice just what the analysand dismisses and will not speak about. It is always our task to do this, but normal people priding themselves on normality can often talk of things that a neurotic finds difficult. They will not be frightened by real things. It is more likely to be phantasy, to be scientific hypotheses, philosophy, systems, religion, in fact all thought-products. These intangible things the normal will often hide, not the tangible and concrete, and only through the abstract and non-concrete do we get the psychical content that alone makes analysis successful.

How shall we judge when analysis is nearing completion? In the first place, the unconscious mind will never be completely analysed.



The acceptance of that fact is a good sign. Another good sign is when a patient gives up thinking that after analysis he will have no more conflict, no more trouble with himself or others, no more emotion, but will live happily ever after in a bliss of Nirvana. The definite disappearance of neurotic symptoms, the increasing confidence of the ego to deal with reality, constructive phantasy for the future, the ability to find a stable love-relationship and sexual maturity are all essential considerations in this question of ending an analysis. The completest test is if the patient has achieved a real ego-assurance, and feels justified in existing with satisfaction, without anxiety dogging thought and action. After analysis, when decisions and crises arise in real life, the patient should know what in himself will be the difficulties he must allow for and guard against. He should feel confidence in his ability to steer his own course.

I finish then by returning to considerations put before you in the earlier lectures. Psycho-analysis, which arose as a branch of medicine, finds itself faced not only with the sick in mind, but with the whole problem of the psychical development of mankind. There is a different *result* of the internal conflict in the so-called normal from the result we see in definite neuroses, but there is no difference in the actual unconscious conflict that lies beneath consciousness. Even with patients who come to us suffering from definite symptom-formation, our conception of our task must be greater than that of cure of symptoms; our task is analysis, and in that analysis the symptom falls into place as something inevitable, depending upon an unconscious psychological constellation.

A knowledge of the different mechanisms of neuroses is useful as book knowledge in analysing neurotic patients. It gives a feeling of security to the analyst to know this psychical construction, something to look for when the patient is definitely an obsessional, a paranoiac or conversion case. It is imperative to have this knowledge. We must also know that it will not give us analytical *technique*. Technique only comes through our own inner knowledge, our own analysed unconscious. The truth of this is nowhere borne out so clearly as in character-analysis. The more normal the individual, the more does the analyst find the need of real depth of analysis in himself, not only to see the intricate successful systems, but to find a way for the truth behind the system to express itself. That is, the normal person has as great a task as the neurotic in reaching conviction, as great a task in undergoing analysis, and I would add that to be a successful analyst of



normal people needs the most thorough-going analysis on the part of the analyst.

There is a goal that every scientific worker should surely set himself, be he the most stable and normal of beings. Upon our approximation to attainment of it depends the future both of psycho-analysis and technique. Scientists as much as other men in other callings become emotionally entangled with their discoveries. Their rancours and their differences and their hot beliefs are no whit less free from their unconscious drives than those we meet in the arts or in politics. Perhaps through the discipline of personal analysis we shall be able at last to attain to a really scientific attitude because there, if attainable, would be the least possible bias due to unknown unconscious motivations. That gives us the goal of personal analysis for the scientific worker. It is not achieved by the attitude of mind which says 'I am a fairly normal person, I ought to be analysed in a few months'. There has been no envisaging of the range and implications of psycho-analysis when one's attitude is 'I am a normal person and I do not need psycho-analysis'. To think that, especially if the thinker is a practitioner, is to be a conjurer, a worker of magic. It is to be blind to the fact that we are all enmeshed in the magical thinking and doing that lies under the veneer of our civilization. The self-imposed goal of the psycho-analyst should be self-knowledge. Therapeutic results may happen by the way, but the goal is beyond that. Self-knowledge means working through all our shibboleths, our rationalizations, self-delusions and self-deceptions to a clear understanding of how we are as we are, why we are as we are, to an intimate knowledge of our own unconscious life, of the sources of our emotions, so that we can always be ready to recognize our bias, our blind spots and pitfalls. It means the possibility of a more and more conscious extension of the ego, which thus knows through self-knowledge more how to use the dynamo of the unconscious. This is quite a different thing from the happy but ignorant personality in which adjustments have happened fortunately, which is excellent for life, but not enough for a person who would practise psycho-analysis.

The future of technique and of psycho-analysis depends upon workers who see that deeper and more thorough personal analysis alone will give us the greatest chance of being truly scientific and objective. We have to experience and gain our convictions as though they were new for the first time. They must be new for us individually, if we are going on to the unknown beyond what is already known.



One cannot take oral sadism, anal sadism, the Œdipus complex for granted and go on from there and build up new theories. We have to live these things into conviction first through our apprenticeship. That is how our *psychical* equipment is gained for technique. At the moment, in the present, the future of psycho-analysis lies with us who are all students. Our community has its difficulties, but there are two ways through those difficulties, in addition to common sense and goodwill. One is by a determination to work our problems out in terms of ourselves, not in terms of others, that is, to make the same demands upon ourselves that we should make upon a patient. That is integrity. The other is that in psycho-analysis, beyond all other sciences and arts, through our own self-knowledge we should be able to find a unity and comradeship beyond all personalities, in which our single purposed search after truth should bear fruit, through us as individuals and through us as a community.



## THE PRINCIPLE OF ENTROPY AND THE DEATH INSTINCT

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In the psycho-analytical theory of instincts the death instinct occupies a peculiar position. Some psycho-analysts are of opinion that it is entirely superfluous, while others make use of it as of a notion based on proved clinical experience. Freud constantly reiterates that this notion is conjectural,<sup>1</sup> and he holds that we must not regard the instincts of death or Eros as ranking with the other propositions he has laid down in his theory of the libido. In his view, with the assumption of the death instinct that theory enters the realm of speculation, for here it oversteps the boundaries of psychological or psycho-analytical methods, since the notions of the death instinct and Eros purport to embrace biological facts—indeed, the universal behaviour of nature (the stability principle). Many uncertainties, confusions and errors arise from the circumstance that we do not always sufficiently distinguish between the different meanings attached to the one word: 'instinct' [1].

As we know, from the psychological standpoint—i.e. as concrete forces within the personality (id, ego and superego)—Freud differentiates the sexual instinct and the instinct of destruction. In antithesis to these stand the speculative biological notions of Eros and the death instinct, by which we mean not so much forces within the personality, but the most universal behaviour of living substance. They are principles, or, if you like, natural forces, but not instincts in the narrower sense of the word. The term 'death instinct' denotes the fact that everything living is of limited duration, has a beginning and an end, and it represents the course of life as the restoration of the inanimate state in which life originated. 'Eros' denotes the constant prolonging of life through reproduction and the aggregation of ever-greater organic masses in increasingly complicated unities. This clear distinction between the 'speculative' (biological) and the psychological standpoint has been frequently emphasized by Freud; nevertheless, it is still possible for misunderstandings to occur because he

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<sup>1</sup> Not only in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* [11], but also, e.g. in [12].

now seeks to abolish this differentiation by enunciating a fundamental principle. He tries to connect the two instincts (the sexual instinct and the instinct of destruction) with the extrapsychic natural forces (Eros and the death instinct). He looks for analogies for the two last within the ego and discovers there Eros, in operation as the sexual instinct, and the death instinct operating as the instinct of destruction. It is this idea which really belongs to the realm of theory and which is, on the one hand, rejected as empty speculation, and, on the other, employed uncritically as a proved fact.

Now that Freud has overstepped the boundaries of psychoanalysis, not only in the direction of biology, but also in that of physics,<sup>2</sup> it is the more urgently important to decide whether in his speculation he is misusing an analogy which takes us nowhere or whether he has introduced into biology and psychology a new natural scientific theory. For he expressly emphasizes the fact that he is identifying the death instinct with the general principle of stability in nature [11].

The decision is especially important for our theoretical study of the psychology of energy and instinct. In this connection we might borrow a criterion from the methodology of the natural sciences and say that similarities between physical, biological and psychic processes may be appraised as more than mere analogies if they can be demonstrated to be special cases of some more comprehensive natural law.

Freud states clearly that he regards the death instinct as the special biological case of the principle of stability [11]. The pleasure principle, which subserves the death instinct, is presumably the psychological special case of that principle. Opponents of Freud's theory of the death instinct, who scent mysticism and religion in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, have entirely overlooked this fact. The conjunction of physical, biological, physiological and psychological facts and laws is neither inadmissible, 'unscientific', nor (as has actually been suggested) meaningless. It depends altogether on whether we have any concrete success in demonstrating that a hitherto unknown case comes under a general law; but endeavours in this direction by no means deserve to be dismissed as speculative or as *a priori* inadmissible from the standpoint of methodology.

How far removed the Freudian conception is from mere physico-psychological analogy is shewn by that important part of his theory of

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<sup>2</sup> And of late also of the history of cultural development [15].



the death instinct which represents the pleasure principle as a special case of that instinct, shall we say on the level of the system P.<sup>3</sup> What is remarkable about this hypothesis is, surely, just that it unifies apparent opposites, not things analogous. Self-observation and naïve perception and evaluation discern in death and pleasure merely irreconcilable opposites. Freud maintains that there exists a hidden functional connection between these two apparently entirely heteronomous spheres.

It cannot, of course, be maintained that he has proved this. It is not, however, his purpose merely to announce dogmatically a paradoxical and bewildering theory ; on the contrary, he develops it into a true working hypothesis in the following sentences : ' The pleasure principle seems directly to subserve the death instincts. . . . At this point innumerable other questions arise to which no answer can be given. We must be patient and wait for other means and opportunities for investigation ' [11, p. 83].

Let us now see whether the conceptions of a dual system and its energies propounded by us [3, 4, 5] will help to corroborate these ideas of Freud's in some respects.

He takes as his starting-point the principle of stability, but in our view this does not formulate with sufficient precision or concreteness the facts intended to be conveyed. In its most recent form, that adopted by Petzold, it runs as follows : ' Every system left to itself and in process of development ultimately terminates in a state of more or less permanence, or at least in a state which either no longer contains the inherent conditions for further change or else contains them, at any rate over a long period of time, only to a negligible extent ' [16, p. 241]. Whether we accept this formulation or the very similar one by Fechner or Spencer [6], what is connoted by the principle of stability is simply this : that all movement and, indeed, all change are of limited duration. Leaving aside a possible philosophical content, this statement scarcely advances us beyond the confines of naïve knowledge. Nor do we gain anything by drawing an analogy between the states of repose and death,

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<sup>3</sup> [In a previous paper (*Imago*, B. XVI, p. 66) the authors divide the organism into two systems : (1) central apparatus, which is roughly the same as the central nervous system (system P) ; (2) system of cells (system C), which consists of the rest of the body. In a unicellular organism these systems are represented by the nucleus and the cytoplasm.—Translator's Note.]

the formula then being that everything set in motion leads to death. The value of the principle is still further diminished by the reflection that motion and rest, life and death, are concepts of relative significance and can never be grasped except in reference to a given system in relation to other systems, or else in reference to a particular level in a given system. Thus the 'macrocosmic' repose of a stone which has just fallen to the ground connotes intensified movements of a 'microcosmic' nature (thermal motion of the molecules), and the state of repose in a sleeping human being implies repose in the system P but intensified activity (growth) of the integrated systems C. Rest and motion, life and death, cannot be defined with precision at all, i.e. they are dialectical opposites. So long as we deduce from them universal modes of behaviour, we remain in the realm of philosophy.

The facts connoted by the principle of stability find pregnant and concrete formulation in the theory of energy. We shall not discuss whether this theory exhausts the content of the stability principle in its physical aspect. We will confine ourselves to the theory of energy because it has sufficient theoretical substantiation and because it must be considered first of all when we are dealing with our psycho-analytical problem. This theory includes the quantity and trend of those changes which are the subject of the stability principle, and it formulates quite plainly the condition which, in terms of that principle, is called indefinitely 'repose' or 'death'. The second main thesis of the theory of energy is this: that all physical processes in any isolated system have a definite trend, namely, towards the equalization of the different intensities [*Intensität*] of the system's energies; a state is aimed at in which such differences no longer exist, that is to say, a state also in which no movement can any longer take place by means of endosystemic factors alone. Such an ultimate cancelling out occurs only when differences in *temperature* are equalized (when *mechanical* differences of intensity are equalized, oscillations arise which, in the process of equalization, create fresh differences); hence, what the second main thesis affirms is that this maximum state of repose can occur only when all the energies have been converted into heat.

This state to which every isolated system (and so, perhaps, the whole universe) tends acquires the maximum durability, for it must last as long as the isolation of the system (of the universe) lasts. But, even here, there can be no talk of a state of absolute repose, for the 'microcosmic' thermal oscillations of the molecules persist. On account of the macrocosmic permanent rigidity of the system in its



'ultimate state' it has been held to be analogous to death and termed 'thermal death'. A more exact term is 'the more probable state' (Boltzmann), and the measure of this is called *entropy*. Henceforward we will give this second principle of the theory of energy the not wholly accurate but concise name of the entropy principle and speak of the entropy law or the tendency to entropy.

Interesting philosophical discussions have taken place on 'thermal death', and the attempt has been made to prove that it is not inevitable, or at least to leave open the possibility that it may not involve the death of living matter. In support of this view Stern [19, 20] has cited in a brilliant passage Fechner's law, which, he says, represents the most favourable situation that we can conceive of for organisms which are endeavouring to maintain themselves in spite of constantly diminishing differences of intensity in their environment. Fechner's law makes organisms dependent not on the absolute but the relative degree of the differences in intensity; hence it is possible for them to exist up to the point of zero. In recent times the most important attempt to handle the problem has been made by Nernst [18], who endeavours, with the help of new findings in physics, to prove that it is inadmissible to apply the entropy law to the universe. We may spare ourselves this discussion, for we are concerned exclusively with systems which are finite in space and time. To these, however, applies the third principle of thermodynamics, the theorem of Nernst, according to which it is not possible to reach zero in finite systems. It is true that in a concrete system all differences in the intensity of energy may be equalized, so that there exists in it only more thermal energy; but it is impossible by means of any exosystemic influence wholly to withdraw this energy from the system and thus reduce its temperature to absolute zero. Accordingly, although from the macrocosmic standpoint absolute repose is attainable, there is bound up with it a corresponding increase in microcosmic (molecular) motion, and this can never be wholly destroyed. Absolute repose is unattainable.

Our discussion of the death instinct will be more fruitful if we take as our starting point not the stability principle, but the entropy principle. The first question we must ask is whether the death instinct can be conceived of as a special case of the latter principle in the realm of organic process.

There is no need for me to prove here that this is the trend of Freud's argument; but I must point out that, even if it be demonstrated that the entropy principle is identical with the death instinct



and death with the 'probable state', his train of thought would not be exhausted. For with the death instinct the historical character of all instincts plays an important part, and Freud holds outright that this instinct represents the striving of organic substance to return to the *earlier* state of inanimate matter. In a consideration of dynamics this historical factor must be disregarded. This is self-evident, but by emphasizing it afresh we may guard against confusion with the Ostwaldian or similar natural philosophy and escape the reproach of substituting physics for psychology.

To adduce the required proof is, of course, beyond our scope, for biology and physiology to-day have not yet progressed beyond the rudiments of a dynamics of the life-process. Nevertheless, it is certain that the processes of life are fixed. It is characteristic of such processes that certain conditions within the system compel the transformation of energy to follow a cyclical course, so that the initial phase is constantly reached again. So long as the exosystemic accession of energy is ensured and so long as the conditions within the system which cause the cycle remain unchanged, the fixed system endures. 'Death' occurs only as an accident in functioning. Many biologists do, in fact, hold this view. The life-processes themselves (apart from traumatic injuries) produce a progressive deterioration of the 'machine', and this, when the so-called necrobiotic processes have reached a certain point, results in the final impairment of the conditions of the cycle, i.e. in death. 'Death is evolved from life' [20, p. 160]. We must conceive of death as in some sense a functional accident which, from birth on, is gradually prepared for by deficiencies of functioning. It is inevitable, because the conditions of the cycle are very complicated and the factor of safety in the machine is indeed low; but, in principle, it is merely an accident, an inadequacy.

'Death as an incident', as Ehrenberg says [8, p. 29]—the isolated process of dying in the individual—would, according to this view, not subserve entropy. 'Death no more furnishes energy than does the breaking of an electric current' [8, p. 29 ff]. Yet it must be pointed out that the result of death is the dissolution of the system, i.e. that at death considerable differences of intensity between the system and the environment arise, which during life (indeed, precisely by means of life) were compensated. All the same it is true that, after a certain period, dissolution results in their ultimate equalization, which life prevented. These contradictions can be explained if we make use of our concept of the individual as a dual system. We differentiate the



processes in the cells (system C) from those in system P. Death is an incident which overtakes the latter system and destroys its regulating function, with which is inseparably bound up the existence of the cells which now undergo dissolution. Of course this accelerates the attainment of equilibrium in system C, which becomes subject to the laws of physics instead of those of life. For system C the death of its superior system signifies accelerated equalization; the death of system P, we may say for the moment, 'subverts the entropy' of the cells. For the entropy of system P (i.e. for the height of its potential = difference of intensity between the central apparatus and the body) no concrete significance can be attributed to death, because what death annihilates is precisely the relation between the parts of the dual system.<sup>4</sup> The system P keeps the common reckoning of energy for the cells and endeavours to hold the 'balance of energy' steady. At the moment when the death of the system occurs, it is futile to ask whether the accounts balance, for they no longer exist. The cells appropriate the balance and each keeps its own account, which the physicist can check by his measurements. Thus the question is not whether the death of system P signifies an increase of entropy in that system,<sup>5</sup> but whether life has the function of increasing the entropy of it.

If the death instinct is to be conceived of as an instinct at all after the incident which we call 'the death of an individual', it cannot be held to be a special organic case of the entropy principle, but (and this is Freud's opinion) it must be historically determined, like all genuine instincts.

Nevertheless, from the dynamic standpoint the dictum that for the living organism 'the goal of all life is death' has ample justification if the concepts in question are suitably defined. It is gratifying to be able to quote a biologist in this connection.

Ehrenberg builds up a biological theory upon the basic idea of the irreversibility of the elementary life-processes. Life consists in a continuous structural process, the growth of substance at the expense

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<sup>4</sup> Moreover, the same statement seems to apply to the living system C which is also a dual system (plasm and nucleus) of a lower order, whose death is brought about by cariolytic.

<sup>5</sup> An observation by Crile [7, p. 536] seems actually to indicate the contrary, for after death the electrical potential difference between brain and body, which at the moment of death had the value  $O$ , rises again.



of fluid ; it consists of the utilizing of energy-intensities to build up substance from which no more work can be extracted, which is partly secreted from the body and partly precipitated within it as cell-nucleus structure (apparatus structure). The structural substance (e.g. the cell-nucleus) determines the velocity, intensity, etc., of the subsequent life-processes. It is this metabolism, this substance-formation, this dying which constitutes life. What we call the life of an individual is the integration of countless elementary life-processes to form a unity determined by the structures which produce those processes. Every individual elementary life-process leads to the irreversible binding of the energies in structure, i.e. to 'death'. The life of the individual aims at the filling of the 'vital space' with structure ; its intensity and duration are determined by the gradient between the vital space and the amount of structure it contains. At any point before the end (which can probably never be reached) the 'incident of death' may bring the process life-death to a standstill.

Freud ascribes to organic substance the tendency to strive after stable conditions and to achieve lasting states of repose, and he calls the agent which executes this tendency the 'death instinct' ; it seems that we may not unreasonably anticipate that biology and physiology, as they advance, will adduce cogent evidence that this tendency is the special case of the entropy principle for organic systems. The death instinct (using the term in the sense attached to it in biological theory) is, if we leave aside the historical factor, rightly regarded from the standpoint of dynamics as a scientific and not a merely speculative hypothesis. Of course the words 'death' and 'instinct' do give prominence to the historic factors in the behaviour of a system, and this easily leads to misunderstanding. We should probably therefore be wise, when considering the death instinct in this sense (which is entirely in accordance with Freud's view), to reserve for it the term 'Nirvana principle' [10].

The attempt to see in the pleasure principle the psychological special case of the entropy principle must for the moment remain at a very rudimentary stage of theory. If we should succeed in evolving satisfactory methods for measuring the libido, we should no doubt be able to arrive at an exact proof of this hypothesis, arguing from the principles of psycho-analytical psychology. Freud has repeatedly shown that the problems of the pleasure principle are *quantitative* and ranks them as a separate economic standpoint. According to his economic hypothesis, pleasure is experienced when quantities of



excitation within the psychic system are diminished and pain when they are increased. He does not overlook the fact that this experience does not depend on the absolute quantities and that possibly the quality of the tension plays a part [12]. If we could demonstrate experimentally that these quantities of excitation and tension represented quantities of energy, we could prove that the decisive part of the individual's whole behaviour is regulated by the entropy principle [12].

Our first attempt at an experimental computation of libido [5] testifies clearly to the correctness of Freud's theory of pleasure, provided that we guard against vague analogies in our discussion. According to our findings, the potential of the individual is raised in the state of repose (sleep), hence repose does not represent increased entropy ; on the contrary, the differences in intensity are considerably augmented. To try to draw an analogy between repose and 'entropy' would result unfavourably for the psycho-analytical theory of instinct. But the state of repose of system P must not be construed as a state of physical equalization of account of the phenomenon of rest. It is obvious that, during sleep, system P is to a great extent eliminated. Directly the individual awakes and motor actions occur, which are regulated by system P, the potential is lowered. Whilst retaining the notion that P is a superior system, we may assert that its function is to lower, and keep low, the potential, which rises as soon as P is eliminated. This elimination (the state of repose) produces a dynamic situation in opposition to the principle of entropy : hence system P 'subverses entropy'.

In one of the sleep-curves plotted by Mosso [5, p. 180] we see that in restless sleep, talking during sleep, etc., there is always a decrease in the temperature-difference (which, according to our view, is a factor of the potential). We cannot immediately reject the supposition that the lowering of the potential during the state of repose corresponds to dreaming. In dreams the system P once more comes partly into play, its function being to guard sleep. Without anticipating future experiments, we might conjecture that this is another proof that system P operates to increase entropy. We thus arrive at the notion (which is in accordance with the practical findings, if not with the theories, of the biology and physiology of sleep) that out of the lively metabolism of the cells during sleep there accumulates a considerable measure of potential difference, which presses to be lowered. The individual awakes, the energies are personalized [4] and are diminished by the psychic work performed during the waking state. We may even say



that spontaneous waking occurs because the potential has become too high. The curves of sleep and narcosis [5, p. 181] do indeed show that, with awaking, the potential begins to be lowered. So, from this point of view also, partial awaking—dreaming—with its lowering of potential must be looked upon as ‘guarding sleep’.

The waking, rested system has a large store of potential, while the exhausted system has a minimum. At first sight it seems from the dynamic point of view almost self-evident that potential is lowered by the working of system P; for work uses up energy. But when we realize that in the waking state a constant stream of energy flows into system P (e.g. through the process of perception), and when we remember that various considerations have forced us to conceive of muscular activities as not merely using up the energies of P (on the contrary, part of these energies is augmented by muscular action) [4, p. 112], the question arises how that system’s function of lowering the potential is achieved. The waking, rested individual displays a lively inclination towards the stimuli and objects of its environment; it craves for stimulus and finds pleasure in the gratification of this craving. This mode of behaviour is especially characteristic of the sexual instincts, where it takes the form of attraction and attachment to an object; but we have evidence of it in connection with the instinct of destruction also. The result of this turning towards objects is that the system receives accessions of energy, and this seems the more unreasonable because it is just when the system is rested that it has a very high potential, whereas in a sleepy state with a low potential it cuts itself off from stimuli. At first it seems that the fact of the craving for stimulus is in direct contradiction to a tendency in the system P to keep the ‘sum of excitation’ as low as possible. Here we are faced with the same problem in the psychological aspect as the life-instinct presents to the Nirvana principle.<sup>6</sup>

If there is really a contradiction to the entropy principle here, the explanation must lie in the mechanical conditions of system P, and it must be only apparent and ultimately capable of solution. In the thermodynamic-osmotic model of the dual system P [4, p. 82] the potential difference between the sphere (central apparatus) and the

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<sup>6</sup> In our subsequent argument we shall modify and give a greater exactness to Bernfeld’s argument [1] that the solution of the problem of craving for stimulus and delight in it lies in their agreement with the Nirvana principle.



cylinder (system C—'body') arises from the fact that the initial temperature of the former is lower than that of the latter. Autonomous equalization of temperature is impossible because the temperature of the cylinder is kept constant. It would appear that the easiest way to secure in the model a minimum of potential (the difference in temperature) would be to prevent fresh energy being conducted to the cylinder from outside. This is in accordance with the kindred psychological notion that through the avoidance of stimuli, i.e. through narcissistic isolation, the 'excitation-level' is kept low. But the potential can be kept constant through isolation in the model only, not in a living organism, for in the latter the potential is raised endo-systemically. In the model the potential can be lowered only by conducting new energy to the cylinder which, according to the mechanical conditions, must be transferred to the sphere, so that its temperature is raised and the difference in temperature—the potential—between cylinder and sphere is diminished. The model's mode of functioning corresponds exactly to the apparently paradoxical behaviour of system P. Only if it receives fresh energy can its potential be lowered. This energy is conveyed by waking psychic activities and is guaranteed by the psychic phenomenon of the craving for stimulus. Libido directed towards the outer world, all the activities of self-preservation and many of those of the instinct of destruction, fulfil the dynamic function of lessening the difference of intensity in system P—lowering its potential. That is to say, they increase the entropy of that system. From the dynamic standpoint Freud's view that the life instincts pave the way to death is most exactly correct. The pleasure principle is the most general conscious regulator of the individual's behaviour. In its function of avoiding pain and achieving pleasure and in its modified development as the reality principle it accomplishes the lowering of the potential in accordance with the law of entropy. Through the pleasure principle the objects, actions and affects, which, dynamically regarded, are processes tending to raise the entropy of system P, become valuable for pleasure and for life itself. When the optimal entropy has been reached, that system has fulfilled its task and 'goes quietly to sleep'; its function is suspended. But when it ceases to operate to reduce the amount of energy, the potential once more is quickly raised to a degree which rouses system P to work again.

If, then, the experience of pleasure is associated with a lowering of potential and if this acts, as we may say, as a physical force, the



question arises how it comes about that pain is experienced at all or that there is any painful tension other than that of quite brief duration which is immediately cancelled by pleasure?

According to the view of Fechner and Freud, it would seem natural to include amongst painful experiences those processes in the system P which are contrary to the conditions of pleasure—that is to say, to assume that pain occurs when the potential of the system is raised. What are the conditions in the dual system under which the potential is thus raised for considerable periods, contrary to the 'natural trend' of the processes of nature?

In discussing perception we endeavoured to show [4, pp. 80 and 88 ff.] that through the operation of the intensities of the environment energy is conducted to system P and, through personalization, lowers that system's potential. This energy reaches the central apparatus through the sense-organs. The potential is lowered through the conducting of energy to the central apparatus and through its personalization, i.e. through the raising of the level of energy in one part of the dual system. On the other hand, this conduction of energy depends on the difference of intensity between the cells and the central apparatus, and therefore on the presence of the potential. If the latter is considerably lowered it must entail difficulties in the mastering of the energies conducted to the system through external stimuli. The energy so conducted must remain in the sense-organ, in system C (in our model, the cylinder) and augment its intensity, thus raising the potential. It is evident, then, that the conception of a dual system enables us to interpret pain dynamically. Pain is associated with conditions in which the potential is low, as we assume it to be in fatigue before sleep. This is in accordance with our empirical knowledge, for it is characteristic of these states that stimuli are felt to be painful and the objects from which they proceed are shunned and eliminated from consciousness.

When the potential is high, the individual's behaviour is characterized by a readiness to turn towards objects and to desire them libidinally. So we could describe as narcissistic or as a flight from objects the state of minimal potential, in which stimuli and objects are shunned (in our model this state is represented by equality of temperature in the cylinder and the sphere). Dynamically we must conceive of the craving for stimulus and flight from objects as two easily differentiated modes of behaviour of system P. Both aim at the increase of entropy but under different mechanical conditions. From the discussion of the economics of energy in the dual system when the



potential is low, we gain some light on the question which had to be left open at the end of our second work [4]: painful conscious processes occur when there is a difficulty in augmenting the intensity in the central apparatus, i.e. in the transport of energy from the cells to that apparatus.

The reason why human life is accompanied by so much pain, in spite of the pleasure principle and the physical tendency to entropy which this safeguards, must be sought in the conditions of the dual system which, given a certain distribution of energy, may lead to temporary malfunctioning. That this possibility is, in fact, so abundantly realized is due to all the social and psychological conditions and complications of natural processes, upon which psycho-analysis throws all the light we need. There are historical influences (ontogenetic and phylogenetic detours, and others imposed upon the individual by the conditions of his social station, which have now become historical) forbidding us many of those activities which would lead to a pleasurable equalizing of tensions. In a word, the restrictions of instinct which reality and the super-ego impose on the system P are the cause of the painful states so remarkably common and persistent.

It is very probable that constitutional factors, i.e. exceptional mechanical conditions, make it physiologically difficult to equalize the potential difference and so provide an opportunity for the excessive development of pain. Or they may permanently keep the potential difference very low, making the individual in question either chary of stimuli or over-sensitive to them, apathetic and narcissistically secluded in himself. Above all we should expect that any pathological structure of the central apparatus would be an important factor here (understanding by structure the energy-capacity in both senses of the term [4, p. 88 ff.]).

As far as it is possible to make an assertion before experimental psycho-analytical work has been done, it seems quite conceivable that the pleasure principle may be demonstrated to be a special case of the entropy principle on the level of system P.

But with this conclusion we have not reached the end of the task which we set before us in this paper, for Freud's argument to which, so far, we have exclusively adhered has hitherto had but little place in psycho-analytical discussion. When we speak of the death instinct, we are struck by a whole series of other elements in Freud's construction: above all, there is dying as an incident. We sometimes find



psycho-analytical writers expressing the view that the premature death of children, or even of adults, is a manifestation of their death instinct (cf. Ferenczi, 9). From the nature of the case there can be no clinical proof of the correctness of this opinion, for it is part of the essence of the death instinct that it is not readily noticeable and sometimes cannot be detected at all. From the dynamic-economic standpoint it is impossible to decide whether this hypothesis is justified. As against it we may point out that, as we have shown, dying is not a concept which can be expressed in terms of dynamics, and that probably it cannot be adopted as an instinctual aim in the proper sense of the term. Freud has constantly asserted that dying and death cannot be instinctual aims for the id. Hence the question is only whether they represent an aim of the ego or a demand of the superego. Nevertheless, we would freely admit that a constant starvation of the erotic life or constant dissatisfaction and pain may have a very injurious effect upon the functioning power of system P. In suicide it certainly seems as though we had a direct manifestation of the 'death instinct'. Of course, in examining suicide analysis constantly reveals nothing else but complicated libidinal situations, implacable demands of the superego, identifications and, finally, a hatred of the subject's own ego or person, which feelings can usually be shown to have their origin in relations with objects. The mysterious factors in suicide, the intensity of the hate or other qualitative characteristics which are difficult to understand, possibly have not much to do with the final result: self-destruction. Like the corresponding factor of sadism these should probably be attributed rather to the instinct of destruction than to the death instinct (Nirvana principle).

But in psycho-analytical discussion it is just the instinct of destruction which constitutes the real difficulty. In *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* Freud recognizes as the pleasure principle within the ego the death instinct of biological speculation (an idea to which, so far, we have confined our discussion). Since then, however, it has become increasingly clear that he is seeking to identify the death instinct with the instinct of destruction, and in his terminology the two are interchangeable. The question is whether it is justifiable so to identify them even from the dynamic-economic standpoint. We shall show that this is not so unless the death instinct which Freud identifies with the instinct of destruction has already acquired a meaning other than that attaching to the term in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, where it is regarded as a special case of the stability principle. His writings of



recent years do not lead to any final decision on the point. But it is noteworthy that he accepts the death instinct (or instinct of destruction) as a psychological fact—a dynamic, and no longer an economic, fact. He does not attempt to describe it in terms of biological theory, nor does he link it up with the stability principle. He views it as a counterpart to the sexual instinct, but not in relation to the pleasure principle. We read, for instance: 'We must confess that it is more difficult for us to detect the latter [the death instinct] and to a great extent we can merely conjecture its existence as a background to Eros, also that it eludes us wherever it is not betrayed by a fusion with Eros' [15, p. 101].

The instinct of destruction and the sexual instinct give rise to two easily differentiated modes of behaviour of the individual in relation to his environment; undoubtedly they are to be construed as two different instincts. Instinct is the urge to restore a lost situation of gratification [11]. Though it is not possible to name with certainty any definite situation of this sort which can be attributed exclusively to either of these two instincts, yet on the whole the trend of the instinct of destruction is to recover gratification by annihilation of the environment and probably also by isolation of the subject from objects. The sexual instinct aims at attaining gratification by turning towards the environment and by retention of objects, i.e. by their preservation. Love is characteristic of the one instinct, hate of the other. They are certainly both of a biological nature, but not, like the death instinct, simply hypotheses in biological theory: these two easily distinguishable modes of behaviour may be demonstrated as concrete facts in the animal world also, right down to the protozoa. Freud observes that it was extraordinarily difficult for psycho-analysis to recognize the instinct of destruction [15], but it is for the biologist precisely the behaviour motivated by destruction which is an uncontestable fact, while it is more difficult to discover love-activities not associated with a sexual instinct tinged with the tendency to destroy. Even when studying earliest infancy we see clearly that originally, in the first weeks of life, the predominant behaviour is rejection of the stimuli of the environment, exclusion and 'hatred' of them [Bernfeld, 1]. When the environment gradually begins to become interesting and stimulating, the infant's first aim is to master it in order to annihilate or reject it orally; finally this urge to mastery issues in an active, aggressive, destructive phase which imparts to the child's pregenital development an obviously sadistic character. In



*Psychologie des Säuglings* [1] all these facts are classified under a single heading according to the primal aim: that of restoring the repose of sleep, which has been interrupted by the disturbing values of the environment and by hunger-stimuli. To this group we give the name: 'repose instinct'. The term 'destruction instinct', however, describes subsequent development very much more clearly. This is the supremely conservative instinct which aims at preservation of the state of sleep—narcissistic repose—which feels and treats the world as an interruption to be escaped or annihilated. Ontogenetically the instinct of destruction as a guardian of sleep, as hunger, as an urge to mastery, is the earlier. It is in connection with the gratification of this instinct that the infant discovers the pleasure of the erotogenic zones and, through modification, restriction and transformation of the activities which it motivates, passes on to manifestations of tenderness and to libidinal object-attachment.<sup>7</sup>

The study of the sexual instinct and that of destruction (even if extended to include all living beings), the demonstration of the differences between the two, of their origin, mutual determinants, the development of their aims, the individual and secular evolution of the

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<sup>7</sup> A more precise account cannot be given here of the reasons for the view which we are advocating and of which Bernfeld [1] has given a detailed exposition, namely, that a very close connection exists between narcissism and the instinct of destruction. In his work on *Fascination* [2] he shows that the preliminary phases of libidinal identification are conditioned by the suppression of motor activity (mastery). Perhaps if we follow this line of thought we shall be able to arrive at more concrete ideas about the energy of the instinct of death or destruction as contrasted with libidinal energy [15]. In the following remark Freud seems to hint at the affinity between narcissism and the instinct of destruction, on the one hand, and the process of binding with libido, on the other: 'But even where it shows itself without any sexual purpose, even in the blindest frenzy of destructiveness, one cannot ignore the fact that satisfaction of it is accompanied by an extraordinarily intense narcissistic enjoyment, due to the fulfilment it brings to the ego of its oldest omnipotence-wishes. The instinct of destruction, when tempered and harnessed (as it were, inhibited in its aim) and directed towards objects, is compelled to provide the ego with satisfaction of its needs and with power over nature' [15, p. 101]. Perhaps this affinity inspired Cohen-Kysper with the idea that the goal of the death instincts is repose and that they aim at lulling to rest . . . Eros, the disturber of the peace [6, p. 405].



means of gratification—all this lies within the sphere of the *qualitative*. These are problems which are germane to Freud's dynamic conception. Though the instincts may be characterized generally as being directed towards gratification, and this may in fact mean the restoration of a state of repose or equilibrium, and though we may even identify this equilibrium of 'release from tension' with a physical equilibrium—nevertheless, all this is merely a quite general proposition inadequate for the characterization of an instinct or its differentiation from other instincts. The gratification aimed at (even if it were in the physicist's view an increase in the entropy of the system) is in every instance a qualitatively determined situation, which has become historic and has certain conditioning factors which are extradynamic. From the point of view of dynamics there is no sense in considering it except in its *quantitative* aspect. The qualitative and historic factors must be considered from other points of view. They will of course be comprehended in the dynamic-economic purview also, in so far as they enter into the mechanical conditions of the system or the integrated subsystems. We must leave it to future investigators to examine whether in the case of the instinct of destruction and the sexual instinct these factors do so co-operate.

But we may venture to make a suggestion. In deriving pain from the mechanical conditions of the dual system we have become acquainted with a state in which the dynamic intensity is so distributed that it is necessary to eliminate and annihilate the sources of excitation (i.e. objects) in order to secure the minimum of potential. This probably corresponds to the psychic situation in which stimuli from the outside world are felt as disturbing factors which must be annihilated if they cannot be ignored—it corresponds, that is to say, to the instinct of destruction.

On various occasions and from various standpoints Freud has made a number of statements about the death instinct. If we were to summarize all that he has said about it under a single heading (because he uses the same term throughout) the result, from the standpoint of dynamics, would be a notion full of contradictions, for he alternates dynamic with economic considerations. The 'death instinct' is synonymous with the instinct of destruction, its partner is the sexual instinct and it is a dynamic concept in the theory of instinct; yet at the same time it is an *historic* concept, definitely comprising qualitative elements. It is to be found in the ego like the sexual instinct, with which it generally appears in combination, and, though it possibly



presents more problems for research than that instinct, these problems are of the same nature. Being ubiquitous, it has biological validity. Being, like the sexual instinct, on the boundary-line between psychic and physical concepts, it is a subject for physiological, but not for dynamic, examination.

The death instinct is something 'other' than the instinct of destruction only when we use the term to connote the biopsychic special case of the principle of stability; to physicists a more significant way of expressing this is to say: when the term 'death instinct' is used to denote the general tendency to entropy in all natural systems. We should be wise not to employ the term 'instinct' to describe this general behaviour of systems. For such a terminology obscures the problem of the function of the instincts (instinct of destruction and sexual instinct) in the general behaviour of the system, i.e. the equalization of difference of intensity.

If this exposition contain a germ of truth, then Freud's notion of the death instinct loses, it is true, the fine philosophical flavour which makes it at once so attractive and so controversial. For to the antithesis: instinct of destruction—sexual instinct, he opposes the antithesis: death instinct—Eros. In the physico-biological notion of the death instinct Eros has no place. The theory of energy has no cognizance of any partner, rival or opponent where the law of entropy is concerned, or at least of none other than the 'mechanical conditions' which in certain cases lengthen the way to entropy and enforce detours. Moreover, the combination of increasingly large masses of substance to form single entities is not in accordance with the trend of the physical process; on the contrary, this aims not merely at the dispersal of energy, but also at the dispersal of substance. From the point of view of physics the philosophically satisfying idea of 'forces opposed to death' has little meaning: from the standpoint of dynamic theory it has none at all. The death instinct, regarded as the behaviour of a system, has no partnership with Eros. Eros is not a mode of behaviour of systems in general; it belongs specifically to organic systems. Similarly, the tendency to destruction does not connote physical behaviour of systems in general: it, likewise, is specific for organic systems. These two modes of behaviour may, in the strictest sense of the word, aspire to the title of instinct—that which differentiates the behaviour of organic systems from the inorganic.

One might possibly have the impression that these ideas tend to a monism contradicting the dualism of instinct upon which Freud



insists. In particular, when we compare libido with free energy (potential of the individual) [4, p. 104] we may well be struck by a resemblance to the psycho-dynamic monism of Jung, his equation of libido and energy (primal libido). This is not the place in which to discuss Jung's theory. What he calls '*Energetik*' (dynamics) [17], has little more than the word in common with the physicists' concept of energy. It is precisely when we wish to establish the dualism of instinct that we lay special emphasis on the monistic character of energy and distinguish it from the multiplicity (dualism) of the instincts. Energy is the sum of the capacity for doing work. Hence it is the 'same' energy which operates as the libido and as the motive power of the instinct of destruction. The free energy of the system P, its potential, can be measured only by a 'monistic' computation. The potential is directed, moreover, to one end only, as is all dynamic movement in nature—namely, towards diminution. Certain specific organic conditions of the system compel organisms to follow this trend in two modes qualitatively so different, accompanied by such opposite phenomena and consciously felt to be so incommensurable. To revert to the language of psycho-analysis, I refer to the manifestations of the instinct of destruction and the sexual instinct.

We have tried to find out something about these specific conditions of the system. When the course of dynamic processes in a dual system, subject to the mechanical conditions of osmosis, is such that a single potential difference exists between the two parts of that system (central apparatus [brain plus nervous system] and cells [body]), the entropy-law impels it to a lowering of the potential. So long as the latter does not exceed a certain minimum, it may be lowered by cutting off from the system supplies of energy from the outside world. If, however, this minimum be exceeded the potential can be lowered only by the accession to the system of fresh quantities of energy. Hence our physicist's model can achieve its entropy in two opposite ways. These correspond respectively to narcissistic-destructive and to object-libidinal behaviour. It would be more accurate to say that, dynamically, these two modes of instinctual behaviour are identical with the two modes of behaviour in the model. So that, without for a moment abandoning our theory of the dualism of instinct, the single trend of the physical processes in the system is maintained. Indeed, this 'referring' of the two instincts to the single dynamic process which comprehends them both adds certainty to Freud's thesis that from the dynamic standpoint the two are essentially different.



The general behaviour of systems is associated with the principle of Le Chatelier [3]. This lays down that every system resists the influences of the outside world, its aim being 'self-preservation', and is a special formulation of the more comprehensive entropy principle. It applies to systems in stable equilibrium. System P cannot behave simply in accordance with Le Chatelier's principle, for it is only in special border-line states that it has a stable equilibrium (or at any rate for short periods of time, e.g. in sleep). In these states the system's behaviour does actually consist of nothing but the simplest activities of resistance or yielding—it is motivated by the 'instinct of repose' (the instinct of destruction). In general, however, its task is not merely to strike a balance of energy, which would soon lead to a stable condition in its relation to the outside world, but it has also to master the differences of energy arising within it and therefore it has need of the more complicated mechanism of the craving for stimulus, libidinal behaviour and the sexual instincts.

From the hypothesis of the dual system we draw the conclusion that the sexual instinct and the instinct of destruction alone can claim to rank as instincts: the specific behaviour of living systems (osmotic dual systems). The death instinct in the sense of the Nirvana principle represents the general behaviour of natural systems (the same applies to the so-called instinct of 'self-preservation' [3]) which, on the level of system P with its historical mechanical conditions, is secured only by the operation of the instinct of destruction and the sexual instinct.

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COMMENTS ON BERNFELD AND FEITELBERG'S  
' THE PRINCIPLE OF ENTROPY AND THE DEATH INSTINCT '

BY

REGINALD O. KAPP.

Analogies between some psycho-analytical theories and some of the laws of physics must have struck many people. Such analogies can be made to appear more or less close according to the form in which the physical law is expressed. If the form chosen is that of a mathematical equation, no analogy will appear to exist. But let it be in words that may appear to personify nature, and analogies will be readily found. If the law of entropy is rather loosely expressed as the law of de-gradation of energy, one need only ignore the hyphen to perceive a resemblance to the history of the human race. If one expresses the same law in terms of the tendency of a self-contained system to reach equilibrium, a different analogy leaps to the mind: that of life longing for death. These provide occasions when people whose training has been more literary than scientific think that they are beginning to ' understand ' science at last.

The authors of the paper under discussion do not pursue analogies in this naïve way. They make it quite clear that they are discussing identities, not analogies. Their argument is that certain psychological instincts, namely, the death instincts, obey the second law of thermodynamics, known as the law of entropy.

Entropy is a number occurring in thermodynamic calculations to which it is convenient to give a name. It is usual to express this number in terms of a quantity of heat divided by a temperature. The law of entropy says that in a self-contained system this number increases with time. If the law is to apply to psychology, there must be a concept there which can be represented as heat divided by temperature. To believe that the law of entropy holds in psychology is to believe that numerical values have a meaning in that science.

This law deals with transformations of energy. The word ' energy ' was used in a psychological sense, as in the expression ' he is full of energy ', before it became a technical term in physics. In consequence people unacquainted with the technical meaning are liable to assume that the identity of terms implies an identity of meaning, and they tend to ascribe to the inanimate world a property observed in human beings. No doubt educated people will try to correct this error as



soon as they become aware of it, but they are liable to revert to it again and again unless they can grasp what the physicist means by the word 'energy'. This term can be described in a variety of ways. Though these all look different, they are merely various ways of saying the same thing. Energy is very commonly expressed as a quantity of power times time. It is used in this form in our electric light bills, when we pay for kilowatt-hours. It is also a quantity of the square of length times mass divided by the square of time. It is also a quantity of velocity times momentum. When we meet a quantity of any of these things, we know that we have a quantity of energy. If we meet a quantity of something else, we know it is not a quantity of energy. If it is a quantity of energy, the law of entropy applies to it. If it is a quantity of something else the law does not apply. The death instinct theory can only be an illustration of this law if it deals with energy as defined above. If that is so, the law of entropy is bound to hold and the author's attempt to prove this by other means is superfluous. The only legitimate way of proving that a law may be generalized from one set of phenomena to cover a further set is to show that identical concepts occur in both sets. Instead the authors are satisfied to show a vague similarity of processes.

Their argument can be restated like this: The law of entropy states that in a self-contained system energy-changes result in an increase of a quantity which is heat divided by temperature; the theory of the death instinct states that in a living being a desire for death results in the increase of a quantity which is certainly not heat divided by temperature. We are asked to accept these two statements, which are barely analogous, as identical.

Even with greater resemblances than this example presents, one can only accept the theory of such an identity if one believes one of two things: either that the quantitative concepts of physics, such as time, length, mass, velocity, momentum, energy, power, force, entropy, etc., all have their place in psychology; or that the concepts underlying the laws of physics are those with which the student of human nature is familiar. That is to say, one must believe that power in physics has something in common with mental power, force with personality, that energy and libido mean much the same thing, that the laws of physics are governed by impulses and wishes of nature as are those of psychology by the impulses and wishes of individuals. The authors' occasional misuse of technical terms suggests that, if they went into the matter, they would find that they had dropped into



the second error, the anthropomorphic one. That is not quite surprising, since it is not so many centuries since physicists themselves did the same thing. It was said in Toricelli's day that nature 'abhors a vacuum'. Nowadays we no longer attribute likes and dislikes to inanimate matter. But yet the authors believe that a law of physics can cover both the impersonal occurrences in the inanimate world and the personal likes and dislikes of people. How can this be, if psychological motives do not operate to govern such occurrences in nature? Without such confusion the authors would hardly use the expression: the system personality 'subserves' entropy. They mean that personality causes an even greater increase in entropy than would occur in a system left to itself. A parallel statement would be that a pressure pump subserves nature's *horror vacui*. The implication is that nature adores an increase in entropy as much as it abhors a vacuum.

Admittedly the authors seem to have an inkling of the anthropomorphic danger. After saying: 'The term "death instinct" is used to denote the general tendency to entropy in all systems', they add: 'We should be wise not to employ the term "instinct" to describe this general behaviour of systems. For such a terminology obscures the problem of the function of the instincts (instinct of destruction and death instinct) in the general behaviour of the system, i.e. the equalization of the differences of intensity'. To avoid the difficulty of ascribing psychological motives to nature, the authors suggest dropping the concept of instinct out of their generalization of the law of entropy. Since instinct is the subject-matter of psychology, that is equivalent to withdrawing their generalization from psychology and denying what the paper is written to prove.

This paper is by no means an isolated instance of a confusion of psychological and physical concepts. Not infrequently people with active minds and no more knowledge of pure science than is acquired by a year's university course in physics and chemistry may be heard to say: 'I believe that some day, somehow, science will explain all mental phenomena. It will be found that they all conform to the laws of physics. The laws of energy will be extended to embrace mental as well as physical energy. Libido will be discovered to be a chemical substance'. They do not realize that the aim of physics is to exclude from its field of study everything that is personal, that pertains to individual minds, that, in fact, is psychological. The concepts left for physics to deal with are then found to be purely quantitative.



That will help to explain that the law of entropy serves to answer questions that are put in the form: 'How much?' Those are not questions with which psychologists are most concerned. They ask: 'What will happen?' when studying behaviour, or, 'What does it feel like?' if they are studying pure psychology. Experiments with test-tubes and pith-balls, which constitute most elementary science lectures, create the impression that a law of physics must necessarily be concerned with questions of the 'what will happen' variety. The proper nature of the technical terms used in physics does not come to be appreciated by such students.

Several passages in the paper under discussion suggest that the authors have some such misapprehension of the nature of technical terms. Thus they say: 'According to our findings, the potential of the individual is raised in a state of repose (sleep)'. From the context it appears that they have measured experimentally something which they call potential and which they believe to have a bearing on the state of entropy of the living body they experimented on. Such measurements would be vastly complicated and are probably impossible. Such experiments as have been made on the energy-equations accompanying physiological processes have not succeeded in proving even whether or not living tissues obey the law of entropy. The entropy-increase that can be deduced from the test-results is always smaller than had been expected. Perhaps the authors measured the electrical potential across the insulating nerve sheaths. That would be an extremely minute quantity and bear no relation to the entropy state of the body. That is merely a guess on my part, based on the observation that electricity is often considered to have a privileged position among physical concepts. It is spoken of as if it had an almost metaphysical significance, or as if it were a vital fluid.<sup>1</sup>

The authors even conclude from their potential measurements that the entropy of the body decreases during sleep without outside influence. They attribute this to psychological causes. In the waking body they

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<sup>1</sup> Since writing the above I have seen an earlier publication by the same authors, from which it appears that the measurement referred to as potential is the difference in temperature between brain and rectum. I regret that I mistook the plane on which the authors' investigations were conducted. It should be noted that heat in the brain and heat in the rectum bear as little relation to the state of entropy of the body as any electrical measurements do.

think the entropy increases in accordance with the physical law. So living bodies obey the law of entropy while awake and disobey it during sleep! That is an odd argument to use as proof that the law applies in the field of psychology.

At least two passages reveal a similar misapprehension as to the nature of energy:

'Life consists in a continuous structural process, the growth of substance at the expense of fluid; it consists in the utilizing of energy-intensities to build up substance from which no more work can be extracted, which is partly secreted from the body and partly precipitated within it as cell-nucleus structure. . . . It is this metabolism, this substance-formation, this dying, which constitutes life'.

Apart from the odd view that life is characterized by the turning of fluids into solids, the statement is quite incorrect that no more work can be extracted after this process has been completed. However the substance may have grown of which the world's coal and oil fields are made, nearly all the work required for our needs is extracted from it.

Even more surprising is the remark that energy reaches the central apparatus through the sense-organs and is stored there. The energy we receive is contained in the food we eat and in the oxygen in the air we breathe. It reaches us through our mouths and not through our eyes and ears. It is stored in the various tissues of our bodies. One can only surmise here that the authors have been influenced by the colloquial use of the word energy into thinking that the difference between a psychological stimulus and physical energy is so slight as not to matter.

It would appear, therefore, that the conclusions in the paper would not have been reached if the authors had appreciated that the fields of study of physics and psychology are separate. This failure is further illustrated by a remark in the paper about the nature of death. We are told that motion and rest, life and death, are 'concepts of relative significance and can never be grasped except in reference to a given system in relation to other systems, or else in reference to a particular level in a given system'. That may or may not be true of motion; but can one say that the distinction between life and death has relative significance only? Does it depend on the reference to a particular level in a given system whether the leg of mutton I had for dinner belonged to a live sheep or a dead one?



# FREUD'S THEORY OF INSTINCT AND OTHER PSYCHO-BIOLOGICAL THEORIES

BY

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*Introduction—The Development of Freud's Theories of Instinct, with special reference to the Pleasure-pain Principle—Fechner's Principles of Stability—The Theories of Bernfeld and Feitelberg—Ferenczi's Expansion of the Idea of Repetition-Compulsion—Can a Useful Principle of Stability be Formulated?—Conclusion.*

## INTRODUCTION

One of the most difficult though most important studies in the domain of psycho-analysis is the investigation of the relation of the pleasure-pain principle to instinct. Many psychologists do not agree that there is any important relation between them, but Freud insists on the principle of seeking pleasure and avoiding pain as the mainspring of action, and this view is in keeping with the rest of his deterministic psychology. For the purpose of the present discussion this principle in one form or another will be accepted as valid.<sup>1</sup> I shall first describe the changes which Freud's ideas on this question have undergone and then deal with the possibility of formulating a fundamental principle describing the behaviour of living organisms. It has evidently been Freud's aim in psycho-analysis to find basic principles similar to those found in other sciences which will describe at once large fields of varying data. He has not succeeded in obtaining any very concrete definitions, as he himself readily admits ; but it is important, if any advance is to be made in this direction, to understand as far as possible the nature of the principles already formulated.

## THE DEVELOPMENT OF FREUD'S THEORIES OF INSTINCT, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE PLEASURE-PAIN PRINCIPLE

One of the great advances which Freud made in psychology was the introduction of dynamic factors : that is to say, he studied processes and their mutual reactions rather than states. This enabled him to form a conception of unconscious mental activity. But the

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<sup>1</sup> A discussion on psychological hedonism from the psycho-analytical point of view, by P. Federn, will be found in *Zeitschrift f. Psychoanalyse*, II., p. 492, 1914.

introduction of dynamic factors involved the formulating of fresh principles. The origin of the new principles is perhaps to be found in Breuer's part of *Studien über Hysterie*<sup>2</sup> where he describes the hypothetical conservation of energy in the nervous system. Later on Freud took up the idea that increase of instinctual energy and its discharge were connected with pain and pleasure respectively, and he used this to explain dream mechanisms and symptom-formation. In 1911<sup>3</sup> he definitely stated that the unconscious mental processes—the older primary processes of the mind—were governed entirely by the pleasure-pain principle. But he went on to say that in certain conscious processes another principle became operative, namely the reality-principle. Acting in this way the mind conceived no longer that which was pleasant but that which was real, even though it should be unpleasant. These ideas were followed up in the *Introductory Lectures* (1915-17) in relation to two groups of instincts (1) ego, or self-preservative, instincts, and (2) libido, or sexual instincts. The latter group followed the principle of pleasure-pain throughout their development, pleasure being in some way connected with the lowering and pain with the heightening of the amount of psychic energy (here called stimulation). The ego instincts at first behaved in the same way, but in the course of their development they replaced the pleasure-pain principle by a modification of it in which gratification was postponed, certain pleasures renounced, and a degree of pain endured.

The next theoretical step which Freud took was expressly to link up his ideas on pleasure and pain with those of Fechner,<sup>4</sup> who had previously seen a relation between pleasure and stability on the one hand and pain and instability on the other hand. Freud described his idea of pleasure and pain being concerned with the decrease and increase of instinctual energy (here called excitation) as a special case of Fechner's hypothesis. He qualified his statement by saying that in many circumstances the goal of complete stability was only approximately, or relatively, attainable. If the mental apparatus could not be freed from excitation entirely, the disturbance was kept at a low or constant level. This concession enabled the reality-principle to be brought into line with the pleasure-principle. In subsequent writings Freud stated

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<sup>2</sup> Cf. pp. 169-170, Edn. 1922.

<sup>3</sup> 'Formulations regarding the two Principles in Mental Functioning,' *Collected Papers*, IV., p. 14.

<sup>4</sup> *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, 1920.



quite clearly that these are both derived from the same tendency to stability.<sup>5</sup> I shall follow up this discussion later. Next, however, we must turn to the question of the position of instinct with regard to these principles.

In the psychology of last century the Law of Association was a most important theory. In the new psychology it gave place to the dynamic conception of *repetition-compulsion*. This was first a clinical phenomenon—the acting-out of memories—but recently Freud has expanded the conception to apply more generally to instinct. On the one hand, he described the importance of repetition in children's play and, on the other hand, he said that reproduction expressed the need of the organism for the restoration of previous conditions.<sup>6</sup> By means of repetitive processes of this kind the pleasure-pain principle was satisfied.

Among psycho-biological processes Freud perceived a duality of instinct represented by Eros and the death instinct. It seems that he was very much influenced by Weissmann's theory that in the organism there are two parts, one (germ plasm) destined for reproduction and the other (soma) for death. In the psychological sphere Freud regarded these elements as conflicting with one another and as being represented roughly by the two groups of instincts described as libido and ego instincts. So far the theory is plain ; but difficulties at once arise when the pleasure-pain principle is introduced.

We should suppose from previous reading that the libido would be entirely controlled by the pleasure-pain principle ; but we find that Eros, which is identified with the sexual instincts, is described as bringing disturbances into the pleasurable downward career of the living organism. Again, we are told that the pleasure-principle stands in the service of the death instincts. But in so far as these are identified with the ego instincts we should rather have expected the reality-principle to stand in their service. Evidently the problem is a very complicated one and Freud has finally been obliged to postulate three principles in order that a description of the pleasure-principle as ' the watchman over our lives ' be not altogether abandoned. These three are (1) the Nirvana-principle, expressing the tendency to absolute rest, characteristic of the death instinct, (2) the pleasure-principle, representing the tendency of the libido, and (3) the reality-principle,

<sup>5</sup> ' The Economic Problem in Masochism,' *Collected Papers*, Vol. II, p. 256, 1924.

<sup>6</sup> *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*.

expressing the influence of the outer world. All three principles have something in common, namely, that they tend to preserve some constant condition.

#### FECHNER'S PRINCIPLES OF STABILITY

In order to ascertain what kind of constancy can be common to these principles we next examine the actual definitions from which Freud states that he has derived his own conceptions. Fechner<sup>7</sup> defined four states: (1) *absolute stability*, a continuous state of rest of the particles or masses of which a system is built; (2) *complete stability*, a condition in which, although movements take place among such particles or masses, these movements always lead back again to the same initial configuration in equal intervals of time continually; (3) *approximate stability*, in which a condition approximating to complete stability is attained, and (4) *absolute instability*, a condition in which the particles or masses of a system continue to be scattered indefinitely.

We can see at once an analogy between the aims of Freud's three principles just mentioned and the first three states defined by Fechner.

In the principle of *complete stability* there is an element of repetition which falls in line with the periodicity observed in instinctual happenings. It is interesting that Freud should have chosen to derive his ideas from Fechner rather than from other psychologists, many of whom have formulated principles of a similar kind.<sup>8</sup> It seems likely that Fechner's conception of rhythmical occurrences constituting stability was the deciding factor.

Freud does not use the term *stability*, but speaks of the constancy of certain quantities of *excitation*. Translated into terms of excitation Fechner's states could refer to conditions of (1) absolute freedom from excitation, (2) constant excitation (i.e. relative freedom from excitation), and (3) relatively undisturbed constant excitation. We shall return to this aspect of the subject at the end of the paper.

#### THE THEORIES OF BERNFELD AND FEITELBERG

The discussion up to this point has led us to the conclusion that some kind of tendency to stability—if at times only approximate or relative—is regarded by Freud as the fundamental unifying law

<sup>7</sup> *Einige Ideen zur Schöpfung- und Entwicklungsgeschichte des Organismen*, p. 28.

<sup>8</sup> See a summary of these views by Imre Hermann, *Zeitschrift*, VIII, p. 1.



governing psychological as well as biological events. Now physicists have formulated what appears at first sight to be a similar law governing physical events, namely the *second law of thermodynamics*. This law states that, on the whole, in the physical world unstable conditions tend to become more stable in the course of time. In a series of papers in *Imago* <sup>9</sup> Bernfeld and Feitelberg attempt to shew that the two laws are the same. If we do not inquire too much into what is meant by stability there would seem to be a *primâ facie* case for the attempt. Moreover, the present trend of biological science is to interpret everything in terms of physics; here the same trend is observed in psychoanalysis. Before discussing these views it will be necessary to consider what the laws of thermodynamics are and before dealing with the second law it may be well to consider the first.

The first law of thermodynamics is the principle of conservation of energy formulated so as to include heat energy. It states that the change of the energy of a system when it passes from one state to another is independent of the path between the two states. A principle analogous to this is involved in what is known to psychoanalysts as the *economics* of mental life. Freud states that the *economic standpoint* <sup>10</sup> is that from which we try to follow out the fate of given volumes of excitation. Whatever displacements and substitutions take place in the discharge of instinctual energy, from the economic point of view it is the total lowering of excitation that is important. There is no more than a vague analogy here, unless instinctual energy be accepted as a form of physical energy or some simple function of it. And whether this is so or not is a point which has been much debated <sup>11</sup> by psychologists, but I think I am right in stating that no physicist would dream of there being anything in common between these two conceptions of energy. Physical energy is detected by measurements ultimately made with clocks and rulers, whereas mental energy in Freud's sense has not yet been measured at all.

Bernfeld and Feitelberg do maintain, however, that this mental energy and even libido are measurable. The actual experiments which they quote in order to prove their point are inadequate. They assert <sup>12</sup>

<sup>9</sup> *Imago*. Bd. XV, p. 289, Bd. XVI, p. 187, p. 173.

<sup>10</sup> 'The Unconscious,' *Collected Papers*, Vol. IV, p. 114.

<sup>11</sup> See, for example, D. Fraser-Harris, *Brit. Journ. Med. Psych.*, 1927, p. 203, and R. D. Gillespie, *Brit. Journ. Psych.*, 1925, p. 266, the former in favour of the reality of nerve-energy and the latter against.

<sup>12</sup> *Imago*, 1930, p. 184.



that the temperature difference which appears to exist under certain circumstances between the brain and other parts of the body is a direct indicator of libido changes. It should be pointed out that such temperature differences as they quote must be due to circumstances which affect the temperature regulation of the body—sweating, alteration of the peripheral blood supply, etc., and cannot be due to heat changes in the nerve cells, because the heat changes within a nerve are of the order of 1/100,000,000 of a degree. All the same, it would be no good considering their views further unless the possibility of measuring libido energy is accepted, so let us assume this to be so for present purposes.

So much for the first law of thermodynamics, but what about the second? The second law is concerned with the energy available for carrying out mechanical work. It can be stated in several forms and has a variety of implications. For the purpose in hand it will be sufficient to consider two aspects of it. One aspect is that spontaneous changes in nature are irreversible: the initial state of a system cannot be restored from the final one by the system's own efforts: the energy available for mechanical work is reduced, and this implies that potential energy is reduced and kinetic energy or free energy is increased. In passing, it is worth while noting that throughout Freud's analogies he seems to favour the opposite terminology to that in general use, calling potential energy *free energy* and kinetic energy, which we call free energy, *bound energy*.<sup>13</sup> The authors of the *Imago* articles repeat Freud's use of the terms *free* and *bound*.

The other aspect of the second law of thermodynamics which comes into consideration here is concerned with the probability of occurrence of physical events. Physical systems tend to pass towards conditions which are of greater probability of occurrence. A state in which a great deal of potential energy is available is more likely to be followed by a state in which a small amount is available than for the reverse to occur. Another way of stating this is to say that a certain mathematical function of the probability of the state of a system, called the 'entropy', tends to increase.

Now Bernfeld and Feitelberg, assuming that the first law of thermodynamics applies to the mind, have attempted to demonstrate two

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<sup>13</sup> Freud says, in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, that the *binding* of the energy which flows freely into the mental apparatus consists in the transition of *free-flowing* energy to a state of rest.



main conclusions: (1) that in living organisms the entropy tends to increase and that this is the cause of their death, and (2) that the second law of thermodynamics, or tendency for entropy to increase, is the same as Freud's principle derived from Fechner's stability principle, which is the tendency of the death instinct.

Both conclusions are open to numerous criticisms. With regard to the first, these authors are not the only people to study the problem of the relation of entropy to living matter. The view has been propounded that in living processes the increase of entropy is retarded.<sup>14</sup> This is the reverse attitude, and it can be supported by the following line of argument. The events which happen even in the most elementary living matter, not to speak of phenomena such as reproduction which are obviously complex, are of a degree of probability almost inconceivably small; and as development increases so does the improbability. This is not at all like the second law of thermodynamics when stated as the tendency for the most likely events to occur. Certain other writers have taken a view which agrees more with that of Bernfeld and Feitelberg and suggest that the life-processes in general tend to accelerate the natural dissipation of energy in the universe.<sup>15</sup> Bernfeld and Feitelberg, however, seem to regard the acceleration as restricted to conscious processes. The divergence of opinion on this subject seems to depend upon whether anabolism or catabolism is considered characteristic of life. Actually, both the building up and breaking down of potential energy are characteristic. While death is an irreversible change, many cellular changes are reversible. Living organisms require to be in places where plenty of potential energy is available; but they very often use this energy extremely rapidly for mechanical purposes.

The study of living matter from the physico-chemical point of view, carried out in artificially isolated circumstances, reveals no necessity for assuming that there is any contravention or modification of the two laws of thermodynamics operative here. But physical laws cannot be directly applied to the total living organism by itself because, unlike a laboratory apparatus, this is a changing system which grows in size and moves from one place to another. Taking all these things into consideration it must be regarded as very doubtful whether the assertion that in the living organism entropy tends to increase is true, or even has any meaning at all.

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<sup>14</sup> J. Johnstone, *The Mechanism of Life*, 1921.

<sup>15</sup> J. T. Cunningham, *Modern Biology*, 1928.



As regards the second conclusion of the authors of the *Imago* papers, there are also criticisms to be met. What connection is there, for instance, between Fechner's definition of stability, and the stability towards which physical events move when entropy increases? Nothing is more improbable in the universe than to find any system of particles or masses in a state of absolute rest. On the other hand, Fechner's condition of absolute instability, where particles are scattered at random, is more in accordance with the probable trend of events. Further, the precise restoration of the previous configuration of a system is one of the most unlikely things in nature. Therefore, the tendency of the second law of thermodynamics is to an entirely different conception of stability from that defined by Fechner and apparently accepted by Freud.

The theories of Bernfeld and Feitelberg which lead up to their second conclusion are unsatisfactory in other ways. They divide the animal into two systems, the *personal system*, the central apparatus or central nervous system, and the *cellular system*, made up out of the remaining cells of the body. This dual system has similar properties, they say, to the dual system, comprising the nucleus and cytoplasm of a single cell.<sup>16</sup> There is no biological justification for this analogy, because the central nervous system is an ectodermal structure, belonging to the same system as the outside skin from the developmental point of view. Moreover, the dual system of these writers can have no connection with the dual system of germ-plasm and soma, which Freud derived from Weissmann, and which lends support to the hypothesis of a death instinct. In fact Bernfeld and Feitelberg's conception of the death instinct pays no attention to the biological standpoint. Thus we have seen that both their conclusions are open to serious objections. Their papers in *Imago*, however, shew what tremendous difficulties are encountered in an attempt to solve the problems which lie at the root of Freud's recent developments of psycho-analytical theory.

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<sup>16</sup> One of their reasons for making this analogy is the desire to derive the Weber-Fechner Law from first principles. Following Abderhalden they find an analogy between this law and osmotic pressure. Their whole discussion on this topic, however, is unnecessary to the main thesis, and involves many other doubtful assumptions. For instance, they say that we perceive only the *intensity* of stimuli. They therefore must neglect the best example of perception according to the W-F law—the appreciation of pitch of sound—which is an *extensive* stimulus.



FERENCZI'S EXPANSION OF THE IDEA OF REPETITION-  
COMPULSION

Following Freud in enlarging the idea of repetition-compulsion to include biological events, Ferenczi<sup>17</sup> outlined a scheme for unifying biological and psychological conceptions of instinct. He saw examples of repetition-compulsion in embryonic recapitulations, in birth and in sexuality. The repetition of previous events is not always of a simple kind, for example, the part played by the organism may be reversed. In certain respects conjugation is the reverse of fission and the sexual act is the reverse of birth. Further, when an animal dies it returns to a condition of disintegrated matter similar to that from which life can be supposed to have arisen. In this way the urge to return to a previous condition, which is characteristic of instinct, explains death. Similarly, Freud wrote at the end of *The Ego and the Id* that there was a likeness between the state of complete sexual satisfaction and death, and he referred to the frequency of the association between death and reproduction among the lower animals.

An advantage of describing a fundamental principle in terms of repetition of events, rather than in terms of energy, is that it avoids the complications involved in borrowing concepts from physical science. And by laying the emphasis on the importance of repetition of events a qualitative interpretation can be made of Fechner's stability principle, which, as we have seen, cannot be interpreted easily in terms of the laws of physics. Freud recently stated that the qualitative peculiarity of the changes concerned with pleasure and pain is more important than the quantitative factors.<sup>18</sup> He wrote: 'Perhaps it [the qualitative peculiarity] is something rhythmic, the periodical duration of the changes, the risings and fallings of the volume of stimuli . . . '.

An interesting way in which Ferenczi's attitude is much closer to psycho-analysis than Bernfeld and Feitelberg's is in his treatment of pathology. Psycho-analysis makes no distinction in its methods of investigating the normal and the pathological. The two latter authors, however, do not concern themselves with pathology and they therefore neglect the very important idea of reaction to a trauma. Freud noticed that repetition-compulsion was most marked when it followed circumstances involving stimuli of traumatic intensity. Ferenczi

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<sup>17</sup> *Versuch einer Genitaltheorie*, 1922.

<sup>18</sup> 'The Economic Problem in Masochism.'



expanded this idea into the hypothesis that the origin of instinct was to be regarded as traumatic—the disturbance of some previous state of comfort. He even touched on the suggestion that the origin of life itself was a traumatic occurrence. This damage could only be undone in dying. But for the time being living organisms, by repeating the traumatic process in reproduction, maintain as constant a condition as possible. This conception of the death instinct is rejected by the *Imago* authors because it is teleological. But if the rest of their physical interpretation is abandoned the objection does not apply. It seems a reasonable interpretation of the death instinct, but must remain very hypothetical until more is known about the origin of life.

#### CAN A USEFUL PRINCIPLE OF STABILITY BE FORMULATED ?

I have pointed out some objections to a physical interpretation of Freud's basic principle and referred to the possibility of a descriptive formulation on the lines suggested by Ferenczi. We notice that Freud's own formulations are usually expressed in terms of *excitation*, but that the death instinct is concerned with *repetition*. No principle therefore can unify his psychological and biological conceptions which does not link up the idea of excitation with repetition. Actually a conception of excitation which will do what is required seems to be implied in Fechner's definition of complete stability.

Let *constant excitation* be defined as a condition in which the same event continues to occur at equal intervals of time. Further, let the condition in which there is no excitation be called a state of rest. To take a concrete example, if the heart beats regularly, there is constant excitation. All rhythmical processes occurring within an organism (and also continuous reproduction) will be examples of constant excitation, if the event repeated each time is the same and the interval between the events is constant. When this is so the stability principle is satisfied.

The excitation is changed if the interval time is altered in magnitude or the event altered in character. I should designate alteration in constant excitation as *stimulus*.

Changes in excitation (i.e. stimuli) may have a certain constancy in themselves in that the excitation may increase or decrease regularly. Some changes cause greater disturbance than others. Changes of small magnitude or rhythmical in themselves, being less disturbing, are more likely to be pleasurable.



The state of absolute freedom from all excitations or rhythms is a theoretical condition, which occurred before life began and does not occur during life and can be regarded as the goal of Freud's Nirvana principle to which the death instincts lead. The actual life of an organism is concerned with preserving the excitations which have somehow or other already been set up. This tendency could be called the pleasure-principle. In the course of its life the organism is subjected to all manner of changes in excitation, but in so far as these changes do not permanently alter the rhythmical nature of its existence they can be identified with the reality-principle. While a meaning can be attached to the death instinct, it has thus become an abstract conception of little practical interest. The pleasure-principle is the one we are mainly concerned with.

This repetitive conception of excitation has implications which are too wide to go into here, but I must just mention one aspect of the subject. It is clear that if an alteration takes place in a rhythmical series of events there are two ways of restoring the rhythm. The disturbance may be of a passing character and leave no trace behind, or it may be incorporated into the rhythm. Disturbances of a minor character may not perhaps affect the rhythm sufficiently to require their incorporation. But large disturbances will require to be repeated if any constant condition is to be preserved—that is to say they are remembered. It is one of the tenets of psycho-analysis that every experience is remembered, but in biology it appears that only certain changes are repeated in the subsequent development of the organism. The laws determining which changes of excitation are carried on, and which are not, remain yet to be discovered.

#### CONCLUSION

The complications arising out of Freud's attempt to go 'beyond the pleasure-principle' have been discussed. Certain attempts that have been made to formulate a *constancy principle*, which will account for the behaviour of living organisms, have been discussed. At present no formulation can be regarded as more than tentative, but there are grave objections to formulations in terms of physical concepts. In particular, the attempt to shew that Freud's death instinct is the same as the second law of thermodynamics is rejected. It is concluded that if Fechner's principles of stability are made the basis of a theory of pleasure and pain the death instinct becomes of theoretical interest only.



## BOOK REVIEWS

*The Psychology of Clothes.* By J. C. Flügel, B.A., D.Sc. (The International Psycho-Analytical Library. The Hogarth Press, 1930. Pp. 257. Illustrations 21. Price 21s.)

The main body of this book is concerned with an analysis of our past and present attitude to clothes. But in the last four chapters Dr. Flügel discusses the change in this attitude which will result when it is better understood. The work thus falls into two parts, which may be described respectively as the pure and the applied psychology of clothes. Although it contains much which is not strictly psycho-analytical, it could only have been written by a psycho-analyst, and it might legitimately claim to have opened a new department of this science. Thus its inclusion in the Psycho-Analytical Library is fully justified.

Dr. Flügel first discusses the fundamental motives of decoration, modesty and protection. He points out that clothes are essentially a compromise which satisfies the conflicting demands of decoration and modesty. Thus, for example, modesty requires the repression of phallic exhibitionism, but the repressed motive is satisfied symbolically in the decoration of a top hat. Grades in the displacement of exhibitionism from the phallus are illustrated by the codpiece, the *poulaine* or phallic shoe and the modern shoe in which comfort is still sacrificed to pointedness (pp. 27-28).

Dr. Flügel analyses any given instance of modesty in terms of five variables. The inhibitory impulse, he says, may be directed primarily against social or sexual forms of display, against the tendency to display the naked body or against the tendency to display gorgeous clothes, against display in the self or against display in others, against desire or against disgust, and it may relate to various parts of the body (p. 54).

Besides offering protection against cold and heat, human or animal foes, and against accident, clothes have also been used as a protection against psychological dangers. Of these the most obvious are magic and spirits, and phallic symbols of various kinds have often been worn as a protection against them. But Dr. Flügel points out that clothes have also been used as a protection against moral danger. Thus 'the monk protects himself in his plain, but all-enveloping, habit against the lures and temptations of this wicked world', (p. 74), and similar motives may be detected in the sombre colours and stiffness of certain of our present clothes. Finally they may symbolise the protecting womb (pp. 81-84).

There are, of course, individual differences in our attitude towards clothes. The *rebellious* type has strongly developed skin and muscle erotism, little power of exhibitionistic sublimation, and relatively little modesty or need for protection. The *resigned* type, as his name implies,



is a resigned edition of the rebellious type. The *unemotional* type has 'neither strong auto-erotic elements to resist clothes' nor 'strong exhibitionism to be displaced on to them' and 'no strong sense of modesty or need of protection'. In the *prudish* type 'there is a triumph of the impulse of modesty' (p. 96). There is also a *duty* type, in which certain kinds of clothes have become 'outward and visible signs of a strict "super ego"' (p. 98).

Among those types who take a positive pleasure in clothes may be distinguished the *protected* type, who finds in clothes a protection against the physical and psychological coldness of the external world, and the *supported* type, who finds comfort in the phallic symbols which adorn him. In the *sublimated* type the auto-erotic elements are weak compared with the capacity for exhibitionistic sublimation. Finally there is a *self-satisfied* type whose self-satisfaction appears to be often a reaction against an inferiority founded upon the castration complex.

Besides individual differences there are also sex differences in our attitude towards clothes. Among primitive people the men are usually the more decorated and the women the more modest. Among ourselves, however, this partition is reversed. Dr. Flügel suggests that the greater decorativeness of women at the present day is due to the fact that their sexual libido is more diffuse. 'Male libido, more definitely concentrated on the phallus, can more easily find, in various ornaments and garments, a symbolic substitute for this one organ; it is more difficult to symbolise, in a general way, the whole body; even though it be entirely covered, there must remain some consciousness of the real flesh underneath the vestments. Hence perhaps the main reason why, in women, the displacement of exhibitionism on to clothes is less complete, and why there is always a greater readiness to combine displaced exhibitionism with actual exposure as in the *décolleté*' (p. 108). It would be interesting to speculate whether the greater diffuseness of female libido is racial or cultural (i.e. due to some trauma, e.g. Daly's menstruation complex). Masculine exhibitionism in dress has been severely repressed since the French Revolution.

After a classification of dress into primitive, tropical and arctic, and into fixed and modish types, follow two chapters on the forces and the vicissitudes of fashion. The main motive of fashion, social and sexual competition, is cleverly exploited by those who have a commercial interest in the subject with considerable, but not unlimited, success. The history of fashion may almost be said to reflect the erotic history of the race. 'There are periods when exhibitionism is triumphant, others when it is sternly inhibited' (p. 155). There is also 'a variation in the amount of the displacement of exhibitionistic interest from the body on to clothes. At the one extreme, clothes may be of comparatively little importance on their own account. They only serve to display the body, to throw its



attractive features into better relief. . . . At the other extreme the body may become little more than (as Carlyle would say), a clothes-horse, the whole effect being achieved by the garments that are hung on it' (pp. 156-157). There is also a great variation in the parts of the body which are emphasised. 'During the later Middle Ages and the Renaissance much interest was devoted to the abdominal region, which was made as conspicuous as possible.' For pregnancy was then idealized. 'In the eighteenth century this abdominal emphasis was abandoned . . . only to give place to an increasing emphasis on the bosom and the hips'. After the Empire period 'the hips again attracted interest and skirts began to billow enormously in order to accentuate them. . . . Subsequently the accentuation of the hips gave place to that of the posterior parts, and in the 'seventies, and again in the 'eighties, women were wearing a creditable imitation of a tail. . . . At the present time interest has departed from the trunk and is centred on the limbs' (pp. 160-161).

Dr. Flügel draws a parallel between the evolution of animal species and the evolution of clothes. Just as there are vestigial organs in the body so there are many vestigial elements in dress which, although they have outlived their utility, remain as decorations. Examples of these are the buttons at the back of the tail coat and the turned down part of the top boot.

After this long impartial analysis of the psychology of clothes, Dr. Flügel ends his book with some discussion of the practical conclusions which can be drawn from his research. He posits the axiom that '*the aim of clothes should be to secure the maximum of satisfaction in accordance with the reality principle*'. It will be clear to anyone who has intelligently read the analytical part of his work that the clothes of the present day fall very short of this ideal. They could well be more beautiful, healthier, cheaper and more convenient. But the difficulty of applying Dr. Flügel's criterion depends upon the difficulty of determining how much decoration, modesty and protection is to be allowed by the reality principle. 'We must admit that the very existence of clothing for purposes of modesty or decoration implies that the conditions of our standard are but incompletely fulfilled, and that, in recommending this or that as a contribution to sartorial reform, we are guilty of striking a compromise, since ultimately our reforms must end in improving clothes out of existence altogether' (p. 237).

This book well maintains Dr. Flügel's high standard of scientific competence. For it is methodical, lucid and unbiassed. Further, it adds a new realm to the domain of knowledge in general and of applied psychoanalysis in particular. These qualities endow it with considerable scientific value. But we may predict that its indirect practical consequences will be no less important.

Hoary institutions which have resisted all direct attacks may never-



theless yield before the peaceful process of analysis. The dispassionate comparisons of the anthropologist are more relentlessly iconoclastic than the polemics of the atheist. And in like manner Dr. Flügel's unbiassed analysis of the vanities and anxieties of dress devalue and expose them as useless and irrational restrictions. His book has therefore laid the foundations of a science which will help to realize its author's prophecy that clothes will be but an episode in the history of the race.

Roger E. Money-Kyrle.

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*Psycho-Analysis of the Total Personality. The Application of Freud's Theory of the Ego to the Neuroses.* By Franz Alexander, M.D. (New York and Washington : Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Co., Monograph Series No. 52, 1930. Pp. 176. Price \$3.50.)

We are glad to see a translation of this important and well-known work. The translators have been at great pains to make the translation as accurate as possible. In their preface they shew they have studied our "Glossary" with care, and they make some kindly criticism of it. The translation has a preface by Dr. Brill.

E. J.

★

*Medical Review of Reviews.* Edited by Dorian Feigenbaum. (March, 1930. Austin Flint Association, Inc., New York. Price \$1.25.)

Dr. Feigenbaum has undertaken the labour of producing a special psychopathological number that runs to 242 pages. It begins with a preface from Professor Freud, who writes some caustic remarks on the reception of psycho-analysis by Americans. The rest of the contents is as follows :—

#### SYMPOSIUM ON NEURASTHENIA

From Beard to Freud . . . . .	H. A. Bunker.
Is Neurasthenia an Organic Disease ? . . . .	I. S. Wechsler.
Diagnostic Errors in Neurasthenia . . . . .	A. A. Brill.
The Hypothesis of the "Organ-Libido" . . . .	O. Fenichel.
The Neurasthenic Core in Hysteria . . . . .	P. Federn.

#### SYMPOSIUM ON CHARACTER PATHOLOGY

The Freudian Ego-Theory and Character Pathology . .	H. Schaxel.
The Neurasthenic-Hypochondriac Character . . . .	P. Schilder.
The Anxiety Character . . . . .	E. Jones.
The Hysterical Character . . . . .	F. Wittels.
The Compulsive Character . . . . .	B. D. Lewin.
The Reactive Character . . . . .	A. S. Lorand.



## THE NEUROTIC CHARACTER AS CRIMINAL

The Neurotic Criminal	.	.	.	.	.	F. Alexander.
The Paranoid Criminal	.	.	.	.	.	D. Feigenbaum.
Interpretation of Delinquency Trends	.	.	.	.	.	W. Healy.
						E. J.

★

*Das Psychoanalytische Volksbuch.* Herausgegeben von Dr. Paul Federn und Dr. Heinrich Meng (2 Bände) (Hippocrates-Verlag. Stuttgart-Leipzig-Zurich, 1928. S. 329 u. 310.)

Psycho-analysts have often been accused of niggardliness in giving popular presentations of their discoveries, and in particular are frequently reproached for their reluctance to formulate codes of behaviour for use in the emotional emergencies of life. The former criticism is scarcely justified, but there is a considerable element of truth in the latter. And there is a good deal to be said for adopting a cautious and reserved attitude towards the publication of behaviouristic or prophylactic codes. It is not simply that psycho-analysts have been deterred by the awful example of non-analytical writers on human conduct, although it is well known that the majority of books on this subject are simply monuments of fatuity. In the first place, psycho-analysts are more concerned with internal factors in illness than with immediate (usually adult) precipitating factors, and in the second the significance of apparently important environmental factors has not yet been finally determined. So there seems every reason to be cautious.

Nevertheless there appear to be two schools of opinion within analytic groups as to the ripeness of time for giving advice. This 'Volksbuch', for example, represents the point of view of those who feel sanguine and confident in giving advice. Admittedly the greater part of the two volumes is concerned to give the average educated person some idea of the many-sidedness of analytic interests, and in particular attempts to explain to those who are inclined to ignore or misinterpret them, the nature of psychic maladaptations. But this is not the most important part of the 'Volksbuch.' In the words of the introduction the books are intended to make clear the inhibitions and disturbances of the child's mind, and it is suggested that in this way the educated individual may be able to handle and relieve them.

With regard to the general expository aspects of the book, this is left in the hands of a number of analysts whose names are already household words. The quality of the different sections varies considerably: some are extremely well expressed, others are rather on the dull side. Perhaps it would have been better to entrust the task to one or two individuals, although in this connection it has to be admitted that Freud has not been so lucky as Darwin, who at any rate had his populariser Huxley. And perhaps



it might be worth while considering whether the average reader is likely to be appealed to by the now stereotyped order of exposition, viz. everyday life, dreams, wit, instinct, etc., etc. In this matter the brilliant example of Freud is rather slavishly followed, despite the fact that few if any writers can vie with Freud in the arts of exposition. Nevertheless, in this general respect, the book as compared with other popular presentations is much more systematic and makes a brave show. Of special interest to English readers is an article by Ernest Jones on Psycho-Analysis and Religion. This appears in the concluding section of the second volume and is, incidentally, the only article by an English writer.

The prophylactic aspects of the 'Volksbuch' do not leave one quite so happy. In the first place the references to the subject, particularly in so far as they apply to children, are scattered throughout the book. More important, however, is the fact that they tend to give the impression of accurate and complete understanding. And this is hardly justified in fact. It is true there are many commonsense qualifications added in order to counteract any tendency to easy optimism in these matters. But it is nowhere directly stated that psycho-analysts are only recently in a position to formulate some very tentative conclusions on the treatment of children through environmental influences. And nowhere do we find any reference to or summary of the work on child analysis. This is most unfortunate. Indeed, one cannot help thinking that the general arrangement of the book could have been altered with considerable advantage. General exposition might well have taken up one volume. But the whole problem of prophylaxis stands or falls on the handling of children. And this could have been given a volume to itself. Here one could have tabulated those precautions of a negative nature, e.g. the things 'not to do' with children. But much more advantageous would have been a clear statement of what is known about child development, followed by an equally clear statement of what is not known or only imperfectly known. This could then have been followed by a list of precautions of a positive nature, only however those that appear to be justified by experience and are weighted by a consensus of opinion. Clearly the public are entitled to demand expert guidance on child problems, and although analysts may delay giving this guidance they cannot shirk the task. They are under the same obligations in this respect as the rest of the medical faculty are in respect of organic illness. The greatest immediate service they can render is a statement of unsolved problems.

One hopes that in any fresh edition of the 'Volksbuch' these defects will be remedied. This is already the second edition of the work (dated 1928, when papers on the discoveries of child analysis were already available).

Edward Glover.



*The Unknown Self.* By Georg Groddeck, M.D. (The C. W. Daniel Company, London, 1929. Pp. 207. Price 7s. 6d. net.)

The name Groddeck will not be forgotten so long as Freud's book on psychic structure is read by a psycho-analytical public. But the fact that Freud borrowed from Groddeck the term 'Id' (It) tends to obscure the latter's more individual claim to enduring recognition. Groddeck would doubtless be the last to claim distinction as a propagandist, yet the fact remains that he is one of the most forceful and original of propagandists in the history of psychological medicine. He has done more than anyone else in recent times to demonstrate to a hidebound medical faculty the universal exploitation of mechanisms of conversion hysteria, the conversion element in organic disease and the psychic gains of illness in general. To this enthusiastic interest he has coupled a passion for investigating the precipitating psychic factors in neurotic and other illness. Over and above all this, his imagination has been fired by the idea of impersonal forces manifesting themselves through various somatic and psychic activities and structures.

This conception is by no means unfamiliar, and its application in psychic affairs certainly helps us to cultivate a sense of perspective concerning the relation of the conscious Ego to the rest of the psyche. Groddeck has always presented these relations in a masterly way, and the present volume, although by no means of the same quality as some of his earlier works, contains many of those illuminating passages with which we have become familiar.

Having paid tribute to these gifts of terse expression and to the tenacity with which he holds by no means popular views, it must be said that his enthusiasm at times outruns his sense of proportion. And on some occasions he quite obviously does scant justice to the nature and function of Ego systems. It is easy to say that his 'It' concept includes everything else, hence is not comparable with the Freudian 'Id.' And of course he admits that the closest access we have to this 'It' is by means of psycho-analysis, i.e. *via* the Ego systems. But that is not sufficient justification for attributing to the 'It' certain activities which are quite adequately understood in terms of the Ego. It is interesting to note that many of the phenomena he describes would be called 'secondary gains' wrested by the Ego from illness. Indeed there are very few cases reported in this book that require any broader concept than that of the Freudian Id-Ego relationship. Groddeck's 'It' is one of those concepts which are extraordinarily vivid and stimulating so long as they are not too closely examined.

And it is not unfair to say that the value of his system depends to a certain extent on the degree of vagueness with which the contrasting Freudian views are presented. These lectures were given in 1926, and at that time there was no excuse for saying, as Groddeck does, 'there exist



(for Freud) only the expressions "Conscious" and "Unconscious". Nor for using such loose sentences as 'What is unconscious was at some time or other in the consciousness'. Indeed a certain elasticity in the use of terms is the weakest feature of his presentation.

It would be easy to pick holes in many expressions of this sort. But Groddeck would himself be the first to admit that his subject is one which involves a good deal of contradictoriness in expression. More interesting, however, is the curious mixture of optimism and pessimism that runs throughout the book. What one might call the constitutional aspect of the 'It' as presented by Groddeck is enough to justify the deepest of pessimism: yet the results obtained by a brief conscious attack on the precipitating factors of illness would appear to justify boundless optimism. Here, surely, the omnipotent 'It' is shewing feet of clay. In short, however tame the Freudian 'Id' may appear by contrast with Groddeck's 'It', there is some reason to believe that the former shews more refractoriness to influence, hence is a more fruitful concept for the comprehension of everyday neurotic illness.

When all has been said, however, Groddeck's claims to recognition as a persuasive and at the same time challenging lecturer on conversion hysteria, etc., cannot be disputed.

Edward Glover.



*A Psychiatric Word Book. A Lexicon of Terms employed in Psychiatry and Psychoanalysis designed for Students of Medicine and Nursing and Psychiatric Social Workers.* By Richard H. Hutchings, M.D. Second Edition. (Utica, N.Y. The State Hospitals Press, 1930. Pp. 162. Price \$1.00.)

There should be a good demand for this excellent little book, and many psychiatrists will welcome it as well as the medical students and psychiatric social workers for whom it was intended. The space allotted to psycho-analytical terms is of interest as indicating the extent to which psycho-analysis has pervaded American psychiatry. Most of the definitions of such terms are very full and correct, and we may note for special commendation 'anaclitic object choice', 'ego ideal', 'libido', 'Œdipus complex', and 'reaction formation'. As an indication of how thoroughly the psycho-analytical point of view is accepted we may cite the example of 'homosexual neurosis', which is defined as 'a term referring to the paranoid group of psychoses', and 'hysteria', which is defined as 'a psychoneurotic disorder resulting from a conflict between the ego and one's primitive instincts, in which the latter are repressed and thus excluded from direct or conscious expression. The unconscious repressed material later, through conversion, finds an outlet by an indirect somatic pathway and thus produces symptoms'.



For the next edition, which we feel sure will be called for, we should like to make the following suggestions. Most of the psycho-analytical terms are distinguished by the caption *Psa* following them. It is omitted, however, with 'anxiety hysteria', 'autism', 'fixation', 'introjection', 'introversion', 'preconscious', 'pregenital sexuality' and 'regression', all of which are essentially psycho-analytical terms.

The definition of 'affect' could be improved on, for the term is complementary rather than supplementary to 'emotion'. 'Allo-erotism' is erotism the object of which is not the self, but which is not necessarily another human being. The word 'censor' should certainly be 'censorship'. 'Obsessional neurosis' is defined as though it referred to a distinct condition from 'compulsion neurosis', whereas the latter term has been introduced as a direct translation of the German *Zwangsneurose* by those who were not aware that there was already a proper term in English for the same thing. The super-ego is said to be synonymous with conscience; it would be worth while to distinguish between the unconscious and the conscious conscience, for the super-ego is synonymous with the former only. Under the term 'vapors' the word 'melancholia' should be 'melancholy'. We prefer the term 'erotogenic zones' to 'erogenous zones'. The latency period is said to cover the time between the ages of five and nine or ten; we should be inclined to extend this to the time from four to eleven.

There are not many terms omitted from this very full little dictionary. 'Ambivalence' and 'empathy' occur to us. The English word 'scopitagniac' might be cited as a synonym for the French *voyeur*.

E. J.

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*A Text-book of Psychiatry.* By D. K. Henderson and R. D. Gillespie. Second edition. (Oxford University Press, London, 1930. Pp. 526. Price 18s. net.)

The fact that psychiatry is in a transitional phase of upheaval and reorganization makes the task of reviewing text-books on the subject somewhat complicated. In the first place, one must wade through each book in order to ascertain the amount of psychological information and insight which has been applied; this must then be compared with the amount of traditional psychiatric teaching which has been incorporated. Having separated out these components, one must then re-read the sections on diagnosis and treatment to see how far they reflect the standpoint of modern psychological science or how far they merely maintain the traditions of the nineteenth century.

Applying these rough and ready methods of valuation to the text-book of Henderson and Gillespie, one readily forms the conclusion that in one respect it is an excellent book. The authors have made the best use they



can of traditional psychiatric classifications. They have given us a very clear outline of what might be called classroom diagnosis. They have reduced the more ornate classifications to simpler form, and have illustrated their groupings with an ample supply of apposite case histories. It is true the sections on treatment are, judged by the same standards, empty of content, but this is not the fault of the authors. They have little or nothing to tell us on this matter because classical psychiatry has little or nothing to say. And it is all to their credit that they have refrained from putting up a smoke screen to hide the poverty of the land. In short, from one point of view a very good example of a 'standard text-book'.

From the point of view of psychological science, however, one is reluctantly compelled to the conclusion that the book is disappointing in almost every respect. One draws this conclusion with a certain reluctance largely out of sympathy with the awkward predicament in which the authors evidently have found themselves. It is clear that they desired to make their text-book as 'modern' as possible, but instead of taking the bull by the horns and treating the psychological aspect systematically and without bias, they have adopted a somewhat weak-kneed compromise, giving here and there a patchy account of psychological views to which is added a running commentary of biassed criticism. The result is an exposition of psychological principles and practice that is neither fish, flesh nor good red herring.

If these remarks applied solely to the psycho-analytical references made throughout the book, the authors might conceivably regard them as a flattering response drawn from a partisan reviewer. But it is not merely the psycho-analytical passages that are pale and inadequate: the general psychological references are equally thin and the sections on general psycho-therapy can scarcely satisfy the most easy-going non-Freudian therapist (e.g. suggestion therapy is not even in the index and is barely mentioned in the text).

If we consider first the general section on psycho-pathology, we will observe that Freudian and non-Freudian views are run together without adequate distinction. And although this has the advantage of disarming more precise criticism, the following examples of confusion can be noted: The term ambivalence is not given its Freudian connotation (p. 89); a semi-Freudian history of the libido is given, omitting the narcissistic organization (p. 104); the function of consciousness is imperfectly stated (p. 105); the systematic meaning of 'unconscious' is confused with the descriptive and no mention is made of the Id concept which clarifies all these difficulties (p. 107): the meaning of introversion as used by different authors is not explained (p. 108); the essential meaning of repression is never properly understood (e.g. the rôle of *unconscious* homosexuality in paranoia (p. 269), or again (p. 429), the relation of primary to actual



repression) ; displacement is defined earlier but its operation in anxiety states neglected (p. 416).

More significant are the omissions regarding modern psycho-analytical teaching. Recent views on guilt, anxiety, the structure of the Ego, the nature of regressions, etc., are nowhere mentioned. And since these constitute the main source of comprehension of psychotic states, it is easy for the authors, by neglecting them, to pooh-pooh any psycho-analytic claims to approach the psychoses.

Still more significant are certain inaccuracies in statement of historical facts, as witness a complete confusion regarding the facts of the Breuer case (p. 406). On p. 460 two direct misstatements are made regarding Freud's analysis of a case of obsessional neurosis ; first, that suggestion was employed, and second, that analysis was carried out for years (instead of months).

To conclude this list of sample omissions and inadequacies, no mention is made of Abraham's results in melancholia, no mention is made of psycho-analytic views in the section on war neuroses, and neither here nor at innumerable other appropriate points regarding psycho-therapy is Ernest Jones' work on the treatment of the neuroses mentioned.

Now all this is pretty good going for a ' modern ' text-book. Nevertheless, it could be passed over were it not for the fact that the authors at many points throughout the volume make certain dogmatic statements of a disparaging kind about psycho-analysis. The gist of these statements amounts to the familiar contradiction, viz., psycho-analysis is not much use in most cases and psycho-analysis is dangerous in many cases. The grounds for the first view are nowhere documented. Unsupported statements are simply made, e.g. ' its results in this condition (obsessional neurosis) are encouraging in only a small minority of cases '. A sample of the second view is as follows (p. 226) : ' We have observed that cases of this type (schizophrenia) in the hands of the psycho-analyst are often considerably aggravated rather than helped '. Of course it is open to the authors to avoid the onus of proof here by saying as they do on p. 462 that psycho-analysis ' can be extremely dangerous ' and that ' much harm has been done . . . by injudicious practitioners of the method '. If the authors mean by this unqualified practitioners, they ought to say so. No psycho-analyst would dream of holding the trained psychiatrist responsible for the howlers of quack psychiatrists. If they mean trained psycho-analysts they ought in common fairness to have quoted from the Report of the Psycho-analysis Committee of the British Medical Association. Of this committee of nineteen, one member only was a psycho-analyst, a considerable number were openly hostile to psycho-analysis (judged by public utterances on the subject), allegations of danger were frequently considered, and no single one was substantiated.



But it is perfectly clear that the authors would not have been deterred from hostile comment by recognition of facts. And it is equally clear that their antagonism is due to two main causes. The first of these is apprehensiveness. On p. 464 they say, 'It seems necessary to estimate beforehand . . . whether, for example, persons of a sensitive idealistic type who have met their difficulties by interest in social, philanthropic and religious works should be submitted to the influence of psycho-analysis (usually shattering in this direction, whatever the analysts may say)'. Incidentally it does not require analytic training to ask what was the matter with these types who had 'met their difficulties'. And if 'the analysts' speaking from experience reply that psycho-analysis does not shatter in this or any other respect, what are we to make of authors who say in effect 'It's no use talking to us; we say it is'. Suppose a psycho-analyst were to say 'Messrs. Henderson and Gillespie are very decent fellows no doubt, and don't mean to do any damage, but of course they are most injudicious in their handling of cases and do a peck of harm by inquiring into the state of the patient's alimentary tract; indeed, their effect on a delicate patient's digestion is usually shattering (whatever they may say)'. It is to be hoped that for their own sakes the authors will purge any future editions of such Jahvistic pronouncements.

The second factor becomes glaringly obvious on p. 407. One of the 'principal difficulties' in accepting Freudian views is 'his pansexualism'. In this year of grace the attempt to spring-clean such an ancient rag-bag argument against psycho-analysis is strangely anachronistic. Curiously enough the authors have already been at pains to point out that the Freudian concept of sexual instinct is broader than the commonly accepted one, and it is true they mention the phenomena of mental conflict, repression, regression, etc. Yet from a comment on p. 418 it is clear that when they talk of sexuality in relation to case histories they have in mind the narrower connotation. In spite of all this we are told that psycho-analytic theory is of 'epoch-making importance'. Coming after a long series of negative criticisms, this is lip-service with a vengeance.

If now we ask what methods Henderson and Gillespie recommend in place of the alleged frequently useless and often dangerous method of psycho-analysis, the answer appears to be 'simple psycho-therapy'. This is best described on p. 284, in connection with drug addiction. It is an investigation into the patient's history and make-up, discussion of the factors which have led to his illness, together with encouragement and general guidance. On p. 183 the definition is made more precise. 'It is wise to attempt to give the patient a better understanding of how the illness (involuntal melancholia) has developed along commonsense non-psycho-analytical lines'. And again, on p. 225, writing of the treatment of schizophrenics along similar lines, 'This is not a policy specially of psycho-



therapy, it is a policy of commonsense'. In other words, except for a grudging application to chronic psycho-neurotic cases, the epoch-making discoveries are to be barricaded out. But although these discoveries are not to be allowed to gate-crash, commonsense is supplied with all the credentials of respectability and suitability. And what is this commonsense? To judge from the case-histories, it is the organized and rationalized content of the pre-conscious system. One must admit the authors have the courage of optimistic, sanguine and polite convictions.

Edward Glover.



*Psychopathology. Its Development and its Place in Medicine.* (Second Edition.) By Bernard Hart, M.D., F.R.C.P. (Cambridge University Press, 1929. Pp. 175. Price 8s. 6d. net.)

Since no material alteration has been made in the body of this book, our careful and adequate review of the first edition (this JOURNAL, Vol. V., pp. 544-548) still applies.

In this edition, however, Dr. Hart has added a new chapter on 'The Conception of Dissociation', which was his Presidential Address to the Medical Section of the British Psychological Society in 1926. This is written with the same clarity of thought which characterizes the author's previous work, but there is one item which demands criticism from our point of view. Dr. Hart again draws attention to Karl Pearson's three steps in the method of science, viz: (a) the observing and recording of phenomena, (b) the classification of the phenomena, and (c) the construction of formulæ or laws which will resume or explain the phenomena, with perhaps the construction of hypothetical entities conceived for such explanation. He considers that Janet's dissociation belongs to the second step, while Freud's unconscious belongs to the third step, because it is not a classification of observed phenomena, but a conceptual abstraction. Later Hart complains that the psycho-analytical school have written practically nothing about double personality; but the reason for this is just that they have not had the opportunity of making *observations* on this class of patient by the psycho-analytical method. Psycho-analysis is a method of observation in the first instance, the observations have been classified, and it is incorrect to state that its laws have been 'constructed' by Freud or anybody else. It is the classification that has taught us certain psychological laws. As to the unconscious being a concept, those among us who practise psycho-analysis do not conceive it, but observe it every day of our lives.

W. H. B. Stoddart.



*The Psychology of Insanity.* (Fourth Edition.) By Bernard Hart, M.D., F.R.C.P. (Cambridge University Press, 1930. Pp. xxxiv + 174. Price 3s. net.)

Although this is the fourth edition of this well-known little volume, to



say nothing of ten reprints since 1912, it has been our misfortune—through a curious concatenation of circumstances—that we have not hitherto had an opportunity of reviewing the work. And now our task seems almost redundant, for we doubt very much whether there is a single reader of this JOURNAL who has not a copy already on his bookshelf. It has achieved the phenomenal success it deserves because the author, in addition to being a clear thinker and clear writer, possesses the faculty of presenting his material in a manner which even the uninitiated cannot fail to understand, and he has given us here the most lucid description of psycho-pathology to be found anywhere.

The present edition differs from its predecessors in having an introduction, the purpose of which is to give the reader 'some understanding of the relation which the principles described here bear to the structure of modern psychology and psychopathology, and of the development which these subjects have undergone in later years' (than 1912). This introduction occupies twenty pages, the first three of which deal mainly with the development of psychopathology before and by Janet. The remainder is devoted to the place of Freud and the standpoint adopted in the book in relation to his work. There is also some reference to Jung and Adler.

Dr. Hart's erudition includes a very complete knowledge of psycho-analytical science, for which he has a profound respect; but he is at variance with some of its conclusions, as he is careful to state in every instance. For example, he believes the 'herd instinct' to be an innate psychological entity, dementia præcox being a disease caused by repression of this instinct and, while he regards the unconscious as a plausible hypothesis like the ether or the atom, he does not consider it to be demonstrable to the senses. Every practising psycho-analyst demonstrates to himself his patient's unconscious, not only by making it conscious, but also by seeing it at work in his patients. He may even be tempted to commit the technical error of pointing out some unconscious mechanism to his patient before the latter is capable of discerning it. But such items do not detract from the value of the book in the very least.

W. H. B. Stoddart.

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*Psychology: Normal and Abnormal.* By J. W. Bridges, Ph.D. (D. Appleton & Co., London, 1930. Pp. xxii + 552. Price 12s. 6d.)

This extensive and elaborate work aims at building a bridge between so-called normal and abnormal psychology. It is written with special reference to the needs of medical students and will serve as a useful, though very conservative, introduction to the subject. The main fault of it is that it could have been written just as well thirty years ago.

Psycho-analysis is dealt with very cursorily, as may be illustrated by the following: 'The Freudian psycho-analysts seem to believe that almost



all human behavior is motivated by the *sex instinct* in one or other of its many forms. This view is obviously incorrect, but it has served to stress the importance of a major drive' (p. 361).

E. J.



*Common Principles in Psychology and Physiology.* By John T. MacCurdy, M.D. (Johns Hopkins), M.A. (Cantab.). (Cambridge University Press, 1928. Pp. 284. Price 15s. net.)

The prospective reader can form an accurate estimate of his ultimate opinion of this book by noting his reaction to the title. If it suggests to him a modest essay on a difficult subject, he will find no reason to alter this opinion: but if he regards the title as ambitious, his ultimate impression will be one of disappointment. To quote the author's own view of the chief purpose of the book, it is ' . . . to provide a vocabulary in which the phenomena of living matter can be discussed, enabling us to disregard the barriers erected between the different branches of biological study': in particular 'to penetrate and if possible to destroy the bulkhead which has appeared between psychology and physiology. . . .' He has been impressed with the fact that if we ask psychologists for a basic psychological theory analogous to the biological theory of evolution 'we are offered conditioned reflexes, *Gestalten*, unconscious sexuality, "purpose", glands of internal secretion, or faculties'. When, however, general application is given to these theories, 'irreconcilable differences of opinion arise'.

It is only fair to say here that if the two last quotations were representative of the author's habits of thinking, or reading, one would follow his further argument in a state of uneasy depression. No psycho-analyst to my knowledge has ever 'offered' unconscious sexuality as a basic psychological theory, and in the second place irreconcilable differences exist long before, not simply after, attempts are made to elaborate generalizations from the data accessible to various schools of psychological opinion.

For the convenience of psycho-analytical readers, it may be said outright that the book contains little to interest the clinician. On the other hand, for analysts who have sufficient leisure to be interested in 'frontier' activities, i.e. the comparison and correlation of various scientific methods, Dr. MacCurdy's painstaking attack on the bulwark is bound to arouse interest and some degree of sympathy. A third group, though sympathetic to the aims of the book, will without doubt conclude that it is a premature attempt. A fourth will probably desire to know how psycho-analysis fares in the course of the argument before deciding whether the tendency is progressive or reactionary. Many of these will end by feeling that there is something to be said for a bulwark between psychology and the discovery of common principles.



The essential part of the argument is to be found in the introductory and concluding chapters: the findings concerning 'laws of patterns' as deduced from psychological and physiological data are adequately summarized in Chapters XIII and XXVI. Readers pressed for time might well begin with these chapters, proceed to the Conclusion and cast back to the Introduction. As far as the body of the book is concerned, it should be added that the author, in working out his correlations and building up his vocabulary, has shown a considerable amount of industry and ingenuity, and at times close thinking. There are occasions, it is true, when one feels that his exposition is needlessly wordy; times when a short definition or postulate would have served just as well as several pages of detailed explanation. But this is to some extent unavoidable. There are other times when one has the uneasy feeling that despite an obvious desire for precision of expression the author no sooner relaxes his attention than a number of vague expressions obtrude themselves. The ordinary writer is forgiven much, but a stickler for meaning must forgive us if we apply more rigorous standards to his work. It is of course unfair to drag paragraphs from their context, but perhaps the following taken from the chapter on Attention will point the present criticism. 'Consciousness, it appears, operates only in voluntary attention, and then its operation is to regulate the choice of patterns, as a rule, rather than to control the pattern directly. The question as to how consciousness performs this feat is not one that can be discussed at this point, since it involves more factors than we have already in hand. We may mention however that the selection of reaction patterns is a function of personality: in fact, personality is demonstrated in this choice. From this it follows that voluntary attention will increase with the development of personality and that where personality reactions are weak, attention will be more of the coerced type'. In the foregoing excerpt, the following phenomena are undefined, and remain undefined, in the context: 'control' of pattern, mechanism of control, personality, development of personality, weakness of personality reactions.

It is not implied that Dr. MacCurdy is always as vague as this quotation would indicate: on the contrary, on some occasions he has only too clear a grasp of the effect he desires to produce. One imagines indeed that he might have written a much more valuable book had he forgotten his interest in common principles. He starts off by a definition of 'images' and introduces the terms 'image-function' and 'liminal image'. His final definition of 'imaginal process' is as follows: 'An imaginal process from the standpoint of an objective observer, is some kind of a reproduction of a specific bit of past experience, which is inferred to exist from the presence of a reaction for which the specific experience would be the appropriate stimulus—this reaction not being completely accounted for by any



demonstrable environmental event'. He goes on to say (p. 14): 'A moment's consideration will show that by eliminating introspection as a necessary or essential element, we have arrived at a definition of something which might appear in conscious, unconscious or even physiological reactions'. Now we are not for the moment concerned with the validity or usefulness of this definition; but we are bound to note that for the purpose of effecting a correlation it is necessary to jettison one of the outstanding features of mental activity. It may be true that the consideration of introspective data introduces an element of confusion into the definition of imaginal processes, but that fact does not entitle us to eliminate these data for the purposes of definition. Either we must be content with a more cumbersome or elastic definition or we must adopt the method of metapsychological description whereby confusion is eliminated by the application of topographic, dynamic and descriptive criteria.

The above may be taken as a representative sample of a difficulty which confronts the reviewer at every page. To deal adequately with terminological issues alone would require several volumes of commentary. Consider for example a simple sentence occurring early in the second chapter: 'For present purposes an instinct may be taken to be a pattern of behaviour; that is, a set, routine automatic mode of response to a given stimulus'. Now let us remember that Dr. MacCurdy is out to demonstrate common principles in psychology and physiology. Here we find that he is unable to establish common principles in psychology. The *aim*, or more strictly the mode of gratification, of *some* instincts *may* be expressed through a pattern of behaviour, or again it may *not*: it may also gain indirect expression by an anacletic relation to the aims of other instincts. In view of such fundamental divergences of opinion, it would appear that Dr. MacCurdy can proceed with the formulation of common principles only by laying down a series of arbitrary psychological definitions of his own and then saying 'So much for psychology'. And this in effect he does. The greater part of the book could have been published separately under the heading 'A Treatise on Psychology.' By Dr. MacCurdy. Chapters on intelligence, appetite, interest, meaning, attention, perception, recognition, etc., all contain some arbitrary formulations on matters concerning which acute controversy exists.

Even where it appears that he has accepted a Freudian view, as for example on the nature of unconscious thinking, and has drawn distinctions between pattern and conscious thinking, he is able to establish an easy gradation between these processes only by doing some violence to awkward facts, e.g. that those mental processes we call 'unconscious phantasies' shew all the characteristics of highly organised (pre)conscious thinking and yet have never been conscious.

At this point, doubtless, the author might protest that he is well aware



of such difficulties, but that he cannot be deterred by such purely psycho-analytical considerations. And yet, again and again throughout the book, and particularly in the concluding chapter (Chapter XXVII), he suggests that the formulations of psycho-analysis are either inadequate for his purpose or give an incomplete account of existing data.

Let us waive this point, however, and ask what system the author evolves in order to give a 'complete' account and to correlate the findings of psychology and physiology. To quote here: 'But, at this point, the pattern nomenclature may come to the rescue. A pattern is a guiding agency just as is a tendency. As such, the nature of its "existence" can be left to metaphysicians to discuss, whilst the psychologists can use the term as fruitfully as he can "tendency".' Later, justifying the use of pattern nomenclature, Dr. MacCurdy says '... if others beside myself can make use of this system, it may be found easier to understand the interrelations of body and mind in these terms, and anything which facilitates understanding is surely practical, even if it merely makes exposition easier'. Now let us take a sample of this fruitful, expository method. On p. 265 we find, 'Personality is an integration of behaviour patterns that has achieved an independence of any one of its constituent reactions'. Does this facilitate understanding? Or does it give a completely inadequate, not to say false, impression of personality? The answer must be left to the individual reader. The psycho-analyst will certainly be ready with a demurrer. To give only one reason, this somewhat glib formulation suggests a degree of organisation of personality which no psycho-analyst has been able to detect in the so-called normal individual. It leaves out of account completely what one might call the negative aspects of personality contributed by the repression group of instinctual mechanisms and in general it gives no idea of the complicated interactions of different and sometimes opposing mechanisms applied frequently to isolated or component parts of instinct. If correlation is to be established by means of such steam-roller methods, its acceptance on any large scale is certain to produce a sharp reaction in favour of analysis. In short, if one asks what has become in Dr. MacCurdy's system of the fruitful and pregnant discoveries of psycho-analysis concerning the nature of the unconscious system, its content and laws, etc., the answer is that by an easy turn of definition these have been shorn of significance.

One cannot help thinking that Dr. MacCurdy has been driven by his dæmon to spoil at least one good book and one interesting essay. His spiritual home is evidently in the groves of academic psychology, and from this peaceful retreat he might have issued an interesting book on psychological definitions. Or he might have published a short but stimulating essay of a few pages on common principles. It is easy for example to suggest, as has frequently been done, that the inhibition mechanisms



described by writers on conditioned reflexes have some resemblance to the various mechanisms of psychic inhibition observed in psychic affairs. But unless that association of ideas sheds some light either on conditioned reflexes or on the phenomena of repression or on the problem of affect, it remains simply an association scarcely worthy of the name of correlation. One sincerely hopes that Dr. MacCurdy may some day return to this aspect of his problem and give us a compact *résumé* of the more fruitful of his conclusions, evidence of which is extremely hard to find in this volume.

Edward Glover.



*Reflex Action.* A Study in the History of Physiological Psychology. By Franklin Fearing, Ph.D. London. (Baillière, Tindall & Cox, 1930. Pp. 350. Price 30s.)

This is a very thorough and scholarly survey of the history of concepts of reflex action from Descartes in the early seventeenth century to the present day. In so far as the history of psychological concepts enables us to use them more clearly and consciously, this volume will render that service admirably to those concerned with physiological psychology. The book is not of great interest to psycho-analysts as such, touching hardly at all upon their particular problems. There are a few references to somnambulism, dreams and automatism, and to the various attempts that have been made to represent these states in terms of reflex action. In the last chapter, on modern concepts, the author sums up the general trend of present-day thought about physiological psychology, and takes his own stand with Koehler and Koffka in their emphasis on the need to consider reflexes in relation to all the concomitant events in the integrated nervous system. He quotes Koehler's recent criticism of the behaviourists: 'If I feel a little disappointed by the work of behaviorism, the reason is not so much a certain innocence in its treatment of direct experience and in its imitation of adult physics, but its astounding sterility in the development of productive concepts about functions underlying observable behavior. As an imitation of physics it is scarcely a satisfactory achievement for the behaviorist to have taken the old concept of reflex action from physiology (including the reflexes of inner secretion) and to give us no further comprehension into the formation of new individual behavior than is offered by his concepts of positive and negative "conditioning"'. Why should behaviorism be so utterly negativistic in its characteristic statements? "Thou shalt not acknowledge direct experience in science" is the first commandment, and "Thou shalt not conceive of other functions but reflexes and conditioned reflexes" is the second'. It is extremely



interesting to find a volume in which so thorough a survey of the history of thought about reflex action is offered closing with the view that: 'It is possible, however, that in the interpretation of behavior in terms of integrated totalities, we have an hypothesis which offers a more comprehensive and intelligible theory of the complexities of behavior and experience. Although we must proceed with the greatest caution, at least we may take hope that the sterility of the faith that mind and behavior can be envisaged by number and measure has been exposed'. It is suggestive to find so marked a convergence towards the dynamic point of view characteristic of psycho-analysis.

Susan Isaacs.



*The Fundamentals of Human Motivation.* By Leonard T. Troland, S.B., A.M., Ph.D. (London, Macmillan & Co., 1930. Pp. xiv + 520. Price 21s.)

Fearing's quotation from Koehler's criticism of the behaviourists, cited in the review of Fearing's *Reflex Action*, is the best comment upon this ambitious volume, which sets out to be 'a systematic treatment of the facts and problems of human motivation'. The author says: 'I believe that the present book is the first to incorporate the word "motivation" in its title'. Alas, we fear that although the word 'motivation' occurs in the book as well as in the title, we cannot see that much light is thrown upon the author's question, 'Why do people behave and feel as they do?' The problems of human conduct are approached from the standpoint of a physiological psychology, and particularly from the point of view of a new doctrine of the author's own—the *theory of retroflex action*. In a glossary, *retroflex action* is defined as: 'The process whereby stimulation of beneceptive or nociceptive mechanisms facilitates or inhibits concurrent cortically adjusted responses. The physiological mechanism of the pleasure-pain senses'. 'Nociception' is: 'A process in a sense-organ or afferent nerve channel which is indicative of conditions or events which are typically injurious to the individual or species', 'beneception' being a similar process indicative of conditions or events typically beneficial to the individual or species. Using these standpoints, the author essays 'to give a physiological basis to the Freudian complex'. He says: '... we cannot neglect to consider such teachings as those of Freud and other psychiatrists, since their theories, perhaps, have done more to found a scientific discussion of motivation than any other contribution to the subject. It is likely that we shall be able to relieve the psychoanalytic doctrines of some of their vagueness, and tie them up with facts in a manner more satisfactory than has thus far been achieved'. How valuable is this attempt to put the Freudian complex in its place



may be judged by the further quotations : ' It is not necessary to go as far as Freud does, and regard the infant boy as a little satyr. . . . ' ' It is quite common, also, for small boys and girls to examine each other's sexual parts, probably not in the beginning from erotic interest, but rather from curiosity. Such experiences, and the thoughts which arise from them, may not be associated at first with sexual feeling, but are available for such association at a later time, through the medium of language '. ' The principle that erotic excitation can facilitate any form of response whatsoever, lies at the basis of the process which is known in the Freudian psychology as *sublimation*. As indicated by McDougall, the mechanism of sublimation is the same as that of so-called perversions of the behavior type, which we have just discussed. . . . ' ' The typical Freudian repressed complex rests upon a contest between erotically-founded response tendencies and pain (either directly, or as represented by the ego complex). If we adopt this interpretation, we see that where repression occurs, the potency of the nociceptive agencies must be greater than that of sex. Otherwise, the sexual tendencies would predominate, and the fears would be repressed. Possibly this prepotency of the pain factor is characteristic only of the supersensitive individuals who come under the observation of the psychiatrist ; because the normal person is more apt to pursue the sexual object, with comparative disregard of ordinarily expected consequences. Freud himself is not altogether clear as to what the agency is which brings about repression. Sometimes he calls it the Censor, and at other times the Ego ; he quite commonly attributes repression to unpleasantness, although frequently the repressed unit represents a pleasure tendency. An examination of his actual cases, however, shews that the agency in question is always a negative retroflex '.

In his chapter called ' Complexes and Their Complexity ', the author states his preference for the term ' subconscious ' as against ' unconscious '. ' It seems to be a contradiction in terms to designate a psychical system as *unconscious*, so that the word *subconscious* is to be preferred. This term indicates that complexes lie in a psychical manifold which is in some sense under or external to the introspective consciousness, although *adjacent* to the latter, so that important interactions readily occur between the two domains. Such complexes can be regarded as having physiological parallels or counterparts, in the form of cortical neurograms, which possess associative connections with retroflex mechanisms. In other words, the physiological basis of any complex would lie in the record in the nervous system which makes a given afferent excitation a conditioner of a retroflex process. So far as these neurograms are not involved in the cortical synergy of any given moment, they cannot find direct representation in consciousness ; and hence if they have any psychical correlates at all, the latter must be relegated to a *subconscious* '. One would have thought the



these same difficulties attached to 'sub' as well as to 'un'; but evidently the prefix 'sub' gives the author a pleasant feeling of doing justice to both parties. And words, as we know, have a high magical value.

Susan Isaacs.

★

*Factors in the Sex Life of Twenty-two Hundred Women.* By Katharine Bement Davis, Ph.D. (Harpers, 1930. Pp. xx + 430. Price 12s. 6d.)

The main thing about this book is that it represents an extraordinary amount of work. Very lengthy questionnaires were submitted to 1,200 married women and 1,000 single women, and their answers on the subject of sexual life are here presented. The data are then analysed and correlated from every conceivable point of view with the aid of the most expert mathematical devices. The work is so laudable that it hardly becomes the reader to ask whether the results justify it. We would, however, express our regret that no summary of whatever general conclusions may be supposed to follow is added, and that only one of the twelve chapters contains any sort of summary at all. In consequence the book is chiefly of value to those workers who feel disposed to undertake a similar study. When this is done, however, we hope that in the presentation of the material the author will be aided by someone with a modern knowledge of sexual psychology, a step unfortunately omitted in the present instance.

There is no reference to any of Freud's writings in the bibliography and we have come across only two allusions to the subject in the text of the book. One of these is extremely misleading. Discussing female homosexuality, the author quotes a passage from a paper by Stanford Read, in 1921, where the narcissistic aspect of homosexuality is the only one mentioned.

From the data quoted we may cite the following. Among the married women twice as many said they had learnt masturbation spontaneously as said they had been taught it; one-third stated they had never masturbated. 'It would appear that pleasurable reaction to the marital relations was significantly higher during the first five years of married life in the group that masturbated, but that the pleasurable reaction persisted longest in the group that never masturbated' (p. 183). Of the thousand unmarried women, 605 described recognised sexual experiences with other women.

E. J.

★

*The Sexual Reform Congress.* Edited by Norman Haire, Ch.M., M.B. (London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1930. Pp. xl + 670. Price 25s.)

Dr. Haire has performed his editorial work, which must have been exceptionally laborious, with great care and skill. It is obviously a book



that does not lend itself to detailed review, but it is of indispensable value to all those who are interested in the modern discussion of the social aspects of sexual problems.

E. J.

★

*Don't be Tired.* By Dr. Peter Schmidt. Translated by Mary Chadwick. (G. P. Putnam's Sons, London and New York, 1930. Price 3s. 6d. net.)

This little book, written for the layman, puts the problem of fatigue and pathological fatigue in the right place.

At the end of the day's work one is tired, relaxes and sleeps; at the end of the year's work one is tired, relaxes and goes on holiday. Pathological fatigue presents an entirely different picture, very well described by Dr. Schmidt (pp. 14-18).

Pathological fatigue is a nervous illness whose explanation the author offers in terms of Freud's theory of the unconscious (pp. 49-92). The remainder of the book gives practical advice, and common-sense recommendations for the treatment of the illness when psycho-analysis, which Dr. Schmidt regards as the treatment by election, cannot be undertaken. Vasectomy has been carried out successfully Dr. Schmidt claims, in a large number of cases for the treatment of the fatigue of old age.

Miss Chadwick's translation makes the book an English essay on morbid tiredness and its treatment that is excellently suited to the layman, and not without value to the medical profession.

M. D. Eder.



# BULLETIN OF THE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL ASSOCIATION

EDITED BY

ANNA FREUD, GENERAL SECRETARY

## ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE

### I

It was decided at the Eleventh International Psycho-Analytical Congress at Oxford that the next Congress should be held in Switzerland. The Central Executive has selected Interlaken as the place of meeting, after consultation with the Council of the Swiss Society, and with the approval of the branch societies; and has chosen the date September 7-10, 1931, having special regard to the Conference of the International Neurological Society, which takes place in Berne immediately before this date. It is requested that members of the several societies of the International Psycho-Analytical Association should give notice of papers to their President as early as possible, in no case later than April 1; and that they should at the same time furnish him with a brief abstract of the projected paper. Further information with regard to the Congress will be circulated to the Councils of the branch societies.

### II

A Psycho-Analytical Society, the Nippon Seishin-Bunski Gakukai (Japanese Psycho-Analytical Society), was formed in Tokio during the spring of the year 1930. It represents the first-fruits of the labours of a group, led by Mr. Y. K. Yabe, which is earnestly devoted to the study of psycho-analysis. Physicians, psychologists and authors are represented in the Society. The list of members is as follows:

Asaba, Takeichi, M.D.

Mawatari, Kazue, M.D.

Nagata, Nideo, dramatist.

Otsuki, Kenji, graduate of Waseda University.

Tsuskima, Kwanji, M.D. (*Secretary*).

Yabe, Yae-Kichi, A.B. (*President*).

They have already translated a series of Freud's writings into Japanese, and have shewn much energy in organizing courses of lectures, and in making systematic instruction in psycho-analysis available for students. The Central Executive has provisionally affiliated the Society, at the request of its president, Mr. Yabe, and the next Congress will have finally to admit the new Society, in accordance with the statutes of the I.P.A. The Berlin and London Societies have already had much pleasure in making Mr. Yabe's acquaintance during his recent prolonged visit to Europe.

M. Eitingon.







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